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PLAYING DOCTOR: CORPORATE MEDICAL PRACTICE
AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
E. Haavi Morreim*
Although health plans once existed mainly to ensure that patients could pay for
care, in recent years managed care organizations (MCOs) have attempted to limit
expenditures by exercising significant influence over the kinds and levels of care
provided. Some commentators argue that such influence constitutes the practice of
medicine, and should subject MCOs to the same medical malpractice torts tradi-
tionally brought against physicians. Others hold that MCOs engage only in
contract interpretation, and do not literally practice medicine.
This Article begins by arguing that traditional common law doctrines governing
corporate practice of medicine do not precisely apply to the current situation be-
cause, whereas the traditional focus is on whether the corporation employs the
physician, in the current setting corporations use many devices, not just employ-
ment, to influence medical care. Because an employment relationship is not the
central question in determining whether an MCO is practicing medicine, a better
definition is needed of what it is for a corporation (or a physician) to practice
medicine. This definition will show that MCOs can and sometimes must practice
medicine, thus opening the need to explore what sort of liability they should incur
when they practice negligently.
Toward answering that question, the Article argues that the proper scope of medi-
cal malpractice and other tort liability for MCOs can only be discerned after it is
determined what duty of care MCOs owe their subscribers. This question, in turn,
should be guided by a focus on how to deliver good health care rather than by de-
ciding, ex ante, whom we wish to hold liable when care has gone badly. In the
quest to discern which tasks are best done by MCOs and which are best done by
physicians, a reasonable division of labor between MCOs and physicians will be
proposed. This division of labor acknowledges that MCOs must sometimes practice
medicine, but will also show that MCOs currently practice medicine more than
they should, primarily because contractual reliance on the concept of "medical ne-
cessity" requires them to practice medicine virtually every time they make a benefits
determination. For a variety of reasons, the concept of "medical necessity" should
be dropped entirely from health plan contracts. Finally, where MCOs do practice
medicine, they should be subject to classic medical malpractice liability of the same
sort to which physicians are subject. Applying these reforms in the context of corpo-
rate practice, however, requires some special analysis.
* Professor, College of Medicine, University of Tennessee, Memphis. B.A. 1972, St.
Olaf College; Ph.D. 1980, University of Virginia. The author acknowledges, with deep grati-
tude, the very helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this manuscript by Peter
Jacobson, William Sage, Susan Wolf, Edward Richards, Larry Palmer, RobertJerry II, Charles
Key, David Hyman, and Lance Stell.
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Observers critical of "managed care"' contend that, whereas
health plans formerly existed simply to ensure their members' fi-
nancial access to health care, many plans now exercise a heavy
hand over-they "manage"-the medical content of that care.
Through utilization management, practice guidelines, physician
profiling, and other tools,2 managed care organizations (MCOs)
sometimes suggest approaches to patient care that differ substan-
tially from the physician's intended plan of care. Resentment on
the part of many physicians and patients has prompted allegations
that MCOs are now actively practicing medicine, and should be
held liable in tort when their intrusions on clinical care amount to
medical malpractice.
Other observers, concerned about uncontrolled escalation of
health care costs, conversely argue that MCOs can and must limit
their coverage. On this view, a contract interpretation or utilization
review determining that a particular intervention is not covered is
not a medical decision; it is simply a conclusion that the plan is not
obligated to provide or pay for a particular intervention. Physicians
and patients are still free to do as they choose because the plan has
not dictated their decisions, only its own financial involvement.
1. In this Article, "managed care" will refer to any health plan that serves not only to
finance patients' access to health care, but also to "manage" the care by determining (at
least in some instances) that certain types of care will be preferred over others, on medical
or economic. grounds or both. Managed care organizations (MCOs) thus range from the
most traditional kinds of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that have their own
medical staffs, clinics, and hospital facilities, to managed indemnity insurers that scrutinize
care prospectively and concurrently, even as they reimburse on a (usually discounted) fee-
for-service basis. In this sense, the managed health plan is involved in providing as well as
financing the care. It is in the context of providing, monitoring, and supervising care that
allegations about corporate practice of medicine arise. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 89.001(8) (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and
Consumer Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1009 (1996).
2. These tools include three types of review for health care expenditures. In retro-
spective review a payor (or an independent reviewer with which it has contracted) decides,
after care has been rendered, whether it will reimbui~e providers. In concurrent review, the
health plan or review entity contacts physicians caring for its hospitalized members on a
frequent basis, to ensure that the patient does not remain in the hospital longer than neces-
sary and receives appropriate kinds and levels of care. In prospective review, physicians are
expected to obtain the health plan's pre-certification to ensure payment for contemplated
hospitalizations, surgeries, or other costly interventions. See E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING
ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 34-35 (1995) [hereinafter
MoRREiM, BALANCING ACT].
In physician profiling, the health plan tracks which physicians utilize what levels of re-
sources, sometimes disseminating the information to its medical staff in an attempt to
encourage more cost-conscious care. In other cases, the profiles may be used to "deselect"
(fire) a physician from the health plan's physician staff. SeeJerome P. Kassirer, The Use and
Abuse of Practice Profiles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 634, 634 (1994); Susanne Salem-Schatz et al.,




The issues are becoming contentious as patients increasingly al-
lege that denials of resources cause adverse outcomes that could
otherwise have been avoided. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,s
for instance, an MCO's denial of hospitalization, and substitution
of limited home nursing services for a woman in a high-risk preg-
nancy, allegedly caused the death of her child. In Wickline v. State,4
physicians for a woman experiencing complications after vascular
surgery requested eight extra days of hospitalization. When utiliza-
tion reviewers determined that only four days were needed and her
physicians then discharged her early, the patient suffered compli-
cations and eventual leg amputation. In other cases, health plans
or their utilization reviewers determined that patients hospitalized
for suicidal ideation did not require further inpatient care, where-
upon the patients were discharged from the hospital and
subsequently committed suicide.5
This Article focuses on two questions: whether MCOs6 as corpo-
rations literally practice medicine when they engage in activities
such as close utilization management and, if they do practice
medicine, whether they should be subject to classic medical mal-
practice liability of the same sort to which physicians are subject.
Briefly, this Article will show the following:
traditional common law doctrines governing corporate
practice do not precisely apply to the current situation
because, whereas the traditional focus is on whether the
corporation employs the physician, in the current setting
3. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the patient's care was within the stan-
dard of care, and that the state's Medicaid utilization review program was not the proximate
cause of the patient's post-surgical complications).
4. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the patient's treatment was within
the standard of care, and that the state's utilization review program was not the proximate
cause of the patient's post-surgical complications).
5. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Moscovitch
v. Danbury Hosp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Conn. 1998); Huss v. Green Spring Health Serv.,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Del. 1998); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49
(D. Mass. 1997); Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990); Muse v. Charter
Hosp., 452 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. Ct. App.), affd, 464 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1995). Some cases concern
the denial of mental health benefits, even though the patient did not commit suicide. See,
e.g., Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999); Brandon v. Aetna Serv., Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 110 (D. Conn. 1999); Hughes v. Blue Cross, 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1988); see
also Leigh Page, Patient Death Prompts First Use of Texas' New HMO Law, AMERICAN MED.
NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at 38.
6. "MCO" in this context covers a range of health plan entities, from indemnity in-
surers that review and sometimes deny reimbursement for health services, to classic health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) that more directly provide care through a panel of
physicians, hospitals, home health agencies, and other providers.
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corporations use many devices, not just employment, to
influence medical care;
because an employment relationship is no longer the
central question in determining whether an MCO is
practicing medicine, a new definition is needed of what
it is for a corporation (or a physician) to practice medi-
cine;
this new definition will show that MCOs can and some-
times must practice medicine, thus opening the need to
explore what sort of liability they should incur when they
practice negligently;
the proper scope of medical malpractice and other tort
liability for MCOs can only be discerned after it is de-
termined what duty of care MCOs owe their subscribers;
this question, in turn, should be guided by a focus on
how to deliver good health care rather than by deciding
ex ante whom we wish to hold liable when care has been
poor;
in the quest to discern which tasks are best done by
MCOs and which are best done by physicians toward the
goal of good care, a reasonable division of labor between
MCOs and physicians will be proposed;
although the division of labor acknowledges that MCOs
must sometimes practice medicine, it will also be shown
that MCOs currently practice medicine more than they
should, primarily because contractual reliance on the
concept of "medical necessity" requires them to practice
medicine virtually every time they make a benefits de-
termination;
" for a variety of reasons, the concept of "medical neces-
sity" should be dropped entirely from health plan
contracts;
* where MCOs have practiced medicine, they should be
subject to classic medical malpractice liability of the same
sort to which physicians are subject; and
assignment of medical malpractice liability to MCOs re-
quires the usual tort elements regarding duty of care,
injury, and causality, albeit with a few interesting twists.
Accordingly, Part I briefly reviews the history of the corporate
practice doctrine-the 1930s common law tradition prohibiting
[VOL. 32:4
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corporations from practicing medicine. The original doctrine pro-
scribes corporations from hiring physicians as employees because
such arrangements could divide physicians' loyalty and permit
laymen to substitute their own judgment for physicians' profes-
sional expertise. Although the ban is anachronistic in many
respects, the issues on which it was based are more lively today than
ever. MCOs need not literally employ physicians in order to exer-
cise considerable influence over medical care via a wide array of
controls and incentives.
Part II inquires whether and in what sense MCOs ever literally
practice medicine. Denial of payment or of care can significantly
affect treatment decisions and thereby medical outcomes; but this
does not, of itself, make the denial an instance of practicing medi-
cine. Rather, an analysis of "practicing medicine" will point to two
elements: making medical judgments, and using those judgments
in ways that significantly influence patients' care and outcomes.
Under these criteria MCOs do, and sometimes must, practice
medicine.
Part III opens the question of legal accountability for such cor-
porate medical practice. Corporations such as MCOs already face
two basic kinds of tort liability for alleged deficiencies in quality of
care: direct corporate liability for issues such as staff credentialing,
and indirect liability for the actions of the MCO's employees or
ostensible agents. Neither encompasses classic medical malpractice
(practicing medicine below the standard of care) because neither
envisions that MCOs are literally practicing medicine. Part III be-
gins to explore the challenges of MCO liability in the context of
this nouveau-corporate medical practice. Before a proper under-
standing of MCO liability can be developed, it is important to
explore two proffered responses to the issue and the reasons why
they do not work. The first would update the old corporate prac-
tice doctrine by forbidding MCOs from engaging in any medical
practice, while the second would update old enterprise liability
concepts by holding MCOs liable for everything. As the flaws in
these approaches are explored, it will become evident that both
assume the wrong starting point. Rather than beginning with the
question, "whom do we wish to hold liable" when untoward out-
comes result from cost constraints, the initial focus should instead
be on promoting high-quality health care that is less likely to pro-
duce untoward outcomes in the first place. At that point, the
proper first question is "who should control what" in the delivery of
7. More generally, the doctrine applies to all lay entities, not just to corporations, and
the prohibition affects other professions, including law and dentistry.
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health care. Only when it is clear who should do which jobs toward
the .goal of good care is it possible to assign liability for doing a
poor job.
Accordingly, Part IV proposes a rough "division of labor" be-
tween physicians and MCOs. On the one hand, ample room for
physicians' clinical discretion is imperative for high-quality care.
MCOs' routine guidelines are not always medically well-founded,
and even the best guides do not fit every patient. Reciprocally, un-
fettered physician practices do not always serve patients well, as
numerous studies are beginning to show. This Part argues that
MCOs have an important role to play in ensuring quality of care,
particularly by identifying, promoting, and monitoring for patterns
of care.
Part V begins to address the second central issue of this Article:
whether health plans should be held liable for medical malprac-
tice. The answer is yes, but those occasions should be relatively
uncommon because, although Part IV concludes that sometimes it
is both appropriate and inevitable for MCOs to practice medicine,
Part V argues that such practice should be far less common than is
presently the case. Because the concept of "medical necessity"
serves as the cornerstone of most health care contracts, MCOs
must routinely make medical judgments in order to make their
benefits determinations. As a result, they routinely practice medi-
cine. For a variety of reasons reviewed in Part V, the notion of
"medical necessity" should be discarded in favor of a much more
explicit specification of the type of care that the enrollee will re-
ceive for particular indications in a given plan-guidelines-based
contracting. MCOs would still unavoidably practice medicine in
certain instances, but only where guidelines are insufficiently spe-
cific or are medically inappropriate for a particular patient. Thus,
as they reduce the extent to which they practice medicine, MCOs'
exposure to malpractice liability would diminish markedly.
Finally, Part VI looks at several issues that must be considered if
malpractice liability is to be directly ascribed to MCOs.
I. CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE:
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Although the doctrine banning corporate practice of medicine
is largely a common law phenomenon arising during the 1930s, its
[VOL. 32:4
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roots go back earlier." Around the turn of the century, when allo-
pathic physicians were competing with myriad other healers, newly
enacted licensing laws required physicians to complete prescribed
learning, pass examinations, and demonstrate the good character
expected of a professional. Thereafter, quality of care rose and
competition diminished. During the early part of the century,
however, two new kinds of practice arrangements, contract practice
and corporate practice, won the condemnation of the American
Medical Association because they seemed to bode a diminution of
physicians' growing stature and a retreat to the previous chaos.
In contract practice, corporations such as lumber and mining
companies hired physicians to care for their employees, particu-
larly in places like the Pacific Northwest, where physicians were not
abundant. Although it ensured better access to care, it also limited
patients' choice of physicians and meant that the corporation,
rather than the physician, might decide how many patients would
be seen.
In corporate practice, corporations marketed professional services
(ranging from medicine and law to optometry and dentistry) to the
public under their own brand name. Corporate practice was
deemed particularly offensive, with images (and sometimes the re-
ality) of crass commercialism. Courts ruling on these arrangements
during the 1930s identified several potential hazards as they
pointed to licensure laws and held that only licensed individuals,
not corporations, can practice medicine, optometry, dentistry, law,
or other professions.9 For present purposes, two of those hazards
seem most pertinent.
8. For more detailed discussions of the history of the corporate practice doctrine, see
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); Jeffrey F.
Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health
Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REv. 445 (1987);Jerry P. Clousson & Joseph T. Butz, A New Look
for the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 29 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 174 (1996); Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Prohibi-
tion: A Dinosaur Awaiting Extinction, 27 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 369 (1994); Mark A. Hall,
Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containmen 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 431, 509-18 (1988); Lisa Rediger Hayward, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REV. 403 (1996); Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason,
Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 11-12
(1996); Sara Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 241
(1997); Judith Parker, Corporate Practice of Medicine: Last Stand or Final Downfall?, 29 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 160 (1996); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the
Corporate Practice Doctrine, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 485 (1987).
9. Concerns are listed by various commentators:
First, physician employment by corporadions controlled by lay persons arguably may
reduce physician autonomy over medical judgments. Second, employed physicians
may experience a sense of divided loyalty between their profit-seeking employer and
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First, where physicians are employees, courts feared that laymen
with no particular knowledge of medicine could dictate how many
patients the physician would see, which treatments he could use,
and other matters that courts believed should be left to a physi-
cian's professional discretion.'0 After all, the defining criterion of
their treatment-seeking patients. Finally, public policy arguments have been raised to
attack the commercialization of the medical profession. Critics of commercialization
within the health care arena are concerned that investors in for-profit medical enti-
ties that employ physicians will exert too much pressure on their physician-employees
to promote the sale of professional services in order to obtain large profits. This may
create pressure on employed physicians to place a greater emphasis on profitability
over quality of patient care.
Mars, supra note 8, at 249 (footnotes omitted). These concerns reflect the difficulty of estab-
lishing a relationship of personal confidence and trust between a patient and a corporation,
and a diminution of trust between physicians and patients; an undue focus on profit by the
corporation; a diminution of the medical profession's status, income, and control; crass
commercialization of professional services; and potential emergence of fee-splitting. See
Dowell, supra note 8, at 369; Hayward, supra note 8, at 406-07; Parker, supra note 8, at 161.
Leading cases include Semler v. Dental Examiner, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (deciding that states
may use police power to forbid certain types of dental advertising to protect the community
from deception even if practices advertised are legitimate); Bartron v. Codington County, 2
N.W.2d 337 (S.D. 1942) (finding legislature may exercise its police power to prohibit corpo-
rations from supplying licensed physician services for profit); People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82
P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938) (citing "evils of divided loyalty and impaired confidence"); Parker
v. Board of Dental Examiners, 14 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932); People v. Merchants'Protective Corp., 209 P.
363 (Cal. 1922); People v. United Medical Service, 200 N.E. 157 (Ill. 1936); Dr. Allison, Dentist v.
Allison, 196 N.E. 799 (Ill. 1935); Bennett v. Indiana State Board, 7 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. 1937); State
v. Bailey Dental Co., 234 N.W. 260 (Iowa 1931), and Teseschi v. Mathis, 183 A.2d 146 (N.J.
1936).
10. In Bennett v. Indiana State Board, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that
[t]he relationship between the licensed optometrist and his unlicensed employer is
that of master and servant. The master is in a position where he may dictate to his
servant the manner of conducting his business, the kind and nature of the goods to
be sold and furnished to the patient, in order to procure the most favorable financial
gain to the employer. And this may be done without regard to the public health,
since the employer is a non-resident and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state, and not licensed.
7 N.E.2d at 981. Similarly, the South Dakota Supreme Court argued that, where a stock-
holder company hires physicians:
[t]he object of such a company would be to produce an earning on its fixed capital.
Its trade commodity would be the professional services of its employees. Constant
pressure would be exerted by the investor to promote such a volume of sales of that
commodity as would produce an ever increasing return on his investment. To pro-
mote such sales it is to be presumed that the layman would apply the methods and
practices in which he had been schooled in the market place. The end result seems
inevitable to us, viz., undue emphasis on mere money making, and commercial ex-
ploitation of professional services.... Such an ethical, trustworthy and unselfish




an employment relationship, as distinct from an independent con-
tractor relationship, is the level of control that the employer can
exert over the employee. One court explained:
[t]he test of the relationship is the right to control. It is not
the fact of actual interference with the control, but the right
to interfere that makes the difference between an independ-
ent contractor and a servant or agent.... An independent
contractor has been said to be "one who, exercising an inde-
pendent employment, contracts to do a piece of work
according to his own methods and without being subject to
the control of his employer, except as to the result of his
work."
Second, the employment relationship was seen to divide the
physician's loyalties. Instead of owing fealty exclusively to his pa-
tients' best interests, the employee-physician would also have duties
to promote the best interests of his corporate master.
12
Codington County, 2 N.W.2d at 346; see also Holden v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 678 N.E.2d
342, 347 (Il. App. Ct. 1997); Dowell, supra note 8, at 369 (explaining rational for the corpo-
rate practice prohibition); Hall, supra note 8, at 514 (presenting similar policy arguments);
Mars, supra note 8, at 249 (noting various public policy concerns regarding the corporate
practice of medicine); Parker, supra note 8, at 161 (listing public policy arguments expand-
ing the prohibition against corporate practice of medicine).
11. Daw's Critical Care v. Department of Labor, 622 A.2d 622, 631 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1992) (citations omitted) (deciding that provider of temporary nurses to medical facilities
was not required to pay unemployment compensation tax). Furthermore, the Georgia Court
of Appeals has stated that the nature of the employment relationship turns on control:
"The true test of whether the relationship is one of employer-employee or employer-
independent contractor is whether the employer, under the contract either oral or
written, assumes the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the
work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in con-
formity to the contract."... Where a " 'hospital reserve(s) no right to control specific
medical techniques employed by the ... doctors, but merely exercise(s) a limited
surveillance in order to monitor the quality of medical care provided,' these controls
are not inconsistent with an employer-independent contractor relationship."
Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys. v. Kohout, 504 S.E.2d 514, 525 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) (citations omitted).
Control is "the cornerstone of the master-servant relationship." William A. Chittenden III,
Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451,
454 (1991).
12. See Holden, 678 N.E.2d at 347; Dr. Allison, 196 N.E. at 799 (employees of a corpora-
tion owe their first allegiance to the corporation, and second to the patient).
In a case involving corporate practice of law, the New York Court of Appeals held that
[t]he relation of attorney and client.., involves the highest trust and confidence. It
cannot... exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it,
and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of the
Playing Doctor
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Since the 1930s, explicit exceptions to the ban on corporate
practice have been numerous. 13 In many states, whatever is left of
the doctrine is simply ignored, 14 although a few states still enforce
their corporate practice bans.5 In the current market, however,
corporation, and not to the directions of the client. There would be neither contract
nor privity between him and the client, and he would not owe even the duty of coun-
sel to the actual litigant. The corporation would control the litigation, the money
earned would belong to the corporation, and the attorney would be responsible to
the corporation only. His master would not be the client but the corporation, con-
ducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make money and not to aid in
the administration of justice which is the highest function of an attorney and coun-
selor at law. The corporation might not have a lawyer among its stockholders,
directors, or officers. Its members might be without character, learning or standing.
There would be no remedy by attachment or disbarment to protect the public from
imposition or fraud, no stimulus to good conduct from the traditions of an ancient
and honorable profession, and no guide except the sordid purpose to earn money
for stockholders.
In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910); see also Mars, supra note 8, at 249.
13. Many states permit employment of physicians by HMOs, hospitals, teaching institu-
tions, industrial organizations, professional corporations run by physicians, and selected
other entities. See Los Angeles County v. Ford, 263 P.2d 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (finding
that contracts between county board of supervisors and medical schools, where medical
schools provided services in county hospitals, did not constitute unlawful corporate practice
of medicine); Hayward, supra note 8, at 410; Mars, supra note 8, at 252; Parker, supra note 8,
at 161; Rossoff, supra note 8, at 497.
14. See Hayward, supra note 8, at 413; Rosoff, supra note 8, at 497.
15. Some courts have recently struck down arrangements featuring physicians as em-
ployees. In Conrad v. Medical Board, the California Court of Appeals struck down a hospital
district's effort to hire physicians, citing the corporate practice ban. "The doctrine is in-
tended to ameliorate 'the evils of divided loyalty and impaired confidence' which are
thought to be created when a corporation solicits medical business from the general public
and turns it over to a special group of doctors, who are thus under lay control." 55 Cal. Rptr.
2d 901, 903 (Ct. App. 1996). In this case, employment agreements would have required the
physician-employees
to meet targets of 4,600 patient encounters per year. If the physician does not meet
the target, and if 45 percent of the fees generated by the physician are less than his or
her base salary, then the employment contract will not be extended. The employ-
ment contract also provides for an incentive fund which represents additional
compensation which the physician may receive from the surplus funds remaining af-
ter the employee-physicians' base salaries are deducted from a certain percentage of
the collections made by the hospital's adult medicine division, the physicians' em-
ployer.
Id. at 905. In Morelli v. Ehsan, 756 P.2d 129 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), a Washington state
court found a partnership featuring a physician, nurse, and business manager to have been
an illegal, unenforceable arrangement. Similarly, a Texas appeals court invalidated a part-
nership between a physician and two non-physicians for operating a hospital emergency
department. See Flynn Bros., Inc. v. First Med. Assocs., 715 S.W.2d 782 (Tx. App. 1986); see
also Garcia v. Texas State Bd., 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
Other cases invoke the ban in ways not anticipated in the 1930s. For instance, in two Illi-
nois cases where employee-physicians left employment with a clinic or hospital and
established a nearby independent practice site, lower courts refused to penalize their viola-
[VOL. 32:4
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two things seem obvious. First, early courts' concerns about lay in-
terference in clinical practice, and about division of physicians'
loyalties, are as vital today as ever. Medical ethics literature is filled
with commentators' worries about both. 16 Second, earlier courts'
specific focus on employment as the keystone of concern is now an
anachronism. MCOs do not need to employ a physician in order to
tion of noncompete clauses in the original employment contract. Citing the corporate prac-
tice ban, these courts held that the employment contracts were void and unenforceable in
the first place, thus excusing physicians from violating the noncompete clauses. See Berlin v.
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 688 N.E.2d
106 (Ill. 1997). In Holden v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, an Illinois appellate court similarly
upheld the traditional ban on corporate practice on grounds of stare decisis, while disagree-
ing with its content:
Indeed, the health maintenance organization (HMO) structure embodies many of
the characteristics the corporate-practice-of-medicine doctrine was contrived to
eradicate. For example, HMO management encourages physicians not to order ex-
pensive tests for patients that management deems to be of marginal diagnostic value.
Indeed, the idea of an HMO is to contain medical costs while providing basic medical
care to as many people as possible. Further, HMOs may solicit patients, thereby un-
dermining the commercialism justification of the corporate-practice rule. Finally,
inherent in the HMO design is the risk that a physician's loyalty will be divided
between the employer and patient, which is the same risk that the corporate-practice-
of-medicine doctrine seeks to protect against. Therefore, because the policy reasons
that initiated the implementation of the corporate-practice-of-medicine doctrine have
already been managed through the implementation of HMO organizations, these
public policy concerns... appear to be not reason enough to continue to prohibit
hospitals from employing physicians.
678 N.E.2d 342, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also Early Detection Ctr., Inc. v. Wilson, 811 P.2d
860 (Kan. 1991); Clousson & Butz, supra note 8, at 174; Hayward, supra note 8, at 414-16.
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Berlin decision, holding that hospi-
tals, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, must be exempt from corporate practice
prohibitions, because they too are licensed and their physician staffs are largely in control of
quality of care. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 113-14 (Ill.
1997); see also Holden v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 692 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(revising earlier Holden decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Berlin); St. Fran-
cis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 618 (Kan. 1994) (concluding that no prohibition
exists preventing a licensed hospital from contracting for the services of a physician).
16. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA
330, 330-35 (1995); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Rela-
tionship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 323-30 (1995); Jerome P. Kassirer, Is
Managed Care Here to Stay?, 336 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1013, 1013-14 (1997);Jerome P. Kassirer,
Managed Care and the Morality of the Marketplace, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 50 (1995); Steven D.
Pearson et al., Ethical Guidelines for Physician Compensation Based on Capitation, 339 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 689, 689-93 (1998); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medi-
cal Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 23-45 (1986); Arnold S. Relman,
Medical Insurance and Health: What About Managed Care?, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 471, 471-72
(1994); Arnold S. Relman, Medical Practice Under the Clinton Reforms-Avoiding Domination by
Business, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1574, 1574-76 (1993); Arnold S. Relman, Shattuck Lecture-
The Health Care Industry: Where Is It Taking Us', 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 854, 854-59 (1991);
Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate Proposition for
Physicians, 333 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1706, 1706-07 (1995).
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control him. They can exercise enormous influence-some would
say control' 7-over medical judgments simply by deciding what
they will and will not provide or pay for, particularly when they in-
form providers and patients in advance about their plans to deny
coverage. Care has grown so costly that without assurance of fund-
ing, many providers will refuse to offer treatments and many
patients will decline to seek them.
Accordingly, the questions concerning corporate practice of
medicine have evolved. Instead of asking whether corporations
should be permitted to employ physicians, we must now examine
the "nouveau-corporate practice," and inquire whether health
plans' broader panoply of economic controls, shy of actual em-
ployment, constitutes the practice of medicine; to what extent any
such practice of medicine is (un)desirable; and whether MCOs
should be, literally, directly liable for classic medical malpractice
when they practice medicine.
II. DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
A. Defining the Argument
Two opposing camps define the argument. On the one hand,
physicians and other commentators have pointed out that MCOs'
economic judgments have an enormous impact on the care that
patients receive. When an MCO undertakes close utilization man-
agement (UM), it tells the physician, or even the patient, precisely
which interventions it will and will not cover-right down to par-
ticular tests and treatments such as drug choices. The reasons
underlying coverage decisions are intense, often intrusive, matters
of medical diagnosis and treatment. On this view, such detailed
second-guessing of clinical decisions is clearly a form of medical
practice and, where MCOs thereby change or significantly influ-
ence the patient's course of care, these commentators conclude
that the health plan is practicing medicine.
17. See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts:
Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985, 1062 (1998) ("As
an empirical matter, MCOs exert control over physicians. Indeed, control is their raison
d'itre. This control is used to influence physicians' decision making away from the over-
utilization of services that fee-for-service medicine encouraged. Most of the techniques




For example, in Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners,8 a physi-
cian engaging in utilization review' 9 on behalf of an MCO denied
authorization for gallbladder surgery by pointing to the patient's
prior history of irritable bowel syndrome, her normal laboratory
blood values, and the absence of evidence of stones on ultrasound
examination. In this case the patient did not actually suffer an in-
jury, because she received the surgery and eventually also the
reimbursement when the surgery revealed she did have gallstones.
The initial denial of payment was, however, sufficient to carry the
suit forward.
The state's Board of Medical Examiners (BOMEX) noted that in
cases like this, UR physicians' "decisions could adversely affect the
health of a patient 20 and concluded that because this UR physician
had indeed practiced medicine, the Board had jurisdiction over
the quality of his practice. The Arizona appellate court agreed:
Although Dr. Murphy is not engaged in the traditional prac-
tice of medicine, to the extent that he renders medical
decisions his conduct is reviewable by BOMEX. Here, Dr.
Murphy evaluated information provided by both the patient's
primary physician and her surgeon. He disagreed with their
decision that gallbladder surgery would alleviate her ongoing
symptoms. [The patient's] doctors diagnosed a medical con-
dition and proposed a non-experimental course of treatment.
Dr. Murphy substituted his medical judgment for theirs and
determined that the surgery was "not medically necessary."
There is no other way to characterize Dr. Murphy's decision:
it was a "medical" decision.'
18. 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
19. "Utilization review" (UR) and "utilization management" (UM) are nearly, though
not exactly, interchangeable terms. UR is the narrower concept, usually applied to a health
plan's decisions about which interventions it will cover for which patients. Such review can
be retrospective, prospective, or concurrent. See supra note 2; see alsoJ. Scott Andresen, Is
Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine? Implications for Managed Care Administrators, 19 J.
LEGAL MED. 431, 433-35 (1998). UM is a broader concept, encompassing UR and addition-
ally some other tactics by which an MCO might try to limit or guide utilization. Disease
management programs, for instance, typically focus on chronic ailments such as asthma,
diabetes, or congestive heart failure, and attempt to help patients to maximize their control
over their disease through careful adherence to medication and lifestyle regimens. See Tho-
mas Bodenheimer, Disease Management-Promises and Pitfalls, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202,
1202 (1999); Robert S. Epstein & Louis M. Sherwood, From Outcomes Research to Disease Man-
agement: A Guide for the Perplexed, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 832, 835-36 (1996);John M.
Harris, Jr., Disease Management: New Wine in New Bottles?, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 838,
840 (1996).
20. Murphy, 949 P.2d at 535.
21. Id. at 536. The court continued:
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Similarly, in Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, the
District of Columbia Board of Medicine concluded that a physician
employed as medical director for a Blue Cross plan practiced
medicine in his utilization review capacities. His actions could rea-
sonably be expected:
"to influence the course of treatment of individual patients
and, hence, to 'treat' them within the meaning of the
Act."... Although he "may not have treated or diagnosed pa-
tients directly, he had a considerable influence"-a
"substantial impact"-"on the treatment of patients insured by
Blue Cross," since "if health insurance is not available, a pro-
cedure very well might not be performed. ,
2 3
In this case, however, the appellate court disagreed with the Board
on the ground that the defendant merely organized the physicians
who performed the UR, did not have a vote, and did not on any
occasion ask the committee to reconsider a decision.24S 25
In Hand v. Tavera, the plaintiff had gone to the emergency
room (ER) with a three-day headache and a history of significant
hypertension. The ER physician observed him for three hours and,
noting that Hand's symptoms rose and fell with his blood pressure,
Dr. Murphy is not a provider of insurance. Instead, Dr. Murphy is an employee who
makes medical decisions for his employer on whether surgeries or other non-
experimental procedures are medically necessary. Such decisions are not insurance
decisions but rather medical decisions because they require Dr. Murphy to determine
whether the procedure is "appropriate for the symptoms and diagnosis of the
[c]ondition," whether it is to be "provided for the diagnosis," care or treatment, and
whether it is "in accordance with standards of good medical practice in Arizona."
Id. A somewhat related case, Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., 957 P.2d 823
(Wyo. 1998), features a patient with chronic back problems who had been scheduled for
surgery. The procedure, however, was cancelled when his health plan's utilization reviewer
denied financial pre-authorization, suggesting steroid injections as a more appropriate ap-
proach. When the anesthesiologist whom the patient then asked to provide the steroid
therapy refused on the ground that it would present risks with little prospect of benefit, UR
suggested physical therapy. When magnetic resonance imaging showed a large herniated
disk, a consulting neurosurgeon favored surgery over physical therapy. Although this litiga-
tion did not directly allege that the health plan had committed malpractice, the Wyoming
Supreme Court noted that "[a]s described above, other courts have recognized that utiliza-
tion review is medical decision-making, and a plan administrator that involves itself in a
medical decision that amounts to a denial of treatment is making a medical decision." Id. at
828.
22. 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997).
23. Id. at 367.
24. See id. at 367-68.
25. 864 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1993).
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concluded that he needed to be admitted to the hospital. Despite
the ER physician's judgment, Dr. Tavera, the physician responsible
for authorizing admissions for Hand's HMO, determined that the
patient could be treated on an outpatient basis. Hand went home
and suffered a fatal stroke several hours later. Initially the defen-
dant prevailed on the ground that no physician-patient
relationship existed, hence no duty of care. The decision was re-
versed on appeal. "We hold that when the health-care plan's
insured shows up at a participating hospital emergency room, and
the plan's doctor on call is consulted about treatment or admis-
sion, there is a physician-patient relationship between the doctor
and the insured. 2 6 Without saying it in so many words, the court
clearly felt that Dr. Tavera was practicing medicine, not making
merely contractual coverage decisions.
On the other hand, MCOs generally insist that they do not prac-
tice medicine. Even when they engage in very detailed UM, they
generally argue that they are simply interpreting contracts and
making coverage decisions. Physicians and other providers re-
main free to treat patients as they wish, even when the plan
211declines to finance their care.
A California appellate court echoed the theme: "the physician
who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a
third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise,
26. Id. at 679. The court also noted that:
the contracts... show that the Humana plan brought Hand and Tavera togetherjust
as surely as though they had met directly and entered the physician-patient relation-
ship.... In effect, Hand had paid in advance for the services of the Humana plan
doctor on duty that night, who happened to be Tavera, and the physician-patient re-
lationship existed.
Id.
27. See Ken Ortolon, Coming in First, TEX. MED., July 1997, at 26, 27.
28. As noted by the Ohio attorney general:
It is sometimes stated that, if a health insuring corporation refuses to certify a health
care service, the patient will be unable to obtain the service in question, even though
his personal physician recommends it. It should be noted, however, that an adverse
determination by a health insuring corporation means that the health insuring cor-
poration will not pay for, reimburse, provide, deliver, arrange for, or otherwise make
available the service in question.... It does not mean that the physician is precluded
from providing the service or that the patient is precluded from obtaining the service
from another source or through other means.... A physician or other provider re-
tains authority to provide whatever services are deemed appropriate for the patient,
even if the services are not included under the plan of the health insuring corpora-
tion.
Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-044 (Aug. 31, 1999).
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cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care.,29
The plaintiffs physician was "not paralyzed .... nor rendered
powerless to act appropriately if other action was required under
the circumstances.
3 0
States' licensing and practice acts seem to support this general
approach. Typically, to practice medicine is to "'diagnose, treat,
operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity
or physical condition.' 01 Clearly, an MCO cannot physically exam-
29. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986).
30. Id. at 819. In Adnan Varol, M.D. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D.
Mich. 1989), a group of psychiatrists sued a health plan on grounds that its utilization review
decisions interfered with their medical practices and constituted the unauthorized practice
of medicine. The court rejected the argument, pointing out that the plan's decisions about
medical necessity are no more the practice of medicine when undertaken prospectively than
when undertaken in the traditional retrospective mode. See id. at 833.
In Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1975), a physician organization alleged that federal regulations mandating utilization review
had a chilling effect on medical practice. The district court disagreed, holding that there is
no interference so long as the criteria acknowledge that a range of treatments and methods
can be consistent with professionally accepted patterns of care. See id. at 135.
Other commentators note:
Coverage disputes are most appropriately viewed as an insurance-purchasing decision
by a pool of subscribers, not a medical-treatment decision by an individual patient.
The denial of coverage does not prevent the doctor from rendering care; it merely
determines that, in the insurer's judgment, the subscriber pool has chosen not to pay
for the particular treatment. Thus, where the parties leave the scope of coverage un-
defined, a particular case is rationally decided by asking only what range of treatment
options the purchasers would have chosen to insure at the time they signed up, not
what treatment they want to receive now that the insurance has been paid and their
illness is manifest.
Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 1637, 1676-77 (1992).
31. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 616 (Kan. 1994). Similarly, one
of the early corporate practice cases notes that practice is
the diagnosis and treatment of ailments of human beings; the prescription of a form
of treatment for the palliation of physical ailments of persons with the intention of
receiving compensation therefor; and the maintenance of an office for the examina-
tion and treatment of persons afflicted or supposed to be afflicted by any ailment.
People v. United Med. Serv., 200 N.E. 157, 163 (Ill. 1936); see also Bartron v. Codington
County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 341 (S.D. 1942) (quoting a 1919 statute defining the practice of
medicine as to "'recommend, prescribe or direct for the use of any person any drug, medi-
cine, apparatus or other agency for the cure, relief or palliation of any ailment or disease of
the mind or body, or for the cure or relief of any wound, fracture or bodily injury or deform-
ity, after having received or with the intent of receiving therefor, either directly or indirectly,
any ... compensation .... ).
In the state of Washington, practicing medicine includes activities such as diagnosing, ad-
vising, prescribing, curing, or administering drugs. See WASH. REv. CODE § 18.71.011 (1999).
In Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 701 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1997), the court
noted that the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act of 1986 defines the
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ine, treat, prescribe for, or operate on a patient in the literal sense
portrayed in these statutes.s2 Only individual persons are capable of
these acts, as the old corporate practice cases observe.33 Additionally,
practice of medicine as "'the application of scientific principles to prevent, diagnose, and
treat physical and mental diseases, disorders, and conditions and to safeguard the life and
health of any woman and infant through pregnancy and parturition.'"
The Texas Medical Practice Act defines practicing medicine, in part, as publicly profess-
ing to be a physician or surgeon and professing to "diagnose, treat, or offer to treat any
disease or disorder, mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury by any system or
method or to effect cures thereof," or actually engaging in these activities. Williams v. Good
Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App. 1988); see also Hall, supra note 8, at 453
(referring to "physician licensing laws' all-encompassing definition of medical practice as
diagnosing, treating, or prescribing for any physical or mental condition").
Some definitions partly define medical practice in terms of an "intention of receiving
compensation therefor." United Med. Serv., 200 N.E. at 163; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.34 (Anderson 1997) (defining a person who practices medicine as an individual who
.examines or diagnoses for compensation of any kind, or prescribes, advises, recommends,
administers, or dispenses for compensation of any kind, direct or indirect"); Bartron, 2
N.W.2d at 341. This feature, present in earlier definitions, has largely been dropped from
current statutes. Indeed, had it been retained, it would imply that physicians rendering
charity care are not practicing medicine at all. Admittedly, many states have had good Sa-
maritan statutes to protect physicians who render care at the scene of an accident, and
charitable immunity statutes protecting hospitals that provide care for the poor. However,
these statutes accomplish their public policy aims of encouraging care for the poor and
desperate, not by denying that it is medical care in the first place, but by explicitly stating
that those who render care in these circumstances will be immune from liability.
32. States' licensing statutes can be very unclear. Most states define practice of medi-
cine in terms of diagnosis, treatment, prescription, or prevention of human disease, ailment,
injury, or other condition. Given such vagueness, it is not surprising to find states' interpre-
tations can vary widely. In New Jersey, a "store owner was convicted of practicing medicine
without a license when he advised customers on what foods they should eat after they had
described their ailments." Andreson, supra note 19, at 439 (citing Pinkus v. MacMahon, 29
A.2d 885 (N.J. 1943)). Indiana deems tattooing to constitute the practice of medicine, while
Texas is willing to consider publishing a book to be medical practice, and Ohio requires a
medical license to perform acupuncture. See id. at 440.
33. See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd., 294 U.S. 608 (1935); People v. Pacific Health
Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938); Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal.
1932); People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 209 P. 363, 364 (Cal. 1922); United Med. Ser.,
200 N.E. at 162; Dr. Allison, Dentist v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799, 800 (Ill. 1935); Bennett v. Indi-
ana State Bd., 7 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ind. 1937); State v. Bailey Dental Co., 234 N.W. 260, 262
(Iowa 1931); Teseschi v. Mathis, 183 A. 146, 146 (N.J. 1936); Bartron, 2 N.W.2d at 343-46.
Indeed, some courts have found that because corporate practice is illegal, corporations
cannot employ physicians-and because the hallmark of employment is control over the
employee's conduct, then a corporation cannot possibly be guilty of practicing medicine, as
it could not have exercised the requisite degree of control over the physician. See Good Health
Plus, 743 S.W.2d at 378. In Pickett v. CIGNA Healthplan, No. 01-92-00803-CV, 1993 WL 209858
(Tex. App. June 17, 1993), the plaintiff sued her physicians and her HMO for medical mal-
practice. The trial court granted summary judgment for the HMO and the appellate court
affirmed, because CIGNA did not actually provide care or employ the patient's physicians.
See id. at *3. Rather, it contracted with an independent practice association whose physicians
provided the care. See id. at *2.
The court looked to the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Act, which defined a
health care liability claim as "a cause of action against a health care provider or physician
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a number of states have declared by statute, or via attorneys gen-
eral opinions, that UM does not constitute the practice of
medicine.34 On this view someone who only evaluates information
for financial purposes and does not actively provide medical care
for patients is not practicing medicine.5
for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards
of medical care." The court then looked at the definition of "health care provider,"
and found that CIGNA did not fall within it, noting further that HMOs in Texas do
not comply with professional licensing requirements and thus, may not engage in the
practice of medicine. The court concluded that CIGNA could not as a matter of law
be liable for medical malpractice. Other courts have similarly held that an entity not
licensed under the jurisdiction of the agency responsible for health care professionals
is not a health care provider for purposes of medical malpractice claims.
Gretchen Garrison, House Bill 335-Managed Care in Missouri, 66 UMKC L. REv. 775, 804
(1998) (citations omitted); see also Freedman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 849 P.2d 811,
817 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Bruttomesso v. Northeastern Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Serv.,
Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 796 (Conn. 1997); Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (citing Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. 1938)); Propst v. Health Mainte-
nance Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Schwartz v. Brownlee, 482
S.E.2d 827, 830 (Va. 1997); Chittenden, supra note 11, at 467-68. This view has been criti-
cized:
One of the arguments HMOs most frequently raised was they simply were not making
treatment decisions because that constitutes the practice of medicine. Managed care
entities cannot practice medicine because the state bans the corporate practice of
medicine, they argued. "That is analogous to a speeder telling a cop he couldn't have
been going 90 miles an hour because the speed limit is only 70," Ms. Barron [Texas
Medical Association lobbyist] said.
Ortolon, supra note 27, at 27.
34. In Ohio, for instance, "R.C. 1751.08(D) states plainly that a health insuring corpo-
ration holding a certificate of authority under R.C. Chapter 1751 'shall not be considered to
be practicing medicine.' ... Pursuant to this provision, ... the health insuring corporation
is not considered to be practicing medicine in the conduct of its utilization review program
under R.C. 1751.77-86 .... " Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-044 (Aug. 31, 1999) (citing Propst
v. Health Maintenance Plan, 582 N.E.2d 1145 (1990)). Other attorneys general have opined
similarly. See, e.g., Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-104 (1990); 24 Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 49, Op. No.
90-130 (1990); Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-0088 (1993); 60 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 100 (1992).
For further discussion, see Andreson, supra note 19, at 444-46. But see Murphy v. Board of
Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-491
(1999).
35. This was the plaintiffs argument in Murphy, 949 P.2d at 535. Because the physician
who performs UR for a third-party payor does not practice medicine, the argument con-
cluded, he should not be subject to review by the Board of Medical Examiners. The Arizona
appellate court disagreed. See id. As noted by the North Carolina Attorney General in 1992, a
denial of coverage
does not prohibit the patient from seeking other funding sources or from seeking
treatment without third-party benefits, and it does not prohibit the attending physi-
cian from providing the treatment.... Thus, the person performing the utilization
review is not diagnosing, operating on, prescribing for, administering to or treating
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Partly in response to widespread opposition to intensive UM,
many MCOs now use other forms of cost containment. Health
plans have two basic ways to control costs: rules (by which the MCO
determines precisely what it will cover) and incentives (wherein
financial risk is shifted back to physicians and other providers) 6
For MCOs, a significant advantage of risk-sharing is that as they
transfer substantial amounts of financial risk back to providers,
they also transfer back clinical decision authority, and with it the
responsibility. For example, some capitation arrangements pay a
physician a flat fee in exchange for providing a specific list of pa-
37tients with a designated set of services. In one such arrangement,
primary care physicians received twenty-eight dollars per patient
per month, from which they covered the first $5000 of each pa-
tient's care. 38 The MCO completely controlled its costs for those
services because, at least within the $5000 threshold, its costs were
determined at the outset. At the same time, risk-sharing permits
the physician wide clinical discretion. After all, if the physician is
overly generous with services the costs come out of his own pocket,
not the MCO's. If the physician has made the clinical decisions
about what to do and whom to do it to with no specific input from
the MCO, then he and not the MCO has been practicing medicine.
Still, financial risk-shifting only partly permits health plans to
control costs without micro-managing utilization. Capitation ar-
rangements generally cover only a limited range of services, such as
outpatient physician care and associated laboratory and radiologic
studies. The greater costs are for inpatient care. Health plans usu-
ally retain financial responsibility, and thereby the majority of
control, over big-ticket services such as hospitalizations and surger-
ies, as well as high-cost drugs and diagnostics. Moreover, not all
risk-sharing is capitation. Lesser financial incentives include bo-
nuses, penalties, and withholding arrangements in which
physicians receive only part of their payment, with the rest payable
later (or not) depending on how costly patients' care has been.
any ailment, injury or deformity, but is merely deciding whether or not third-party
payment is available.
60 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 100, 100 (1992).
36. See MORREIM, BALANCING ACT, supra note 2, at 32; Alan L. Hillman, Managing the
Physician: Rules Versus Incentives, HEALTH AiF., Winter 1991, at 138; E. Haavi Morreim, Reve-
nue Streams and Clinical Discretion, 46J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 331 (1998).
37. See generally Donald M. Berwick, Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care (pt. 5),
335 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1227 (1996) (discussing capitation's effect on health care quality).
38. See David Azevedo, Did an HMO Doctor's Greed KillJoyce Ching?, MED. ECON., Feb. 16,
1996, at 43, 47; Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44.
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Such arrangements reward physicians for being cost-conscious, but
still leave a significant level of financial risk with the health plan.
Throughout, MCOs must exert considerable control over the
ways in which their funds are used and thereby inevitably exert
considerable influence over what type of care is provided to which
patients. When they do this, the MCOs are accused of practicing
medicine. Thus accused, they respond that their decisions deter-
mine money, not care.
The debate is captured particularly well in Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc. 39 A physician recommended inpatient care for a
woman in a high-risk pregnancy, but her MCO determined that
ten hours of home nursing care each day would be sufficient.
When the fetus went into distress and died after the nurse had left
for the day, the family sued for wrongful death and other torts. En
route to its finding that all claims were preempted by ERISA, the
Fifth Circuit discussed whether the plan's utilization review and
denial of requested hospitalization constituted a medical decision
or a benefits decision. 4°
The MCO argued that the denial "was a decision made in its ca-
pacity as a plan fiduciary about what benefits were authorized
under the Plan. All it did, it argues, was to determine whether Mrs.
Corcoran qualified for the benefits provided by the plan by apply-
ing previously established eligibility criteria. '4' The benefits
decisions are based on medical information, but the basic activity
was an administrative claims-handling.2
The plaintiffs, in contrast, argued that the MCO was clearly mak-
ing medical decisions when it decided that the patient did not
medically need continuous hospitalization but could do as well
with limited home nursing.3 The utilization review process is rife
39. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
40. If the decision were strictly a medical decision, the suit might not have been pre-
empted by ERISA, because preemption applies only to suits "to recover benefits due...
under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce ... rights under the terms of the plan, or to clar-
ify... rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1994). However, because the court found
that the denial of inpatient hospitalization was a benefits determination rather than a medi-
cal decision, ERISA's preemption of state-based causes of action did apply. For further
discussion of ERISA, see E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans: Diminishing
Deference to Fiduciaries, and an Emerging Problem for Provider-Sponsored Organizations, 65 TENN. L.
REv. 511 (1998); E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal
Standard of Care, 59 U. PIrT. L. R~v. 1, 76-94 (1997) [hereinafter Morreim, Resource Limits];
E. Haavi Morreim, Moral Justice and Legal Justice in Managed Care: The Ascent of Contributive
Justice, 23J.L. MED. & ETHics 247 (1995) [hereinafter Morreim, Contributive Justice].
41. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329.




with medical decisions, they argued, as the plan determines
whether a surgery is (un)necessary, how long a patient should be
hospitalized, and which prescriptions and treatments are most ap-
propriate."
The Fifth Circuit could not "fully agree with either United or the
Corcorans."' 5 Despite the fact that medical decisions were ultimately
left up to the beneficiary and her physician, that the MCO-
beneficiary relationship was not precisely a physician-patient rela-
tionship, and that the MCO had contractually reserved the right to
make benefits decisions on the basis of medical information, the
court pointed out that prospective UR decisions have a powerful
influence on treatment decisions, because the beneficiaries may be
far less inclined to pursue treatments that they know in advance
will not be reimbursed. The very purpose of prospective UR is to
influence treatment decisions in just this way. 6 The court neverthe-
less concluded in favor of the MCO:
Ultimately, we conclude that United makes medical decisions-
indeed, United gives medical advice-but it does so in the
context of making a determination about the availability of
benefits under the plan. Accordingly, we hold that the Louisi-
ana tort action asserted by the Corcorans for the wrongful
death of their child allegedly resulting from United's errone-
ous medical decision is pre-empted by ERISA .
B. Three Inadequate Answers
Determining whether MCOs actually practice medicine requires
a dismissal of three inadequate arguments. First, some commenta-
tors argue that an MCO's denial of resources may have immediate
and serious medical consequences, and that this impact on pa-
tients' treatment and outcomes means that the MCO has practiced
medicine. In rebuttal, however, the bare fact that an MCO's denial
of resources has a significant impact does not mean that the denial
was a medical decision, or further that it constituted the practice of
medicine. Suppose, for instance, that the MCO's contract explicitly
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covers only thirty days of inpatient psychiatric care. 8 A patient who
has reached this limit, and whose MCO has said "no further fund-
ing," might be promptly discharged by the hospital as a direct
consequence. Any ensuing problems, however, cannot be attrib-
uted to the MCO. 49 Because the limits of coverage in such a case
are so clear, the health plan is simply applying the contract to the
facts. The decision not to provide extra-contractual benefits can
affect subsequent treatment decisions and thereby the patient's
medical outcome. However, the denial is fundamentally no differ-
ent than a similar refusal by the patient's next-door-neighbor, who
also does not owe him any such funds and who also declines to
provide them for free. Other examples include exclusions for par-
ticular services such as podiatry,0 or more broadly for preexisting
conditions.5 Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot claim that MCOs prac-
tice medicine simply because their decisions affect patients'
52medical care and outcomes.
This conclusion is echoed in Morris v. District of Columbia Board of
Medicine,3 discussed just above, in which the D.C. Medical Board
found that a health plan's medical director had practiced medicine
without a license. The finding was based on the physician's ability
to inluence clinical decisions. 4 The appellate court overturned:
This definition of "treatment" is so open-ended that it cannot
reasonably be squared with the statutory term. In normal
medical usage, "treat" means "to care for ... medically or sur-
gically: deal with by medical or surgical means" .... Conduct
that merely "[a]ffects," "influences," or "substantially im-
pact[s]" on the course of such care by others cannot itself be
treatment without converting a major part of the business of
health insurers such as Blue Cross into the "practice of medi-
cine." Equating "treat[ment]" with any conduct that
"practically [a]ffect[s]" it, in ways potentially involving no ex-
48. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
beneficiary's policy covered up to 30 days of inpatient psychiatric care per 12-month pe-
riod).
49. In Wilson, the patient had not exhausted all 30 days of his inpatient coverage; an
outside UR entity suspended coverage on the ground that further inpatient care was not
medically necessary. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83.
50. See Axelroth v. Health Partners, 720 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1998).
51. See England v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 846 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
52. As another example, an employee who has been discharged from his job may also
lose health insurance. Such a loss will probably affect that person's health care and perhaps
thereby his health, but we could not thereby conclude that the employer had been practic-
ing medicine. (I owe this example to David Hyman).
53. 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997).
54. See id. at 367.
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ercise of medical judgment, is contrary to any sensible inter-
pretation of the statute.5
The second inadequate argument comes from health plans
when they hold that, so long as their activities involve interpreting
the contract, they cannot also be practicing medicine. In contrast
to the above example of straightforward contractual caps on dol-
lars or days, most health plan benefits decisions are based on
antecedent medical conclusions. In Corcoran v. United States the
court observed that the plan makes a medical decision in order to
make its benefits decision. Moreover, such medically-based deci-
sions permeate plans' benefits decisions, because the concept of
"medical necessity" serves as the contractual cornerstone defining
benefits in most health plans. "Under the test of 'medical neces-
sity,' which serves almost universally as the contractual touchstone
of plan coverage, the criteria used to check the spending discretion
of providers are almost exclusively medical, not economic. 5 6 Thus,
the fact that the MCO points to a contract does not, by itself, pre-
clude the possibility that it practices medicine in the context of
making benefits decisions.
55. Id. at 367 (citations omitted). Likewise, in his dissent in Long v. Great West Life &
Annuity Insurance, 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998),Justice Richard V. Thomas argued:
It is clear ... from the philosophical discussion that the premise for the assumed
harm is that the insured will forego appropriate care because of the advanced advice
that the carrier will not pay in full. The logical fallacy presented is that the carrier
could be guilty of malpractice in a situation in which a physician could not. It would
be fruitless to search for authority that a medical practitioner is guilty of malpractice
because his patient decided not to pursue treatment because of the potential ex-
pense.
Id. at 833 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
In a similar vein, the California Supreme Court has held that insurers must have the
power to determine which services they cover under the language of their contract, even if
on occasion the insurer disagrees with the patient's own physician. See Sarchett v. Blue
Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 273 (Cal. 1987); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Smither, 573
S.W.2d 363, 365 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) ("Since a large part of today's rising medical costs are
borne by organizations which offer medical benefits plans, such as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, we believe these organizations should be entitled to some measure of protection and
should be allowed to challenge decisions made by doctors.").
56. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRU-
MENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 15 (1995); see also Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of
Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1055, 1055-56 (1996) (arguing that covered benefits in both public and private insur-
ance contracts are defined in terms of "medical necessity" which means "medically
appropriate" and "excludes experimental care, nonstandard treatments, treatments without
any known benefit, and treatment such as cosmetic surgery not intended to correct or re-
lieve a medical condition").
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In the third inadequate argument, health plans suggest that they
cannot practice medicine because they cannot, for example, physi-
cally examine patients or perform surgical or diagnostic
procedures. This assertion misunderstands, however, the essence
of medical practice. Arguably, the most central element in clinical
medicine is not the hands-on skills of examining patients and per-
forming procedures. In many cases, lesser-trained personnel can
master such techniques with considerable facility. Rather, the heart
and soul of medicine as a learned profession is judgment. Thus,
the surgeon's most crucial contribution is a series of judgments:
whether this patient presents a surgical or nonsurgical problem
and, if surgical, which particular procedure, using what particular
implants or devices, would be most suitable. Intraoperatively there
are judgments about what to do if the patient has idiosyncratic
anatomy or, even more importantly, what to do if things go wrong.
The skills of incising and suturing are obviously important and re-
quire significant training, but these activities are not the hallmark
of being a physician. Similarly, the internist or pediatrician must
gather history, symptoms, and signs, and make judgments about
which diagnoses are most likely, which further tests are likely to
yield useful information, at what risk, and how to weigh those risks
against the hoped-for information. For therapy, further judgments
weigh the likelihood of success for various treatments against their
possible harms. The act of writing the orders, or even performing a
diagnostic or therapeutic intervention, is usually considerably less
demanding of their expertise. Throughout, uncertainties pepper
the process. The judgments require empirical estimations of likeli-
hood and normative evaluations about merits, and they are based
on scientific literature, collective consensus, and the practitioner's
own clinical experience.57 Importantly, courts are embracing the
notion that judgment is the central element of practicing medi-
cine, even in settings such as telemedicine in which there is no
physical contact whatever between physician and patient."
57. In its recent opinion on corporate practice of medicine, the Louisiana Board of
Medical Examiners offered a definition of medical practice that places a primacy on judg-
ment: "As contemplated by the Medical Practice Act ... the essence of the practice of
medicine is the exercise of independent medical judgment in the diagnosing, treating, curing or
relieving of any bodily or mental disease, condition, infirmity, deformity, defect, ailment, or
injury in any human being...." Board of Medical Examiners, Statement of Position: Corpo-
rate Practice of Medicine; Applicability of Louisiana Medical Practice Act to Employment of
Physician by Corporation Other than a Professional Medical Corporation, Sept. 24, 1992, at
2 (emphasis added).
58. In the type of telemedicine most relevant to this discussion, a consulting physician
at a geographic distance electronically gathers information about a patient, then offers opin-
ions and recommendations. Such electronic consultation can be particularly valuable for
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C. Resolving the Argument
Having refuted these three misconceptions, it is possible to de-
velop a clearer view of what it is to practice medicine, whether as a
physician or as a corporation. There are two elements, each of
which is necessary, yet neither of which are alone sufficient. The
first is the exercise of medical judgment-the formulation of opin-
ions based on the esoteric, highly technical knowledge base that is
distinctive to medicine as a profession. Cases like Morris and Mur-
phy59 illustrate that utilization management often involves medical
judgments that can potentially disagree with treating physicians'
opinions. As further discussed in Part V, health plans must often
make medical judgments in order to make their coverage deci-
sions, because most contracts base benefits decisions on the notion
of "medical necessity"-a concept clearly requiring medical judg-
ments.60
Nevertheless, making a medical judgment does not, by itself,
constitute the practice of medicine. A person sitting at a distance,
merely contemplating someone's medical condition as an intellec-
tual exercise, may be making medical judgments but obviously is
not practicing medicine. To constitute practice, a medical judg-
ment must in some sense be carried out. It must be used to
determine, or at least significantly influence, what type of care will
be provided to a particular patient. This is the second element of
practicing medicine.
The notion of "significant influence" must be included along-
side "determining" the patient's care, because even physicians do
not always determine their patients' care. The patient, after all, has
some say in the matter. He can decline what is offered, request an
alternative approach, or ostensibly agree with what is proposed and
then fail to adhere. From a legal standpoint, the inquiry into
bringing sophishticated expertise to patients in isolated areas, or for bringing sophisticated
expertise to patients with unusual conditions. Clearly, in this setting the physician does no
"hands-on" work whatever-until, perhaps, refined technologies become available for such
interventions as remote, robotic surgery. In the meantime, telemedicine represents a situa-
tion in which the physician's sole contribution is to provide his medical judgment. For a very
useful discussion of potential liabilities surrounding telemedicine, see Patricia C. Kuszler,
Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care Delivery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 297 (1999) (considering the application of medical negligence liability theories to
telemedicine and integrated delivery health plans); see also Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice:
Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 327 (1999) (examining the "content-
related liability exposure of health care providers operating in cyberspace").
59. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 22.
60. See infra Part V.A.
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whether the MCO exerted the requisite level of influence would
most plausibly be understood in classic causality terms as whether
the MCO's coverage decision was a "substantial factor" in bringing
about the treatment decision and in turn the patient's outcome.6
"Substantial factor" can be elusive to define. In this Article it will
be understood in terms of two dimensions. First, it must be the
case that the MCO actually owes (coverage for) the medical service
in question. As noted previously, when the MCO does not owe, for
example, more than thirty days of inpatient care, or care for pre-
existing conditions, then its refusal to provide coverage beyond
that cannot be "the cause" of the patient's hospital discharge, any
more than a similar refusal by some neighbor down the street.62 In
such cases, the patient's lack of money is clearly an important fac-
tor in his decision to forego care; but because the health plan
clearly did not owe the coverage, the lack of money is an unfortu-
nate fact of life, not the fault of this MCO. Of course, there will be
cases where it is unclear initially whether the health plan owes cov-
erage. Courts will have to answer that question as part of their
broader inquiry into whether the MCO practiced medicine, and
63
whether it may be held liable for malpractice.
The other dimension in determining whether an MCO's denial
of coverage is a "substantial factor" in a decision about treatment
(and in any adverse outcomes resulting from that decision) is the
question whether the denial was "material" to the decision. Materi-
ality, a notion adapted here from the law of informed consent,4
refers to information or decisional factors that are important
enough (at least potentially) to sway a decision one way or another.
As patients decide what sort of treatment to undergo, or as physi-
cians decide what to offer, they will consider numerous factors. In
some cases a health plan's decision may not be crucial: the patient
61. See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (Ct. App. 1990) ("'The actors' neg-
ligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his [or her] conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from
liability .... '") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977)).
62. In other words, in certain situations an agent bears causal responsibility, or not,
because she antecedently bore a duty of care. For example, the parent is the cause of a
child's starvation, not because the parent was the only one who failed to feed the child-
where a child has starved, many people have failed to feed it-but because the parent is the
one who antecedently had a duty to see to it that the child was fed. Thus the parent, and not
some stranger down the street, is the cause because of a prior duty. For further exploration
of the relationship between causality and the duty of care, see E. Haavi Morreim, Whodunit?
Causal Responsibility of Utilization Review for Physicians' Decisions, Patients' Outcomes, 20 L. MEn.
& HEALTH CARE 40 (1992).
63. See infra notes 254-82 and accompanying text.




may have to pay only slightly more out of pocket, or providers
may be willing to waive their charges, or other sources of funding
may be available. However, because medicine can be very expen-
sive and alternate sources of care are increasingly difficult to
obtain, it will often be the case that a third party payor's adverse
coverage decision will weigh heavily if not decisively: either pro-
viders will refuse to offer it, or the patient will decline the
intervention because he cannot afford it. 65 The question of
65. Several courts have acknowledged the close connection between funding and the
availability of care. One court took judicial notice of the fact that many patients rely on
heath insurance to cover all or part of the high costs of major medical care. The court noted
that "absent pre-claim verification of insurance coverage, patients may be forced to leave a
hospital without receiving medical treatment-even though they are insured for the medical
services they seek to obtain-because they lack other sufficient financial resources to pay the
costs of treatment." Mimbs v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 832 F. Supp. 354, 358 (S.D. Ga.
1993) (discussing that health plan had incorrectly stated, in prospective UR, that the pro-
posed care would not be covered).
The Fifth Circuit discussed funding and availability of care at some length in Corcoran:
A prospective decision is ... different in its impact on the beneficiary than a retro-
spective decision. In both systems, the beneficiary theoretically knows in advance
what treatments the plan will pay for because coverage is spelled out in the plan
documents. But in the retrospective system, a beneficiary who embarks on the course
of treatment recommended by his or her physician has only a potential risk of disal-
lowance of all or a part of the cost of that treatment, and then only after treatment
has been rendered. In contrast, in a prospective system a beneficiary may be squarely
presented in advance of treatment with a statement that the insurer will not pay ....
A beneficiary in the latter system would likely be far less inclined to undertake the
course of treatment that the insurer has at least preliminarily rejected.
By its very nature, a system of prospective decisionmaking influences the beneficiary's
choice among treatment options to a far greater degree than does the theoretical risk
of disallowance of claim facing a beneficiary in a retrospective system. Indeed, the
perception among insurers that prospective determinations result in lower health
care costs is premised on the likelihood that a beneficiary, faced with the knowledge
of specifically what the plan will and will not pay for, will choose the treatment option
recommended by the plan in order to avoid risking total or partial disallowance of
beiefits.
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1033 (1992).
In Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., 957 P.2d 823, 827 (Wyo. 1998), the
Wyoming Supreme Court noted that
[a]lthough the attending physician is the ultimate decisionmaker regarding a pa-
tient's treatment, it is, as commentators note, naive to assume that a provider's
determination that recommended care is not medically necessary, and therefore not
covered by insurance or the health plan, will not affect the treatment ultimately re-
ceived by the patient.
Other courts have likewise "recognized the 'commercial realities' facing third-party provid-
ers of health care services, noting that ... one of the first steps in accepting a patient for
treatment is to determine a financial source for the cost of care to be provided.'" Cypress
Playing Doctor
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
materiality is thus quite fact-specific, and can only be answered by
examining the details of each case.66
In sum, MCOs can and do practice medicine. 67 Not all of their
benefits determinations, however, constitute medical practice.
Where the contract is clear and requires no medical judgment (as
with a cap on days or dollars), a denial of benefits is not the prac-
tice of medicine, even if it has an enormous impact on the
patient's care. Barring ambiguities, it is the straightforward applica-
tion of the language to the facts. In contrast, where the contract
requires the plan to make its own medical judgment in order to
make its benefits decision, as when benefits hinge on "medical ne-
cessity," and where such judgments determine or strongly
influence the patient's actual course of care, then the plan has
practiced medicine.
III. LIABILITY FOR MCOs: Two APPROACHES
AND THEIR PROBLEMS
What sort of liability should MCOs bear when their medical
practice constitutes malpractice? MCOs as business enterprises are
already subject to various sorts of liability, such as fraud for false
advertising, or breach of contract where they fail to deliver prom-
ised services. 6s This Article, however, particularly inquires whether
Fairbanks Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citing Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1990)).
66. See PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE 145 (1990). For a case illustration regard-
ing potentially material information about financial (non)coverage for care, see Mark G.
Kuczewski & Michael DeVita, Managed Care and End-of-Life Decisions, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 2424 (1998).
67. A similar concept of medical practice appeared in 1890, as the Kansas Supreme
Court noted:
The practice of medicine may be said to consist in three things: First, in judging the
nature, character, and symptoms of the disease; second, in determining the proper
remedy for the disease; third, in giving or prescribing the application of the remedy to
the disease. If the person who makes a diagnosis of a case also gives the medicine to
the patient, he is, in ourjudgment, practicing medicine.
Underwood v. Scott, 23 P. 942, 943 (Kan. 1890); see also State Electro-Med. Inst. v. Platner,
103 N.W. 1079, 1081 (Neb. 1905) (defining the medical practitioner as one "who undertakes
to judge the nature of disease or to determine the proper remedy therefor, or to apply the
remedy"). Unfortunately, this view did not prevail, as a wide range of subsequent courts
opined that the mere hiring of a physician constituted the practice of medicine.
68. Chittenden offers an extensive discussion of current and prospective avenues of li-
ability against managed care organizations, including: (1) vicarious liability (including
respondeat superior and ostensible agency); (2) direct liability (for selection and control of
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MCOs can be subject to classic medical malpractice claims of the
same sort to which physicians are subject. At present, they have not
been. Rather, problems in quality of care have raised direct and
indirect tort liability for MCOs, neither of which is equivalent to
medical malpractice.
Under direct liability, specifically corporate negligence, a health
plan owes certain duties directly to enrollees, such as to exercise
due care in selecting, monitoring, and retaining its physician staff.
69
providers); (3) direct liability (for breach of contract, consumer fraud, breach of fiduciary
duties); (4) direct negligence in design or implementation of quality assurance or utilization
review programs); (5) direct liability (RICO). See generally Chittenden, supra note 11 passim.
Chittenden's discussion includes brief reference to health plans' duties to disclose their cost-
containment and incentive systems. See id. at 483. Since that article was written, other cases
have supported this potential cause of action, at least in ERISA cases. See Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997); Drolet v. HealthSource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.H. 1997);
McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F. Supp. 545, 551 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
Breach of contract cases include Charles v. Kender, 646 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995);
Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); Williams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (permitting breach of contract claim against physician); McClellan v. Health
Maintenance Organization, 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); and Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan v. Bridewell, 946 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App. 1997).
In a number of cases, state law claims for breach of contract were held to be preempted
by ERISA. See, e.g., Cannon v. Group Health Serv., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996); Kuhl v.
Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321; Ramirez
v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997); Hemphill v. Unisys Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Utah
1994); Metroplex Infusion Care v. Lone Star Container Corp., 855 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex.
1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Rollo v. Maxicare, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988).
Similarly, William Sage summarizes three established categories of corporate liability for
health plans: (1) vicarious liability (as employers are liable for employees-e.g. the Veterans
Administration, academic medical centers, etc.); (2) direct liability (via cases against hospi-
tals, e.g., for inadequately reviewing credentials and monitoring performance); (3) private
contracting (e.g., as a health plan voluntarily pays liability insurance for its physicians). See
William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 159, 173-75.
William Helvestine discusses various possibilities for liability pursuant to UR, as under-
taken by various entities, including: negligence, breach of contract, insurance bad faith,
infliction of emotional distress, warranty theories, products liability, defamation and inter-
ference with contractual advantage, antitrust, liability of consultants and employees, state
regulation, direct liability, vicarious liability, and others. See William A. Helvestine, Legal
Implications of Utilization Review, in CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CAl? 169,
175-90 (Bradford H. Gray & MarilynJ. Field eds., 1989).
Mark Hall likewise discusses theories of liability, including tortious interference with ad-
vantageous relationships and fee-splitting. See Hall, supra note 8, at 460-504; see also Allen D.
Allred & Terry 0. Tottenham, Liability and Indemnity Issues for Integrated Delivery Systems, 40
ST. Louis U. L.J. 457, 457-83 (1996); Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost
Containment Measures, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 79, 84-100 (1990).
69. Corporate negligence as applied to health plans is based on similar duties placed
on hospitals, and includes duties to select, monitor, and retain only qualified physician staff.
In the case of health plans, courts have also identified duties to avoid defective design and
implementation of utilization management programs, among other duties; in other cases,
plaintiffs allege misrepresentation or fraud where health plans do not deliver what they
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Indirect, or vicarious, liability takes two forms. In the more tradi-
tional form a health plan may be held liable for the misdeeds of its
employees, including physician-employees. v More recently some
health plans have also been held liable for the actions of physicians
who, although independent contractors, are believed by the
MCO's subscribers to be "ostensible agents" of the MCO.71
Despite these avenues of direct and indirect liability, MCO cor-
porations do not bear liability for medical malpractice at this time.
They can vicariously assume or at least share in the blame for the
actions of the physicians they employ or contract with; or they can
be liable for their own inadequacies in selecting or monitoring
those physicians. Both stop shy of holding the MCO directly at
purported they would. See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878-80 (Ct. App. 1990);
Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670-71 (Ct. App. 1986); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581,
585-86 (Pa. 1997); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 706-09 (Pa. 1991); Shannon v.
McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 831, 835-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); McClellan v. HMO, 604 A.2d
1053, 1058-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Chittenden, supra note 11, at 468-73; Hall, supra note
8, at 458-59 (discussing Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1.
1965)); Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L.
REv. 587, 601-03 (1997).
In some of these cases, a claim for direct negligence that might otherwise go forward is
preempted by federal law (through ERISA). See Travelers Ins., 984 F. Supp. at 54-56, 62-64;
Dearmass v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Health-
care, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185-87 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1290-91
(holding that claims are preempted for misrepresentation, though not for ostensible
agency); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn. 1990); see also
Sage, supra note 68, at 186-87.
70. Hospitals often employ physicians in specialties such as radiology, anesthesiology,
and pathology. Some HMOs, in particular the "staff-model" HMOs, employ virtually all their
physicians. See Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1105-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). But
see Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 253-55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
71. Ostensible agency originally emerged as a way of describing hospitals' relationships
with physicians. Ordinarily a hospital cannot be held liable for the actions of independent
contractors such as physicians, because they do not employ these individuals or control their
actions. However, when the plaintiff has been induced to think that the physician actually is
an employee of the hospital, and relies on that belief, the hospital may be liable as though it
were an employer. See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Clark v. Southview
Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
More recently the doctrine has been extended to MCOs. As with hospitals, an MCO can-
not ordinarily be held liable for the actions of physicians who are independent contractors.
Such arrangements are found, for instance, in the independent practice association (IPA)
form of HMOs. (In an IPA, the HMO contracts for services from a variety of physicians in
private practice. These physicians typically practice in their own offices and may have con-
tracts with a variety of insurers and MCOs.) When an HMO holds itself out as the actual
provider of services, however, or represents that the physicians are its employees so that the
patient looks to the HMO more than to the physician for care (and perhaps also relies on
such representations), then the physician may be the "ostensible agent" of the HMO, and
the HMO may thereby be vicariously liable for damages the physician causes. See, e.g., Kear-
ney, 859 F. Supp. at 188; Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1290; Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547
A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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fault for committing medical malpractice, because practicing
medicine is an activity heretofore deemed to lie exclusively within
the control of physicians.
2
There are various possible responses to this gap between the fact
that corporations do practice medicine, and the fact that they have
not actually been subject to liability for medical malpractice. This
Part examines two proposals. The first would fix the gap by pre-
cluding MCOs from practicing medicine at all, while the second
would place on the MCOs all liability for quality of care. Both pro-
posals and their problems will be discussed here, thereby opening
the door to a superior approach in the Parts that follow.
A. Permitting Employment, Proscribing Interference
The first proposal is to fix the flaws in the old corporate practice
ban. The original doctrine, prohibiting employment of physicians,
has become largely anachronistic as HMOs, hospitals, and a variety
of other entities routinely hire physicians rather than relating to
them as independent contractors. It is just one part of a massive
reorganization of the economic structures by which health care is1 3
now delivered. At the same time it has been recognized that,
72. It may be noted, however, that plaintiffs are increasingly willing to accuse health
plans of classic medical malpractice as distinct from simply (and sloppily) using the term in
connection with corporate negligence or vicarious liability. In Brandon v. Aetna Services, Inc.,
46 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Conn. 1999), the plaintiff alleged
that Defendants committed malpractice by engaging in the practice of medicine or
psychiatry "by undertaking to make decisions about what psychiatric and psychologi-
cal treatment was and was not appropriate for Mr. Brandon," and then failing to
exercise the degree and skill ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists and psychologists in
Connecticut or Vermont by failing or refusing to "approve and pay for at least six
months of treatment."
Id. at 112. The district court held that ERISA preempted this claim.
Other exceptions in which the plaintiff tries to claim that the plan literally practiced
medicine include Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1378 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992); Garrison v. Northeast Georgia Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1336, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343, 346 (N.D. Cal.
1996); Williams v. California Physicians'Serv., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 511 (Ct. App. 1999); Wil-
liams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tex. App. 1988).
73. For further discussion of that reorganization see John K. Iglehart, Medicaid and
Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1727 (1995); Philip R. Kletke et al., Current Trends in
Physicians' Practice Arrangements, 276 JAMA 555 (1996); Bruce E. Landon et al., A Conceptual
Model of the Effects of Health Care Organizations on the Quality of Medical Care, 279 JAMA 1377
(1998); Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note 40.
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although employment relationships are defined by the extent to
which a master controls the nature and manner of a servant's
work,74 an employment relationship is hardly the only means by
which MCOs exert control over physicians. Health care is often so
costly that patients can ill afford to pay out of pocket, and provid-
ers straining under reduced fees, financial risk-sharing, and
increasingly frequent reimbursement denials and delays are less
able than ever before to provide care for free. Hence, an MCO's
denial of coverage, or even a UR process that is a bit too sluggish,
can exert a powerful influence over which services are actually• 75
available.
Notwithstanding such broadened opportunities for corporate
control of medicine, it can also be argued that the flourishing di-
versity of economic arrangements for health care delivery has
helped to spawn useful innovations and to contain the costs that
had previously been spiraling out of control. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has long been opposed to the traditional cor-
porate practice ban for just such reasons. In the 1940s, the
Supreme Court held that the American Medical Association
(AMA) had illegally restrained trade when it tried to discourage its
physician members from practicing in an HMO setting.76 Begin-
ning in 1975, the FTC ordered the AMA to remove its ethics-code
restrictions on contract and corporate practice because these pro-
visions stifled innovation and illegally restrained trade.77
74. See Daw's Critical Care v. Dept. of Labor, 622 A.2d 622, 631 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1992). The court noted:
The test of the relationship is the ight to control. It is not the fact of actual interfer-
ence with the control, but the fight to interfere, that makes the difference between
an independent contractor and a servant or agent.... An independent contractor
has been said to be " 'one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to
do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the
control of his employer, except as to the result of his work.'"
Id.; see also Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys., Inc. v. Kohout, 504 S.E.2d 514, 525
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998);Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 17, at 1062.
75. See supra note 65.
76. See American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1943).
77. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 8, at 475. The FTC found several anticompetitive ef-
fects of the corporate ban:
First, the provisions sought to limit price competition among doctors by fixing the
adequacy of compensation and by prohibiting competitive bidding. Second, the pro-
visions inhibited competition by limiting hospitals, prepaid health plans, and lay
entities to the traditional fee-for-service method of compensation and by proscribing
their use of salaries and other more cost-efficient payment methods. Last, the provi-
sions restricted arrangements between physicians and nonphysicians and, therefore,
prevented the creation of more economical business structures.
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One approach, now advanced by a number of commentators, re-
tains but significantly modifies the corporate practice doctrine.
Corporations should be permitted to employ physicians, but with
one major caveat: they must not interfere with physicians' clinical
decisions. Thus, Mars argues that "[u] nless a corporation is truly
interfering with its employed physicians' medical judgments, there
seems to be no sound basis for the continued blanket and uncon-
ditional prohibition on contractual employment arrangements.
78
Mars suggests that "[t]he line of demarcation that courts have
drawn, based on structure, should be reanalyzed in terms of
whether the form of arrangement is truly interfering with a physi-
cian's freedom of action ....
In fact, several states have moved in this direction. In 1996,
Tennessee enacted legislation freeing hospitals from the corporate
practice ban while mandating that they not interfere with physi-
cians' medical judgment.8 0 Similarly, a South Dakota statute, while
continuing to ban corporate practice per se, stipulates that employ-
ing physicians does not constitute practicing medicine so long as
the relationship does not "' [i] n any manner, directly or indirectly,
supplant, diminish or regulate the physician's independent judg-
ment concerning the practice of medicine or the diagnosis and
treatment of any patient.'
Superficially, the proposal seems attractive because the real con-
cern about corporate practice of medicine is not the employment
status, but the control that MCOs can exert over physicians.
Instead of proscribing particular kinds of structural arrangements
such as employment, the remedy is to require MCOs to stop prac-
ticing medicine-to cease making their own medical judgments
and intruding them into clinical patient care decisions.
Such intuitive appeal fades quickly, however, as the proposal's
implications are traced out. "Interfering" in clinical decisions
Id. at 476-77; see also American Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd per cu-
riam, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); Dowell, supra note 8, at 370; Mars, supra note 8, at 268; Parker,
supra note 8, at 167; Rosoff, supra note 8, at 493.
78. Mars, supra note 8, at 251-52.
79. Id. at 265-66; see also Dowell, supra note 8, at 372 (in the corporate employment
context, the "management agreement should clearly acknowledge the physician will have
complete control over matters of diagnosis, treatment, and medical judgment"); Hayward,
supra note 8, at 428.
80. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-204, 63-6-225, 63-11-205 (1997); see also Mars, supra
note 8, at 276-77.
81. Hayward, supra note 8, at 428 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 36-4-8.1 (Michie Supp.
1995)). In like manner, the Texas HMO Act stipulates that the Act does not "authorize any
person to regulate, interfere, or intervene in any manner in the practice of medicine or any
healing art." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.29(b) (West 1981).
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seems to be defined as any action that might prompt a physician to
refrain from undertaking a particular intervention or to change his
proposed course of care. This definition seems implicit, for
instance, in Muse v. Charter Hospital of Winston-Salem, Inc.s2 A six-
teen-year-old boy, admitted to a psychiatric hospital for suicidal
ideation, was discharged by the hospital when his insurance fund-
ing ceased. The North Carolina appellate court held that, by
discharging the boy solely because funding had expired, the hospi-
tal had "interfered" with the physician's medical judgment. A
"hospital has a duty to the patient to obey the instructions of a doc-
tor, absent the instructions being obviously negligent or
dangerous.... In light of these holdings, it seems axiomatic that
the hospital has the duty not to institute policies or practices which
interfere with the doctor's medical judgment.
Thus, Muse instructs that a hospital must permit physicians to
provide care in whatever way they see fit.s 4 The problem with this
prescription is that every medical decision is also a spending deci-
sion. If physicians have unfettered medical freedom they also have
unfettered economic freedom to spend others' money and use
others' resources. The implication is that hospitals (or MCOs)
should have essentially no power to control costs. In an era when
the cost of care has risen to nearly unbearable levels, it is difficult
82. 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
83. Id. at 594. Interestingly, other potentially relevant causal factors were dismissed by
the court. The patient could have been transferred to a state facility, but was not. Instead, he
was doing reasonably well at discharge and went on a week-long vacation with family, after
which he began outpatient treatment. Questions were raised about the quality of physicians'
care, both in the inpatient and subsequent outpatient settings. Nevertheless, the court held
that the hospital was the cause of the boy's subsequent suicide because it had interfered with
medical judgment.
84. A similar view is expressed in dicta by the Seventh Circuit:
We must remember that doctors, not insurance executives, are qualified experts in
determining what is the best course of treatment and therapy for their patients.
Trained physicians, and them [sic] alone, should be allowed to make care-related de-
cisions (with, of course, input from the patient). Medical care should not be subject
to the whim of the new layer of insurance bureaucracy now dictating the most basic,
as well as the important, medical policies and procedures from the boardroom.
Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 377 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Wickline v. State, 192 Cal.
App. 3d 1630, 1645 (1987) ("[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limita-
tions imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, ...
cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his
own determinative medical decisions go sour.") (emphasis added); Mt. Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek,
271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016 (Civ. Ct. 1966) (stating that only the treating physician can deter-
mine appropriate treatment for a given condition); Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa.




to defend giving any one party so much control over shared finan-
cial resources.
Once we agree that MCOs may-indeed must-"interfere" at
least sometimes with physicians' spending decisions in order to85
conserve resources, we are left with powerful questions about who
should control what in the delivery of health care. Part IV ad-
dresses the issue, after we see this very same question arise via
another route.
B. Enterprise Liability
While the above approach has MCOs abjure all medical practice
(by never "interfering" with physicians' judgment), an alternative
has MCOs assume all legal liability, regardless of who engaged in
the medical practice at issue. Whereas the approach discussed
above would have plans avoid medical malpractice liability by
avoiding medical practice, under enterprise liability plans bear all
liability, including malpractice, because they are viewed as the best
locus of responsibility.
Enterprise liability was proposed originally as a way to address
86broader flaws in the tort system. Its earliest version advocated
consolidating tort liability at the locus where most malpractice in-
cidents happened, identified at that time as the hospital. By
focusing all litigation against a single party, it was hoped that faster,
less costly resolution of tort claims might be achieved. Further,
hospitals might use their influence to enhance the quality of care
delivered within their walls while, reciprocally, physicians no
longer under the pressure of malpractice suits could avoid the
heavy costs of malpractice insurance and feel less impelled to re-
sort to costly defensive medicine.
85. A number of courts have found that it is sometimes legitimate for health plans to
deny coverage for resources that a physician might otherwise like to use. See Free v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Md. 1982); Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 272-73
(Cal. 1987); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Smither, 573 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Lockshin v. Blue Cross, 434 N.E.2d 754, 756-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). But see Van Vactor v.
Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
86. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice
of the Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 29 (1994) [hereinafter Abraham & Weiler,
Responsible Enterprise]; Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and
the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1994) [hereinafter
Abraham & Weiler, Evolution]; William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice
and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994). For an excellent discussion
of historical and current concepts of enterprise liability, see Sage, supra note 68, at 173-79.
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Enterprise liability as a hospital-oriented concept gained little
foothold, partly because changing economic conditions soon
meant that health plans, rather than hospitals, became the impor-
tant locus of control over the financing, delivery, and
accountability of care. s7 Several commentators, however, now sup-
port translating the essential concepts underlying enterprise
liability into the world of MCOs. As Clark C. Havighurst, one of its
leading advocates, recently proposed, "MCOs, as distinguished
from indemnity-type health insurers, should bear exclusive legal
responsibility for the negligence of physicians treating their sub-
scribers or enrollees. 88 Accordingly, on this view health plans
should bear all liability "for personal injuries and other losses aris-
ing from care rendered by health care providers to enrollees under
the contract between the health plan and the purchaser of cover-
age."89
Several rationales support enterprise liability. For one thing, as
health plans are the main agents of cost containment, they may
need the specter of legal liability to keep their cost-cutting from
paring down quality.90 At the same time, health plans are better
positioned than individual physicians to serve as the centers for
information technology, disease management, and other
population-oriented health care improvements. 9  Moreover,
"physicians-relieved of many concerns over individual liability-
might participate more readily in cooperative decision making
and might be less resistant to clinical practice guidelines and
87. See Havighurst, supra note 69, at 603-06, 622; Sage, supra note 68, at 159-64, 169-
70, 191.
88. Havighurst, supra note 69, at 587.
89. Id. at 626. Enterprise liability, in other words, would be a form of automatic vicari-
ous liability. See id. at 617. It might also be described in terms of nondelegable duties. See id.
at 614. Other sources discuss the notion of nondelegable duties. See Thompson v. Nason
Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Walls v. Hazleton State Gen. Hosp., 629 A.2d 232 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. Ct. App.
1998); Sampson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1996); William S.
Brewbaker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of
Quality, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 117, 147-48; Chittenden, supra note 11, at
464-65.
Brewbaker discusses a related notion, suggesting that health plans should be held to an
implied warranty on the quality of their care. Brewbaker distinguishes implied warranties
from enterprise liability mainly insofar as the latter restricts liability exclusively to the health
plan or some other single entity. Under Brewbaker's approach, physicians could still be
liable in addition to the health plan. See Brewbaker, supra, at 134-41. Sage also discusses the
merits of the idea, though he does not so heartily endorse it. See Sage, supra note 68, at 166-
69.
90. See Havighurst, supra note 69, at 589; Sage, supra note 68, at 164, 166.
91. See Havighurst, supra note 69, at 600; Sage, supra note 68, at 167, 196.
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other efforts by health plans to induce cost-effective practice on a
system-wide 'basis."
9 2
Finally, and of particular concern to Havighurst, "[tihe mar-
ket-oriented health policy of the 1980s and 1990s could easily
give way to heavy-handed government regulation of MCOs unless
private-law remedies for torts and breach of contract are per-
ceived to provide adequate deterrence of quality lapses. 93 Such
regulatory intrusions could squelch a wide array of potentially useful
cost-saving and quality-enhancing innovations in health care deliv-
ery. Accordingly, Havighurst concludes that " [e] nterprise liability is
the logical legal culmination of the shift to de facto corporate re-
"94sponsibility that is revolutionizing American health care.
In sum, conferring legal accountability on MCOs may be the
only way to deflect undesirable regulation, legitimize managed
care in the eyes of the public and its political representatives, en-
sure a reasonable level of quality, and secure a viable level of
market freedom to assure innovation and improved delivery of
care into the future.9
Despite its apparent advantages, the idea of requiring MCOs to
bear liability for physicians' errors as well as for their own lapses
has major drawbacks. An underlying rationale is to encourage
MCOs to be more involved not only in selecting and monitoring
their physicians, but also in influencing day-to-day clinical prac-
tice.96 Yet it is not clear that increasing health plans' clinical
influence, via increasing their legal risks, is necessarily desirable.
An instructive parallel comes from health plans' growing economic
risks, which have prompted them to exercise greater clinical con-
trols as a way of controlling their costs. Some tactics have been
obviously quite crude.97 Others have been more subtle. Intensive
92. Sage, supra note 68, at 166.
93. Havighurst, supra note 69, at 590-91. As troubling questions about MCOs' quality
of care are pressed, "a strong backlash against HMOs and other managed care plans is
threatening to move many decisions out of the hands of competing health plans and into
the hands of Congress or state legislatures." Id. at 591.
94. Havighurst, supra note 69, at 588.
95. See id. at 594-95.
96. See id. at 616.
97. Some MCO rules have caused fairly obvious inefficiencies. In some MCOs, a physi-
cian must seek approval for every intervention over $200, for instance, perhaps waiting long
periods, only to speak with a utilization clerk lacking the education or medical sophistication
to understand the question; an MCO may "deselect" a physician for ordering an ambulance
to transport an unconscious patient; specialist referrals might be limited to just one visit; or
the MCO may contract with hospitals and other facilities far from members' homes, poten-
tially exacerbating an illness or injury while a patient is en route to the distant site. See
Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make with
Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1995);Joan B. Trauner & Julie S. Chesnutt, Medical
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UR and gatekeeping arrangements, for instance, are costly and
may be only marginally effective.9s Tightly constrained pharmaceu-
tical formularies may save short-term drug costs, but can raise rates
of hospitalization and emergency room use, as some patients expe-
rience greater side-effects and adherence problems with older,
cheaper, or generic drugs that are not quite equivalent to their
newer counterparts.99 Failure to make timely specialist referrals can
generate multiple visits, extensive testing, and treatment failures.l0
If MCOs' increased economic risk has precipitated clinically
counterproductive intrusions, it might be expected that increasing
their legal risk would have a similar effect because whoever bears
risk, whether economic or legal, has an incentive to take whatever
available measures might limit that risk. Those measures, particu-
larly if undertaken by people with legal or business expertise but
no clinical medical expertise, may interfere with good patient
101care.
Groups in California: Managing Care Under Capitation, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 159; Ed-
ward Felsenthal, When HMOs Say No to Health Coverage, More Patients Are Taking Them to Court,
WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at B1; Richard K. McDonald, My Practice Almost Destroyed Me, MED.
ECON., Mar. 11, 1996, at 181.
98. See Robert L. Bree et al., Effect of Mandatory Radiology Consultation on Inpatient Imag-
ing Use, 276 JAMA 1595, 1597 (1996); Stanley Goldfarb, Physicians in Control of the Capitated
Dollar: Do Unto Others .... 123 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 546, 546 (1995); Stephen N. Rosen-
berg et al., Effect of Utilization Review in a Fee-for-Service Health Insurance Plan, 333 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1326, 1328-29 (1995); Martin F. Shapiro & Neil S. Wenger, Rethinking Utilization Re-
view, 333 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1353, 1353 (1995).
99. See Susan D. Horn et al., Formulary Limitations and the Elderly: Results from the Man-
aged Care Outcomes Project, 4 AM.J. MANAGED CARE 1105, 1105 (1998); Steven A. Schroeder &
Joel C. Cantor, On Squeezing Balloons-Cost Control Fails Again, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1099,
1099 (1991); Stephen B. Soumerai et al., A Critical Analysis of Studies of State Drug Reimburse-
ment Policies: Research in Need of Discipline, 71 MILBANK Q. 217, 217 (1993) [hereinafter
Soumerai, Critical Analysis]; Stephen B. Soumerai et al., Effects of Limiting Medicaid Drug-
Reimbursement Benefits on the Use of Psychotropic Agents and Acute Mental Health Services by Patients
with Schizophrenia, 331 NEw ENG.J. MED. 650, 654 (1994); Stephen B. Soumerai et al., Effects
of Medicaid Drug-Payment Limits on Admission to Hospitals and Nursing Homes, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1072, 1074-76 (1991); Dan A. Streja et al., Selective Contracting and Patient Outcomes: A
Case Study of Formulary Restrictions for Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor Antidepressants, 5 AM.
J. MANAGED CARE 1133, 1133-34 (1999).
100. See Barbara Gerbert et al., Primary Care Physicians as Gatekeepers in Managed Care:
Primary Care Physicians' and Dermatologists' Skills at Secondary Prevention of Skin Cancer, 132 AR-
CHIVES DERMATOLOGY 1030, 1035 (1996); Robert S. Kirsner & Daniel G. Federman, Lack of
Correlation Between Internists' Ability in Dermatology and Their Patterns of Treating Patients with
Skin Disease, 132 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 1043, 1043 (1996).
101. Havighurst himself has noted the connection between risk and control in an ear-
lier work, suggesting that hospitals might willingly accept increased liability in order to gain
increased control. He notes hospitals' response to the case of Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il. 1965), in which liability was imposed on a hospital for
its physician staff's failures: "More surprising than the legal result in that case was the wide-
spread reaction to it, which suggested that hospital managers had been waiting for some
excuse to demand more cooperation and quality assurance from their medical staffs." Clark
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These concerns, already raised by physician groups,' °  are only
part of the problem. An even deeper problem concerns the very
standards by which to judge the quality of medical care. Under the
common law, the standard of care that physicians owe their pa-
tients is determined almost exclusively by the profession itself. With
some variations permitted for schools of thought, specialty fields,
locality, and other factors, 0 3 physicians' prevailing practices almost
universally determine the kind and quality of care to which a pa-
tient is entitled. If MCOs become solely responsible for adverse
medical outcomes, it is reasonable to expect that they will require
their physicians to adhere closely to MCO-chosen guidelines. The
more rigid the adherence, the more those guidelines will actually
become prevailing practice. Once that happens, then adherence
will almost always be legally adequate to ward off adverse malprac-
tice judgments, regardless of how poorly patients fare under them.
The only alternative to this scenario, under enterprise liability,
would be for courts to abandon their traditional reliance on pre-
vailing physician practices and establish some sort of court-ordered
standards that may be no better than MCO-ordered standards. 1
04
C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984
DuKE L.J. 1071, 1079.
102. See Havighurst, supra note 69, at 628; Sage, supra note 68, at 170 n.46.
103. See E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1719, 1729-43 (1987).
104. One well-known example in which a court attempted to manufacture a standard of
care to supplant the physician-based standard it considered inadequate is Helling v. Carey,
519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). A young woman visited her ophthalmologist repeatedly for eye
problems, but her underlying glaucoma was discovered too late to save her sight. Because
glaucoma is almost completely confined to older patients, the standard of care had not in-
cluded testing patients under age 40. The court saw fit to change the standard of care,
contradicting prevailing practice:
The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients un-
der 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards
of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to
protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma.
We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the reasonable standard that should have
been followed under the undisputed facts of this case was the timely giving of this
simple, harmless pressure test .... and that, in failing to do so, the defendants were
negligent, which proximately resulted in the blindness sustained by the plaintiff for
which the defendants are liable.
Id. at 983.
The court failed to consider some relevant data. Once one recognizes that the tonometry
test used to detect glaucoma has very poor sensitivity and specificity (that is, it has high
numbers of both false-positives and false-negatives), and once these are brought to the un-
der-40 population that has a very low incidence of glaucoma, the actual value of the test is
stunningly low, and cumulative costs are stunningly high. On one analysis, if the test were
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Havighurst might not be unduly disturbed by such an outcome.
His objective, as noted, is to foster greater MCO influence over
day-to-day clinical practice. 105 Such amplified MCO control, how-
ever, may not be altogether benign. The guidelines by which
MCOs currently determine which interventions they will cover are
not always of the highest scientific caliber, and even well-founded
guidelines do not apply to every patient.
10 6
Even more troubling, quality in a realm as complex as health
care is unlikely to be achieved by a strictly one-way flow in which
information, guidelines, and instructions go from the MCO to the
physicians as the former "supervises" the latter to ensure that its
standards are met. Optimal quality of care requires that physicians
reciprocally "supervise" the MCO, to advise when a guideline is not
effective, or when it would disserve a particular patient's needs.
0 7
Checks and balances are essential. If an MCO bears all legal re-
sponsibility for adverse outcomes, however, and if its very adoption
of a particular guideline will tend to make that guideline the stan-
dard of care, then MCOs may not be warmly receptive to
physicians' challenges.
At the same time, physicians in such a system may be extremely
reluctant to challenge their MCOs. Under the current system, the
prospect of a malpractice suit shadows physicians, but they know
that the great majority of adverse outcomes do not lead to mal-
practice claims, even where the injury was the product of
negligence.108 With the further knowledge that problems in rapport
and relationships are more likely to trigger suits than adverse out-
comes,19 physicians can take reasonable steps to avoid lawsuits.
Where tort claims are nevertheless filed, the financial costs of liti-
routinely used for patients under age 40, for every one patient whose glaucoma was correctly
diagnosed by the test, some 17,500 other young people would have test results that falsely
indicated the presence of glaucoma. If the test were repeated on this group, the number of
false-positives would be reduced to 12,250. In all, "twenty-eight rounds of tonometry tests,
83,348 separate tests, would be required to reduce the number of false positives to fewer
than two. At a mean charge of $25 per test, this series of tests would cost $2,083,700." Eric E.
Fortess & Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing, and Legal Liability, 13 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 217 (1985).
105. See Havighurst, supra note 69, at 616-17.
106. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
107. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
108. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 373 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370, 373 (1991).
109. See generally Wendy Levinson, Physician-Patient Communication: A Key to Malpractice
Prevention, 272 JAMA 1619 (1994); Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication:
The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA
553 (1997); Berkeley Rice, Where Doctors Get Sued the Most, MED. ECON., Feb. 27, 1995, at 109;
Paul A. Sommers, Malpractice Risk and Patient Relations, 20J. FAm. PRAC. 299 (1985).
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gation and adverse judgments will be covered by malpractice in-
surers. Nothing can remove completely the threat of malpractice
suits, but in most situations the issue can remain reasonably well in
the background of daily clinical practice.
The scene could be strikingly different under enterprise liability.
Here the MCO, not the tort lawyer, poses the threat. That threat is
constant, not intermittent. The prospect of being fired, or of hav-
ing one's privileges or income reduced, may be far more likely and
more immediate. A vigilant MCO that monitors its physicians'
every move has a better chance of spotting a deviation from stan-
dards than does the average patient. Moreover, the financial
damages of being disciplined by the MCO are borne, not by an in-
surer, but by the physician himself. Those costs can be enormous.
One answer is for the physician to ensure that his care is of high
quality. More realistically, the physician may seek to ensure that his
care is high-quality as perceived by the MCO. He will be rewarded for
following the guidelines, not for challenging them. If the MCO's
guidelines are inferior, then let the MCO bear the liability. Under
such a scenario, where physicians may be penalized for challenging
the MCO, but not penalized for failing to challenge, physicians
may not be eager to help improve quality by pointing out MCOs'
flaws. As a further disincentive to being the "squeaky wheel," MCOs
typically evaluate physicians, not only on their medical quality, but
also on their economic performance. Being a costly physician can
just as easily trigger an unfavorable review as being a poor-quality
physician. Thus, although enterprise liability theoretically gives
health plans an incentive to strive for quality, it may actually give
physicians perverse incentives to cooperate in only superficial ways.
That sort of don't-rock-the-boat complicity could produce a medi-
ocrity that no one would embrace.
Such heightened MCO control over clinical practices raises the
very specters that prompted the original corporate practice bans so
many years ago: supervision of intimate, medically sensitive deci-
sions by non-medical personnel, and a dividing of physicians'
allegiances between patients and corporations. As the Indiana Su-
preme Court noted:
The master is in a position where he may dictate to his servant
the manner of conducting his business, the kind and nature
of the goods to be sold and furnished to the patient, in order
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to procure the most favorable financial gain to the employer.
And this may be done without regard to the public health
110
When corporations feel pressed to control every detail of the
medical care for which they bear legal risk, even beyond the eco-
nomic risks they now bear, the potential implications are troubling.
C. The Real Dispute: Who Should Control What
After first concluding that MCOs can and do practice medicine,
Part II turned to the question of what sort of liability MCOs ought
to bear when they practice medicine. An important lesson has
emerged from examining two attempts to resolve that challenge.
Statutes forbidding health plans from "interfering" with physicians'
clinical judgment avoid the problems of nouveau-corporate prac-
tice of medicine, but at the cost of handing virtually all clinical and
thereby all economic control to physicians. Such a scheme grants
doctors virtually unlimited freedom to spend other people's
money. Reciprocally, however, enterprise liability gives all legal re-
sponsibility, and thereby virtually all clinical control, to the health
plans. Their opportunities to practice medicine would burgeon
unacceptably. Between these unsavory alternatives--ceding all
economic control to physicians, versus ceding all clinical control to
health plans-there must surely be a better answer.111
The better answer begins with the suggestion that the foregoing
analyses start with the wrong questions. The first approach began
with the implicit question of how to preserve clinical control in
physicians' hands, a view presupposing that all control should in-
deed be in physicians' hands. In a comparable vein, proponents of
110. Bennett v. Indiana State Bd., 7 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. 1937). Similarly, the South
Dakota Supreme Court feared an "undue emphasis on mere money making, and commer-
cial exploitation of professional services.... Such an ethical, trustworthy and unselfish
professionalism as the community needs and wants cannot survive in a purely commercial
atmosphere." Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942).
111. Physicians and plans, of course, are hardly the only players in the delivery of health
care. Employers, other kinds of providers and, above all, patients have a key role. However,
physicians have the legally crucial power of prescription, and with it a virtual monopoly over
access to many diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Health plans, including employers
where plans are self-funded, have a similar near-monopoly over access to the funding that is
prerequisite to most health care. Because these two entities play such a crucial role, atten-
tion in this Article focuses on them exclusively.
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enterprise liability" ' began with the question "whom do we want to
bear liability in health care," a view presupposing that the most
important question is who should bear the costs of adverse out-
comes. But as argued above, we should not assign liability to an
MCO for anything we do not want the MCO to control in the first
place.
Accordingly, instead of asking "how do we preserve physician
control" or "who should bear liability," the first question should be
"whom do we want to control which aspects of health care." If we
want high-quality health care and efficient, effective health care
systems, we must ask which party is able to perform best for a given
aspect of health care. On the other side of the same coin, if we do
not want a particular party to exercise control over some aspect of
health care, then we should not assign liability to that party.
Rather, liability sh ould be ascribed, post hoc, to those who, by an-
tecedent analysis, could and should have exercised control.
However, the a:iswer to the question who should control what as-
pects of health care is neither simple nor self-evident.
IV. CLINICAL CONTROL: PHYSICIANS
VERSUS HEALTH PLANS
This Part suggests that high-quality health care should best be
achieved by a sharing of control and responsibility, appropriately
distributed between physicians and health plans.
A. Limits on Health Plans' Control
Physicians must be able to exercise a considerable degree of in-
dependent clinical discretion in the care of individual patients.
1 1 3
The reasons are classic and familiar.
First, it has already been noted 1 4 that the most central character-
istic of medicine as a learned profession is the requirement of
112. See Abraham & Weiler, Evolution, supra note 86, at 399-414; Abraham & Weiler, R-
sponsible Enterprise, supra note 86, at 29-36; Sage, supra note 68, at 162; Sage et al., supra note
86, at 7.
113. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Saving Lives, Spending Money: Shepherding the Role of
Technology, in ETHICS AND VALUES IN HEALTH CARE AND MEDICINE ON THE FRONTIERS OF
THE TWENTY-FI RST CENTURY 63 (James Bono & Stephen Wear eds., forthcoming 2000)
[hereinafter Morreim, Saving Lives].
114. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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judgment. The physician must bring scientific generalities and
finely honed skills to the care of patients whose personal and bio-
logical idiosyncrasies may defy any standard routines of care. The
hallmark of a profession is the need to make judgments that com-
bine an esoteric, expansive knowledge with a host of uncertainties
and peculiarities inherent in individual situations, toward the ob-
jective of meeting deeply important human needs. 5 At some
point, only a physician who has personally examined a patient can
discern the specific character of that person's symptoms, evaluate
which are most important, and bring these together into a coher-
ent picture of what is happening and what could or should be
done. Although more distant observers can comment intelligently
about the best general approach to the assessment and manage-
ment of a problem, a professional directly involved with the patient
is almost always in the best position to determine whether those
suggestions actually fit the realities of the case.
Second, in the era of high technology medicine it has become
nearly impossible to provide even simple, mundane kinds of care
without ready access to an array of resources. An orthopedist can-
not diagnose a fracture without radiographs, and cannot surgically
reduce that fracture without a well-equipped operating facility; the
oncologist needs sophisticated pharmaceuticals, radiation, and
chemotherapy; the infectious disease specialist needs quick access
to laboratory tests and antibiotics to treat bacterial meningitis or
pneumonia; the primary care physician must be free to provide a
variety of common tests and treatments. Admittedly, not all medi-
cal routines are well-conceived, and vexing questions arise
concerning new technologies. As argued below,"" health plans
have a legitimate role in providing general guidance for both
medical and economic efficiency in health care. But in daily clini-
cal care, physicians should not be required to fight for every
resource at every step for every patient. Endless delays to secure
innumerable approvals can be medically hazardous, not to men-
tion demoralizing to physicians and patients alike. In general,
physicians require ample freedom to examine the patient, deter-
mine that certain ordinary steps are reasonable, and take them.
Third, good health care is often impossible to provide without a
personal relationship between patient and provider. The patient
who does not trust her physician may be unwilling to disclose
115. For a useful introduction, with references, concerning the defining characteristics
of professions, see David T. Ozar, Profession and Professional Ethics, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 2103, 2103-12 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995).
116. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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medical history that is crucial to diagnostic accuracy, or may be
unwilling to adhere to treatment if she does not believe that her
provider is both knowledgeable and devoted to her best interests as
an individual. Physicians can examine and prescribe endlessly, but
if patients refuse to cooperate, it is to little avail. Reciprocally, the
patient who asks for a particular intervention has deep suspicions if
his physician, embedded in financial incentives or in an MCO-
controls-all health plan, suggests that such an intervention is un-
necessary. The result can be a gamesmanship that thwarts both
clinical quality and economic controls.
Such physician-patient trust requires that physicians have suffi-
cient flexibility to negotiate with patients to reach mutually
acceptable courses of action. If the physician does not have the dis-
cretion to offer choices suitable to the patient's personal
circumstances and values, then in an important sense, the physi-
cian and patient do not relate to each other. Rather, they relate to
a third party who tells each of them what to do. l11 The more se-
verely MCOs limit physicians' capacity to fine-tune guidelines to
patients' needs, the less opportunity arises to build trust, and the
poorer those patients' care may be.
Finally, even though physicians admittedly can err, and even
though their clinical routines are not always based on the best sci-
ence and judgment, MCOs are not necessarily better-suited to do
the job. In particular, the tools by which MCOs currently second-
guess physicians' judgments are often deeply flawed. Although
practice guidelines have proliferated in health care,"1 many of
those by which MCOs make benefits determinations and UM deci-
sions, and which they expect physicians to follow, have little, no, or
poor-quality scientific basis. The reasons are numerous.
Many important topics in medicine have not been studied scien-
tifically. " 9 Coronary artery bypass surgery, for example, was first
117. See Morreim, supra note 36, at 333.
118. According to one estimate, some 75 national organizations have developed about
1800 sets of guidelines. See Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s,
HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997, at 134, 142.
119. As noted by Feinstein, clinical research, as opposed to basic science and laboratory
research, has long been looked down upon as being somehow inferior "applied" work. As a
result, until recently funding has focused mainly on the latter. See Alvan R. Feinstein, Clini-
cal Judgment Revisited: The Distraction of Quantitative Models, 1230 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
799 (1994). Other commentators have noted that those who use guidelines
cannot help but notice that guideline developers must often reckon with research
that is modest in rigor, discordant, or nonexistent. Although most guidelines are an
amalgam of evidence and expert opinion, methods of integrating knowledge and ex-
perience into guidelines, particularly when data are sparse, are neither as mature nor
as transparent as methods of incorporating research results.
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performed in 1964, but its efficacy was not scientifically evaluated
until 1977; similarly, angioplasty to open up clogged arteries in the
heart was "performed in hundreds of thousands of patients prior to
the first randomized clinical trial demonstrating efficacy in
1992. "12° In another example, as of 1988, a national conference on
antithrombotic therapy121 evaluated the scientific foundation for
various existing recommendations on which physicians based
treatment. The American College of Chest Physicians found that
only twenty-four percent of such recommendations were based on
scientific studies, while fifty-five percent were based on uncon-
trolled clinical observations. Ten years later, forty-four percent of
the recommendations were science-based, though this was largely
because of Food and Drug Administration requirements for the
testing of new drugs. 121 Where scientific studies are available, they
are not always incorporated into guidelines because groups and
organizations that construct guidelines may have agendas other
than scientific purity, or they may simply fail to perform a suffi-
ciently thorough search for available studies.
123
Moreover, the very best kind of science, the randomized, dou-
ble-blind controlled trial, does not always apply well to ordinary
patients. In order to test strictly for the effects of the specific drug
or procedure under investigation, scientific study design must be
restricted to patients fitting a narrow set of eligibility criteria. Typi-
cally the research subjects must suffer from only the particular
disease whose treatment is being studied, with a minimum of other
diseases and medications. After all, when subjects suffer simultane-
ously from multiple diseases and treatments, it is difficult for
scientists to distinguish between the effects of the study-treatment
and all the other potentially confounding factors.'24 Once the study
Deborah Cook & Mita Giacomini, The Trials and Tribulations of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 281
JAMA 1950, 1950 (1999).
120. James E. Dalen, "Conventional" and "Unconventional" Medicine, 158 ARCHIVES IN-
TERNAL MED. 2179, 2180 (1998).
121. Antithrombotic therapies are blood-thinning, or anti-clotting, treatments used to
prevent stroke, pulmonary embolism, and the like.
122. See Dalen, supra note 120, at 2179-80.
123. See Judith Wilson Ross, Practice Guidelines: Texts in Search of Authority, in GETTING
DOCTORS TO LISTEN: ETHICS AND OUTcoMEs DATA IN CONTEXT 41-70 (PhilipJ. Boyle ed.,
1998).
124. In scientific research, evaluation of diseases and treatments
generally requires a priori hypotheses, randomization (to eliminate selection bias and
confounding), homogeneous patients at high risk for the outcome, experienced in-
vestigators who follow a protocol, a comparative measure such as placebo (if ethical),
and intensive follow-up to ensure compliance. Under these circumstances, if a treat-
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is complete, however, its results are applied in clinical practice to
all the more complex patients who could never have been eligible
for the study. 125
Outcomes studies are an emerging kind of research intended to
establish better correlations between what physicians do during
clinical care and the results that patients actually experience, both
long- and short-term. Outcomes studies in general suffer from a
lack of standardized methodologies-what counts as an outcome,
which costs should be tallied, and the like. 12 Among the legitimate
ment proves to be better than a placebo (or a comparative measure), one can be re-
assured that the treatment can work.
However, questions may remain about the ability of the treatment to work adequately
in a broader range of patients and in usual practice settings in which both patients
and providers face natural barriers to care.
Epstein & Sherwood, supra note 19, at 833; see also Alvan R. Feinstein & Ralph I. Horwitz,
Problems in the "Evidence" of "Evidence-Based Medicine," 103 AM.J. MED. 529 (1997); Kenneth B.
Wells & Roland Sturm, Care for Depression in a Changing Environment, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1995,
at 78, 80.
125. See generally Epstein & Sherwood, supra note 19. Regarding coronary bypass surgery,
some experts observed that "only 4 to 13 percent of the patients who now undergo this op-
eration would meet the eligibility criteria for the randomized controlled trials that
established its efficacy." Annetine C. Gellins et al., Capturing the Unexpected Benefits of Medical
Research, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 693, 694 (1998). Sometimes the result of the discrepancy
between eligible research subjects and ordinary patients is that even well-researched new
drugs and procedures must be quickly withdrawn from the market, as they suddenly pro-
duce undesirable results and side-effects that were not seen during the research period. See,
e.g., Michael A. Friedman et al., The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines: Do Recent Market Re-
movals Mean There Is a Problem?, 281 JAMA 1728 (1999); Elyse Tanouye, American Home
Withdraws New Drug to Ease Pain, AfterDeath of 4 Patients, WALL ST.J.,June 23, 1998, at A3.
126. See, e.g., E. Andrew Balas et al., Interpreting Cost Analyses of Clinical Interventions, 279
JAMA 54, 56 (1998); Arnold Epstein, Performance Reports on Quality-Prototypes, Problems, and
Prospects, 333 NEW ENG.J. MED. 57, 58-59 (1995); Robert G. Evans, Manufacturing Consensus,
Marketing Truth: Guidelines for Economic Evaluation, 123 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 59, 59 (1995);
Feinstein, supra note 119, at 800; Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell, TheJournal's Policy on
Cost-Effectiveness Analyses, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 669 (1994); Soumerai et al., Critical
Analysis, supra note 99, at 249.
For a summary of economic analysis, see Task Force on Principles for Economic Analysis
of Health Care Technology, Economic Analysis of Health Care Technology: A Report on Principles,
123 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 61 (1995). Economic outcomes research offers
unique methodologic choices, such as which types of costs to include (direct, indi-
rect, intangible, induced), which perspective to apply (that of society, payer,
provider, patient), which design to adopt (cost-identification, cost-benefit, cost-
effectiveness, cost-utility), from where to obtain costs (indemnity database, managed
care or capitated database, hospital cost systems, Medicare, Medicaid), and whether
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methodologies, each has significant advantages and disadvantages.
For instance, administrative databases (hospital billing records)
permit great breadth, quantity, and easy availability of data, but are
often littered with gaps and inaccuracies. 12' Furthermore, because
many organizations undertake their outcomes studies independ-




In designating endpoints of study, one study might take survival alone as the mark of suc-
cess, while another might focus on survival without major neurological deficits. Compare
Hilary E. Whyte et al., Extreme Immaturity: Outcome of 568 Pregnancies of 23-26 Weeks' Gestation,
82 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (1993), with Marilee C. Allen et al., The Limit of Viability-
Neonatal Outcome of Infants Born at 22 to 25 Weeks' Gestation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1597
(1993).
Regarding guidelines activities more generally, Power has noted:
These guidelines activities are uncoordinated ... and different agencies sometimes
issue different guidelines on the same topic. Occasionally, their recommendations
conflict.
At least some of these differences are probably attributable to the vastly different
methods used to create the guidelines. Methodological differences include the types
of people selected to be in the expert group, methods used to collect and synthesize
evidence, methods used to structure the group discussion and arrive at consensus,
and degree to which recommendations are linked directly with the evidence behind
them.
ElaineJ. Power, Identifying Health Technologies That Work, 274JAMA 205, 205 (1995); see also
Mark Holoweiko, When an Insurer Calls Your Treatment Experimental, MED. ECON., Sept. 11,
1995, at 172; LaurieJones, Does Prevention Save Money?, AMER. MED. NEwS,Jan. 9, 1995, at 17,
22.
127. See generally John Hornberger & Elizabeth Wrone, When to Base Clinical Policies on
Observational Versus Randomized Trial Data, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 679 (1997); Lisa I.
lezzoni, Assessing Quality Using Administrative Data, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 666 (1997);
Wayne A. Ray, Policy and Program Analysis Using Administrative Data Banks, 127 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 712 (1997).
128. Epstein and Sherwood note:
Even when measures are aggregated, statistical power may be insufficient to detect a
significant improvement in outcomes. For example, in a modestly sized health plan
with 25,000 members, one might estimate that 150 persons have diabetes and use in-
sulin. Even if all 150 participated in a program that reduced the number of diabetes-
related complications by 50% through improved diet, exercise, and appropriate use
of insulin, the statistical power would be too low to document the program value
compared with complication rates with a previous program.
Epstein & Sherwood, supra note 19, at 833; see also Mary L. Durham, Partnerships for Research
Among Managed Care Organizations, HEALTH AF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 111, 114. For further
discussion of the scientific problems behind health plans' practice guidelines, see BERUCH
A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND PRICING (1995); American
College of Physicians, The Oversight of Medical Care: A Proposal for Reform, 120 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 423 (1994); David M. Eddy, Three Battles to Watch in the 1990s, 270 JAMA 520
(1993); Robert G. Evans, Manufacturing Consensus, Marketing Truth: Guidelines for Economic
Evaluation, 123 ANNALS INTERNAL MEn. 59, 59 (1995); Alan M. Garber, Can Technology As-
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In other cases, outcomes studies look scientific, yet lack any ac-
ceptable methodology at all,12 9 while still others may be corrupted
by researchers' personal conflicts of interest.' 30 In some cases, stud-
ies are undertaken by drug and device manufacturers, insurers,
managed care organizations, or employers, all of whom may have
substantial conflicts of interest. 131 Such conflicts do not inherently
mean that the resulting research will be biased or inaccurate, but
the hazards cannot be dismissed. At the other end, studies
undertaken by government or academic groups may completely
ignore considerations of economics and cost-effectiveness.'
32
Rather like outcomes studies, post-marketing research on FDA-
approved products is typically undertaken to demonstrate which
pharmaceuticals or other products are most cost-effective. Yet such
research has no official requirements for scientific rigor, and
sessment Control Health Spending?, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1994, at 115, 124; Alan L. Hillman et
al., Avoiding Bias in the Conduct and Reporting of Cost-Effectiveness Research Sponsored by Pharma-
ceutical Companies, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1362 (1991); Kassirer & Angell, supra note 126, at
669; David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars-Drug Promotion in a Competitive Marketplace,
331 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1350 (1994); Steven D. Pearson et al., Critical Pathways as a Strategy for
Improving Care: Problems and Potential, 123 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 941, 943-44 (1995);
Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238 (1997); Henry Thomas Stelfox et al.,
Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium-Channel Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101
(1998); Task Force on Principles for Economic Analysis of Health Care Technology, supra
note 125, at 61; Steven H. Woolf & Robert S. Lawrence, Preserving Scientific Debate and Patient
Choice: Lessons from the Consensus Panel on Mammography Screening, 278 JAMA 2105 (1997);
George Anders, Limits on Second-Eye Cataract Surgery Are Lifted by Major Actuarial Firm, WALL
ST.J., Dec. 15, 1994, at B6; Ralph T. King, Jr., In Marketing of Drugs, Cenentech Tests Limits of
What Is Acceptable, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 10, 1995, at Al.
129. One pharmaceutical company, for instance, compiled an extensive registry listing
patients who had a particular illness (e.g., heart attack) and what treatments they received
with what outcome. The registry paid physicians to provide considerable information about
the use of drugs manufactured by the company, but not about patients who received alter-
nate treatments. As a result, the data is not only not the product of any controlled trials, it
does not even include comparative information. Although it has the look of science and is
often cited by physicians, it is thus not seriously scientific. See King, supra note 128.
Similarly, a study of clot lysis in patients who have suffered heart attack might, if funded
by the manufacturer of one particularly expensive drug, incorporate methodological or
analytic techniques that might tend to favor that drug. See BRODY, supra note 128, at 144-52.
130. See BRODY, supra note 128; Stelfox, supra note 128.
131. See Andrew F. Nelson et al., The State of Research Within Managed Care Plans: 1997
Survey, HEALTH AFF.,Jan./Feb. 1998, at 128.
132. One study found that the majority of guidelines in peer-reviewed medical litera-
ture in fact do not mention costs at all, and only 14% provided any estimates about costs of
various options for care. See Terrence M. Shaneyfelt et al., Are Guidelines Following Guidelines?
The Methodological Quality of Clinical Practice Guidelines in the Peer-Reviewed Medical Literature,
281 JAMA 1900, 1904 (1999); see also Larry Culpepper &Jane Sisk, The Development of Practice
Guidelines: A Case Study in Otitis Media with Effusion, in GE'rTING DOCTORS TO LISTEN: ETHICS
AND OUTCOMES DATA IN CONTEXT 71, 80 (PhilipJ. Boyle ed., 1998).
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studies are sometimes more of a marketing device than a bona fide
research effort.'33
Where a dearth of credible studies requires the use of expert
consensus panels to fill in the blanks, further opportunities for bias
arise if those who choose the experts have a financial interest in
the conclusions those panels reach. Absent good science, or sci-
ence supporting their objectives, guidelines-creators may simply
rely on the Merck Manual, Medicare guidelines, "an administrator
who 'asked friends who are doctors,' or an insurance company's
employee-physician (usually not a specialist in the field in ques-
tion) who reads textbooks and discusses the issue with other
insurance company physicians."034 As several commentators re-
cently observed, "materials such as the practice guidelines
prepared by Milliman and Robertson, a well-known actuarial firm,
often rely on insurers' own decisions rather than on well-designed
scientific research.' ' 35 Even where guideline developers attempt to
remain as free of bias and conflict of interest as possible, their per-
sonal values can powerfully influence their final recommendations,
as for example when they evaluate the desirability of various out-
136comes.
Equally important, guidelines often do not leave room for issues
that are personally important to patients. Many studies only collect
data on a limited array of outcomes, such as mortality or tumor
shrinkage, and do not include factors such as a treatment's effects
133. The only requirement is that the results of such studies not be used in official mar-
keting. See Hillman et al., supra note 128. In the worst examples, some of these studies are
simply marketing devices, without any scientific merit. One such "study," for instance, was
ostensibly intended to
assess the efficacy and tolerability of [the company's drug] in controlling mild-to-
moderate hypertension. The sponsor used its sales force to recruit 2500 office-based
"investigators" who were frequent prescribers of drugs in the therapeutic class in
question. Each investigator was to enroll 12 patients (for a total enrollment of
30,000) and was offered reimbursement of $85 per patient enrolled, or $1050 per
physician.
The "study" was not capable of achieving even the modest objectives stated. There
was no control group, and the study was not blinded. There was thus no possibility
that it would generate useful data on efficacy and little likelihood that it would pro-
duce data on safety other than the potential for detecting a rare adverse event.
Kessler et al., supra note 128, at 1351.
134. Angela R. Holder, Medical Insurance Payments and Patients Involved in Research, 16
IRB 19, 19 (1994).
135. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Necessary?,
340 NEW ENG.J. MED. 229, 231 (1999).
136. SeeShaneyfelt et al., supra note 132, at 1904.
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on quality of life. 37 Neither do they always have room for patients'
personal preferences, 13 8 which can be crucial for long-term adher-
ence to therapy, a factor especially important in chronic illness. In
sum, MCOs cannot at present claim to provide any divine revela-
tion of how health care should be delivered, either in broad terms
or for their own particular enrollees. To the extent that guidelines
are plainly inapplicable in individual cases, physicians must have
discretion if they are to meet patient needs.
39
B. Limits on Physicians' Control
From these limits on health plans' capacities, however, it would
be a mistake to infer that unlimited clinical discretion for physi-
cians would be the best way to optimize health care. Contrary to
common assumptions, physicians-even those within a subspecialty
area-do not necessarily share a basic set of knowledge and skills.
Clinical practices vary widely, often with no underlying basis in pa-
tients' illnesses.'O "[S]everal studies estimate that only 15 to 20
137. See Fred Gifford, Outcomes Research and Practice Guidelines: Upstream Issues for Down-
stream Users, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 38, 42; Ian F. Tannock, Treating the
Patient, Not Just the Cancer, 317 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1534 (1987).
138. See Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 124, at 532-33; Robert S. Hayward et al., Users'
Guides to the Medical Literature (pt. VIII.A), 274 JAMA 570 (1995); Spencer B. King et al., A
Randomized Trial Comparing Coronary Angioplasty with Coronary Bypass Surgery, 331 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1044 (1994).
139. See Lucian L. Leape, Translating Medical Science into Medical Practice: Do We Need a
National Medical Standards Board?, 273 JAMA 1534 (1995); Elaine J. Power, Identifying Health
Technologies That Work, 274 JAMA 205 (1995); Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines: A New
Reality in Medicine (pt. III), 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2646, 2646 (1993).
140. See generally Elliott S. Fisher et al., Hospital Readmission Rates for Cohorts of Medicare
Beneficiaries in Boston and New Haven, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 989 passim (1994); Elliot S.
Fisher et al., Prioritizing Oregon's Hospital Resources: An Example Based on Variations in Discretion-
ary Medical Utilization, 267 JAMA 1925 passim (1992); Edward Guadagnoli et al., Variation in
the Use of Cardiac Procedures After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 573 passim
(1995); Lucian L. Leape et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Small-Area Variations in the Use of
Health Care Services?, 263 JAMA 669 (1990); Lucian L. Leape et al., Relation Between Surgeons'
Practice Volumes and Geographic Variation in the Rate of Carotid Endarterectomy, 321 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 653 passim (1989) [hereinafter Leape et al., Practice Volumes and Geographic Variation];
Louise Pilote et al., Regional Variation Across the United States in the Management of Acute Myo-
cardial Infarction, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 565 passim (1995); Frans Van de Werf et al.,
Variations in Patient Management and Outcomes for Acute Myocardial Infarction in the United States
and Other Countries, 273 JAMA 1586 passim (1995); Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Variation in
Office-Based Quality: A Claims-Based Profile of Care Provided to Medicare Patients with Diabetes, 273
JAMA 1503 passim (1995); H. Gilbert Welch et al., An Analysis ofInpatient Practice Patterns in
Florida and Oregon, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 607 passim (1994); W. Pete Welch et al., Geographic
Variation in Expenditures for Physicians' Services in the United States, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 621
passim (1993); David E. Wennberg, Variation in the Delivery of Health Care: The Stakes Are High,
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percent of medical practices can be justified on the basis of rigor-
ous scientific data establishing their effectiveness."
4
1
Part of this variation arises from the uncertainties that permeate
medicine. As noted above, many features of human function and
physiology are not yet scientifically understood; the complete
range of effects and side-effects of many drugs and treatments has
yet to be fully detailed. Moreover, no individual physician knows
everything that his profession as a whole knows, nor will any one
physician master every skill with the utmost proficiency; patients
sometimes present biological idiosyncrasies that defy the textbooks.
Consequently, most clinical scenarios permit multiple acceptable
approaches. Choosing one approach over another is less a matter
of science and medicine than a matter of values and the manage-
ment of uncertainty.4 2 It becomes difficult for physicians to insist
that they alone should be entitled to make all judgment calls.4
128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 866 passim (1998); David E. 'Wennberg et al., The Association
Between Local Diagnostic Testing Intensity and Invasive Cardiac Procedures, 275 JAMA 1161 passim
(1996) [hereinafter 'Wennberg et al., Invasive Cardiac Procedures]; John E. Wennberg, Out-
comes Research, Cost Containment, and the Fear of Health Care Rationing, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1202 passim (1990);John E. Wennberg, Unwanted Variations in the Rules of Practice, 265 JAMA
1306 passim (1991);John E. 'Wennberg, Which Rate Is Right?, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310 pas-
sim (1986) ;John E. Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilised
in Boston?, LANCET, May 23, 1987 at 1185 [hereinafter Wennberg, et al., Rationed]; John E.
Wennberg et al., Hospital Use and Mortality Among Medicare Beneficiaries in Boston and New
Haven, 321 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1168 passim (1989) [hereinafter Wennberg et al., Hospital Use];
John E. Wennberg et al., The Paradox of Appropriate Care, 258 JAMA 2568 passim (1987)
[hereinafter Wennberg et al., Paradox].
141. Paul G. Shekelle et al., The Reproducibility of a Method to Identify the Overuse and Un-
defuse of Medical Procedures, 338 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1888, 1888 (1998).
142. Mark Hall addresses the confusion inherent in practicing medicine: "'Medicine
abounds with situations in which alternative clinical strategies are available with no scientific
evidence indicating which is preferable.'" Hall, supra note 8, at 481; see also JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 165-206 (1984); Renee C. Fox, Training for Uncer-
tainty, in THE STUDENT-PHYSICIAN: INTRODUCTORY STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION 207, 212 (Robert G. Merton et al. eds., 1957).
143. See Katz, supra note 142, at 205-06; E. Haavi Morreim, The Law of Nature and the
Law of the Land: Of Horses, Zebras, and Unicorns, 53 PHAROS 2 (1990).
Mark Hall views the situation in strong terms:
To a large extent, this preservation of professional autonomy is unjustified. Unques-
tionably, sound medical practice requires a degree of restriction on interference with
the details of medical treatment, whether from a lay or professional source. The sci-
entific foundations of medicine justify some group autonomy and its judgmental
nature justifies some individual autonomy. It is wrong, however, to insist on absolute
freedom from control. When the unknown value of medical procedures leaves a
broad range of acceptable methods of patient management and medical practice-
the current situation with the great bulk of medicine-it is difficult to maintain that
influencing physicians to exercise their judgment conservatively is inappropriate. To
the extent that restrictions on institutional influence lack a strong quality-of-care jus-
tification, they serve primarily to protect the vested interests of physicians.
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Perhaps more importantly, physicians do not always adhere even
to those practices that are known and widely agreed to be good
and appropriate. Overuse, underuse, and misuse of medical inter-
ventions are common, presenting significant problems in the
quality of health care provided throughout the U.S. 144 One recent
analysis suggested:
The dominant finding of our review is that there are large
gaps between the care people should receive and the care
they do receive. This is true for all three types of care-
preventive, acute, and chronic.... A simple average of the
findings of the preventive care studies shows that about 50
percent of people received recommended care .... An aver-
age of 70 percent of patients received recommended acute
care, and 30 percent received contraindicated acute care. For
chronic conditions, 60 percent received recommended care
and 20 percent received contraindicated care.
145
Examples of overuse are not hard to find. Antibiotics have often
been used with unnecessary frequency at unnecessary levels of po-
tency, with the result that resistant organisms are increasingly a
problem. 46 Similar concerns arise regarding the use of growth
Hall, supra note 8, at 535.
144. See Mark R. Chassin & Robert W. Galvin, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Qual-
ity, 280JAMA 1000 (1998). Chassin and Galvin describe the problems of underuse, overuse,
and misuse:
Underuse is the failure to provide a health care service when it would have produced
a favorable outcome for a patient.... Overuse occurs when a health care service is
provided under circumstances in which its potential for harm exceeds the possible
benefit.... Misuse occurs when an appropriate service has been selected but a pre-
ventable complication occurs and the patient does not receive the full potential
benefit of the service.
Id. at 1002; see also Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System: The Movement for
Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 488 (1999); Mark A. Schuster et al.,
How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States?, 76 MILBANK Q. 517 (1998).
145. Schuster et al., supra note 144, at 520-21. Schuster's analysis reviews a large num-
ber of studies that report on quality of health care in the United States.
146. See Chassin & Galvin, supra note 144; Culpepper & Sisk, supra note 132, at 77; Scott
F. Dowell et al., Principles of Judicious Use of Anitimicrobial Agents for Pediatric Upper Respiratory
Tract Infections, 101 PEDIATRICS 163, 165-71 (1998); Gilles L. Fraser et al., Antibiotic Optimiza-
tion: An Evaluation of Patient Safety and Economic Outcomes, 157 ARClIVES INTERNAL MED. 1689
(1997); Ralph Gonzales et al., Antibiotic Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract
Infections, and Bronchitis by Ambulatory Care Physicians, 278 JAMA 901 (1997); Ralph Gonzales
et al., Decreasing Antibiotic Use in Ambulatory Practice, 281 JAMA 1512 (1999); William J.
Hueston, Antibiotics: Neither Cost Effective nor "Cough" Effective, 44 J. FAM. PRAC. 261 (1997);
Nirmal Joshi & David Milfred, The Use and Misuse of New Antibiotics, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 569 (1995); Donald N. MacKay, Treatment of Acute Bronchitis in Adults Without Underlying
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hormone therapy in children who have no growth hormone defi-
ciency.147 Likewise, although ample evidence suggests that coronary
angiography and revascularization (cardiac bypass surgery) should
not be routinely used over more conservative medication-based
approaches, United States physicians use the surgery vastly more
often than their Canadian and European counterparts, with no
apparent justification in terms of patients' degree of illness or in-
firmity. 148 Some studies suggest on a more general level that from
eight to forty-six percent of surgeries (depending on the type of
surgery) may be unnecessary. 49 In the same vein, intensive surveil-
lance of women in preterm labor "had no effect on the primary
Lung Disease, 11 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 557 (1996); Ann-Christine Nyquist et al., Antibiotic
Prescribing for Children with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis, 279 JAMA
875 (1998); Benjamin Schwartz et al., Why Do Physicians Prescribe Antibiotics for Children with
Upper Respiratory Tract Infections?, 279JAMA 875 (1998).
147. See Barry B. Bercu, The Growing Conundrum: Growth Hormone Treatment of the Non-
Growth Hormone Deficient Child, 276 JAMA 567 (1996); Leona Cuttler et al., Short Stature and
Growth Hormone Therapy, 276JAMA 531 (1996); Beth S. Finkelstein et al., Insurance Coverage,
Physician Recommendations, and Access to Emerging Treatments: Growth Hormone Therapy for Child-
hood Short Stature, 279JAMA 663 (1998).
148. See Richard A. Lange & L. David Hillis, Use and Overuse of Angiography and Revascu-
larization for Acute Coronary Syndromes, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1838 (1998). Lange and Hillis
describe this phenomenon:
Although the patients enrolled in the United States were more likely than their Ca-
nadian counterparts to undergo coronary angiography (68 percent vs. 35 percent,
respectively) and subsequent revascularization (31 percent vs. 12 percent), the inci-
dence of reinfarction and death during more than three years of follow-up was
similar. The chief predictors of the decision by U.S. physicians to use coronary angi-
ography were a relatively young age of the patient and the availability of a
catheterization facility. Furthermore, there was marked regional variation within the
United States in the rates of use of angiography and revascularization, which was not
explained by differences in the characteristics of the patients or the incidence of
complications of myocardial infarction.
Id. at 1838. Excessive use is probably related to the more widespread availability of facilities
and trained personnel in the U.S. See id. at 1839.
There is, however, a counterargument. At least one study has shown that, although the
U.S. level of coronary bypass surgery may not always lead to improved survival, it has been
associated with improved quality of life and reduction of symptoms of angina. See Christian
W. Hamm et al., A Randomized Study of Coronary Angioplasty Compared with Bypass Surgery in
Patients with Symptomatic Multivessel Coronary Disease, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1037 (1994). In
comparisons between the U.S. and Canada, higher rates of the surgery in the U.S. were
associated with improved quality of life. SeeJack V. Tu et al., Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Sur-
gery in Ontario and New York State: Which Rate Is Right?, 126 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 13 (1997).
By the same token, Canadians also had to wait a significantly longer period of time to re-
ceive surgery, thus by implication living with angina symptoms for a longer period. See
Daniel B. Mark et al., Use of Medical Resources and Quality of Life After Acute Myocardial Infarction
in Canada and the United States, 331 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1130 (1994); Elizabeth A. McGlynn et
al., Comparison of the Appropriateness of Coronary Angiography and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft
Surgery Between Canada and New York State, 272JAMA 934 (1994).
149. See Bodenheimer, supra note 144, at 488.
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outcomes .... but did lead to significantly more unscheduled visits
and greater use of prophylactic tocolytic drugs."' 50 A two-year fol-
low-up of some patients who had undergone angioplasty for
coronary artery disease (including many with only mild disease)
showed that the angioplasty "had reduced symptoms only in the
group with severe angina, yet doubled the risk of nonfatal myocar-
dial infarction (MI) or death overall.'' 1
In other cases, underuse is the problem. Heart disease provides
leading examples. During a myocardial infarction, thrombolytic
(clot-busting) agents can dramatically improve survival rates. Yet
these drugs are seriously underused. 152 Similarly, for patients who
have survived an MI, aspirin and beta-blocker (B-blocker) drugs
can significantly reduce the likelihood of a second episode. Yet re-
cent studies show that only an average of 37.3% of physicians
prescribe these drugs for their post-MI patients."13 In a study look-
ing at the actual filling of prescriptions for cardiology patients,
"less than 50% of cardiologists' patients were taking B-blockers.'
54
It is likewise well-known that patients with congestive heart failure
can benefit greatly from ACE inhibitor (angiotensin-converting
enzyme inhibitor) drugs. Yet in one study, "on chart review of pa-
tients with congestive heart failure at one academic medical center,
only three quarters of eligible patients were taking an [ACE] in-
hibitor, and only 60% of these were at doses known to be
efficacious."' 5
150. Elliot S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of Growth in
Medical Care: How Might More Be Worse?, 281 JAMA 446, 447 (1999) (arguing that discrete
clinical interventions do not necessarily increase safety and may result in more harm).
151. Id.
152. See Harlan M. Krumholz et al., Thrombolytic Therapy for Eligible Elderly Patients with
Acute Myocardial Infarction, 277 JAMA 1683, 1683 (1997) (illustrating that physicians do not
treat eligible patients with thrombolytic agents based on physicians' clinical judgments
rather than omissions); Chris L. Pashos et al., Trends in the Use of Drug Therapies in Patients
with Acute Myocardial Infarction: 1988-1992, 23J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1023, 1023 (1994).
153. See Thomas J. Wang & Randall S. Stafford, National Patterns and Predictors offl-Blocker
Use in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease, 15 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1901, 1904 (1987); see
also Thomas M. Burton, An HMO Checks Up on its Doctors' Care and Is Disturbed Itself, WALL ST.
J., July 8, 1998, at Al (discussing a survey by the nation's largest managed care company
showing many of its physicians routinely don't prescribe essential drugs or perform diagnos-
tic tests); Ron Winslow, Studies Show Doctors Underprescribe Beta Blockers for Heart Attack Patients,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1998, at B5 (referring to two studies indicating physicians underpre-
scribe beta blockers for elderly heart-attack patients).
154. Martin T. Donohoe, Comparing Generalist and Specialty Care: Discrepancies, Deficiencies,
and Excesses, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1596, 1598 (1998).
155. Id. at 1597. Another study investigated whether physicians prescribe treatments
appropriately for patients with acute MI. This includes giving aspirin, appropriately with-
holding calcium channel blockers for those with impaired left ventricular function,
prescribing ACE inhibitors at discharge, using thrombolytics or angioplasty for reperfusion,
prescribing beta-blockers at discharge, and advising patients to quit smoking. The study
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In like manner, it is well-known that many surgery patients are at
significantly increased risk for thromboembolism. Although an ar-
ray of safe and effective means can greatly reduce this risk, in fact
they are often not used. In a study of Medicare patients from
twenty community hospitals in Oklahoma, appropriate preventive
"[p]rophylaxis measures were implemented for only 160 (38%) of
419 patients studied.... Only 97 (39%) of 250 patients.., at very
high risk received any form of prophylaxis and of these 97, only 64
patients (66%) received appropriate measures. 156
In other instances, physicians widely fail to prescribe diuretics
for hypertension, despite evidence that they are safe and effective.
Instead, prescribing habits for hypertension and other common
conditions lean toward high-cost, highly-advertised newer drugs
such as calcium-channel antagonists that may, in fact, have greater
risks and lower efficacy.15 7 More broadly, evidence indicates that
found that aspirin was used 86% during hospitalization and 78% after, calcium channel
blockers were appropriately withheld 82% of the time, use of ACE inhibitors at discharge
was only 60%, reperfusion was 67%, beta-blocker prescription at discharge was 50%, and
smoking cessation advice was 42%. Researchers concluded: "Substantial geographic. varia-
tion exists in the treatment of patients with acute myocardial infarction [AMI], and these
gaps between knowledge and practice have important consequences. Therapies with proven
benefit for AMI are underused despite strong evidence that their use will result in better
patient outcomes." Gerald T. O'Connor et al., Geographic Variation in the Treatment of Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 281 JAMA 627, 627 (1999).
156. Dale W. Bratzler et al., Underuse of Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis for General
Surgery Patients: Physician Practices in the Community Hospital Setting, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1909, 1909 (1998).
In a similar vein, although it has been known for many years that prenatal administration
of corticosteroids for fetuses at risk of premature delivery can greatly reduce mortality and
morbidity, physicians' actual adherence to this recommendation was low until highly fo-
cused educational efforts were undertaken. See generally Laura C. Leviton et al., Methods to
Encourage the Use of Antenatal Corticosteroid Therapy for Fetal Maturation: A Randomized Controlled
Trial, 281 JAMA 46, 46 (1999) (noting the reduced risks of corticosteroid therapy and its low
level of use before information dissemination).
157. See Martin Moser, Why Are Physicians Not Prescribing Diuretics More Frequently in the
Management of Hypertension?, 279 JAMA 1813 (1998). As Furberg and Psaty note regarding
the question whether drugs called calcium agonists (CAs) should be used for hypertension:
The documentation on efficacy and safety is limited to small, short-term clinical trials,
typically a few hundred patients treated for 2 to 3 months. Pharmaceutical companies
have used skillful marketing based on concepts and mechanisms of action to promote
these agents and have avoided for more than a decade calls for large-scale, random-
ized clinical trials to determine the effect of these drugs on major cardiovascular
disease end points. Clinicians have chosen to prescribe CAs without proper evidence
of health efficacy and long-term safety.
Curt D. Furberg & Bruce M. Psaty, Should Dihydropyridines Be Used as First-Line Drugs in the
Treatment of Hypertension? The Con Side, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2157, 2157 (1995); see
also Frank A. Lederle et al., Reserpine and the Medical Marketplace, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 705, 705 (1993).
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many physicians unwittingly base treatment and drug selection de-
cisions more on drug advertisements than on medical literature. 
58
Preventive medicine likewise can receive short shrift. Many phy-
sicians, particularly primary care providers, do not prescribe
standard anti-asthma medications, such as inhaled corticoster-
oids. 5 9 Physicians also commonly fail to order standard diabetes
care, such as frequent glucose monitoring, regular cholesterol
checks, and annual retinal exams.'60 Other routine health mainte-
nance interventions are often neglected for the population at
large.' In still other examples, physicians widely fail to use antibi-
otics for ulcers caused by H pyloi bacteria; recognize and treat
depression in the outpatient setting; use anticoagulents for
patients in chronic atrial fibrillation; or use breast-conserving sur-
gery for women with localized breast tumors.
62
Diagnostic accuracy is not always better than therapeutic
choices. In a ten-year retrospective review of autopsies at a major
New Orleans medical center, researchers found that of the 250
tumors found at autopsy, 111 were undiagnosed or misdiagnosed.
Of particular concern, in fifty-seven percent of these patients, the
underlying cause of death was directly related to the undiagnosed
or misdiagnosed malignancy. 63 In other diagnostic areas, several
158. See generally Jerry Avorn et al., Scientific Versus Commercial Sources of Influence on the
Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982); Ronald I. Shorr & William L.
Greene, A Food-Borne Outbreak of Expensive Antibiotic Use in a Community Teaching Hospita4 273
JAMA 1908 (1995).
159. See Antonio P. Legorreta et al., Compliance with National Asthma Management Guide-
lines and Specialty Care: A Health Maintenance Organization Experience, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 457, 459 (1998); see also Donohoe, supra note 154, at 1599.
160. See Donohoe, supra note 154, at 1600; Leape, supra note 139, at 1535; Weiner et al.,
supra note 140, at 1506; Burton, supra note 154, at Al.
161. See Burton, supra note 152, at Al. One study focused on physicians in United
HealthCare plans at three sites. The study examined the following issues: whether physicians
measured potassium levels in patients on diuretics; whether more than one H2 agonist was
(inappropriately) prescribed for patients with peptic ulcer disease; whether insulin-
dependent diabetics had their AIC levels measured; and whether insulin-dependent diabet-
ics received an annual eye exam. Across the three plans, the figures were 41%, 50%, and
47% for measuring potassium levels; 21%, 18%, and 20% for inappropriate prescription of
more than one H2 agonist; 26%, 26%, and 23% for measuring AIC levels; and 46%, 43%,
and 62% for annual eye exams. The chief medical officer of the plan concluded:
"'Mediocre' is the best word to describe the clinical performance revealed in these meas-
ures." Lee N. Newcomer, Physician, Measure Thyself HEALTH AFF.,July/Aug. 1998, at 32, 35.
162. See Donohoe, supra note 154, at 1600. Of note, the use of breast-conserving surgery
is rising in some areas, though not always with the use of adjunctive radiation therapy. See
Gerald F. Riley et al., Stage at Diagnosis and Treatment Patterns Among Older Women with Breast
Cancer: An HMO and Fee-for-Service Comparison, 281 JAMA 720, 721 (1999); Xianglin Du, In-
crease in the Use of Breast-Conserving Surgery, 282JAMA 326 (1999) (letter to the editor).
163. See Elizabeth C. Burton et al., Autopsy Diagnoses of Malignant Neoplasms: How Often
Are Clinical Diagnoses Incorrect?, 280JAMA 1245 (1998); see also George D. Lundberg, Low-Tech
Autopsies in the Era of High-Tech Medicine, 280JAMA 1273 (1998).
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studies suggest that "[s] imple clinical prediction rules have proven
superior to physician judgment inthe [sic] diagnosis of acute ab-
dominal pain, acute myocardial infarction, streptococcal tonsillitis,
pneumonia, intracellular [versus] extracellular causes of jaundice,
presence of ankle fracture, survival after diagnosis of Hodgkin's
disease or coronary artery disease. 'l
Even simpler techniques of physical examination may not always
be mastered. A recent study evaluated the ability of residents in
internal medicine and family practice to recognize important
sounds when listening to patients' hearts. Overall, the residents
recognized only twenty percent of the sounds. The study found:
all residents we tested had great difficulty in identifying 12
commonly encountered and important events. Residents were
incorrect 4 of 5 times, improved little with year of training,
and were not more accurate than a group of medical students.
Indeed, trainees in both residencies were less accurate than
students [for certain kinds of heart sounds].... [W]e found
minimal gains, if any, as a result of residency training. Defi-
ciencies of this type will probably persist even after residents
enter practice. Indeed, increasing evidence in the literature
seems to suggest that errors in physical diagnosis are com-
monly encountered among generalists. These errors may even
lead to greater utilization of resources and a higher cost of
165care.
When significant clinical deficiencies such as those listed above
are directly pointed out to physicians, they do not always move
quickly to change their clinical practices. Studies suggest that con-
certed, systematic attempts to encourage physicians to adopt
improved approaches often fail.ce Some observers have perhaps
164. BASIC BENEFITS AND CLINICAL GUIDELINES 48-49 (David C. Hadorn ed., 1992)
(citations omitted).
165. Salvatore Mangione & Linda Z. Nieman, Cardiac Auscultatory Skills of Internal Medi-
cine and Family Practice Trainees: A Comparison of Diagnostic Proficiency, 278 JAMA 717, 721
(1997).
166. Commentators confirm that "[miost guidelines ... have not been successful in
changing physician behavior." Landon et al., supra note 73, at 1379 (citing as evidence S.R.
Weingarten et al., Evaluation of a Pneumonia Practice Guideline in an Interventional Trial, 153
Am. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 1110 (1996)); see alsoJeremy M. Grimshaw & Ian
T. Russell, Effect of Clinical Guidelines on Medical Practice: A Systematic Review of Rigorous Evalua-
tions, 342 LANCET 1317 (1993); Lawrence M. Lewis et al., Failure of a Chest Pain Clinical Policy
to Modify Physician Evaluation and Management, 25 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 9 (1995). Physi-
cians do not always stay up-to-date via the commonly presumed means of browsing medical
journals, attending professional meetings, and conferring regularly with colleagues. See C.
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cynically suggested that entrepreneurial concerns may not be ir-
relevant. For example, organized medicine's support for the early
corporate bans allegedly was at least partly based on fears about
lost revenues and increased competition. 67 A number of antitrust
suits chastising organized medicine for its resistance to HMOs and
to contract medicine point out that at least sometimes, when cer-
tain business practices have been condemned as unethical or as
bad medicine, an underlying concern has been economic.' s
Errors in the broader health care context have also been studied
in recent years. A widely cited study of adverse events in New York
hospitals during 1984 concluded that the rate of adverse events was
3.7%. Although errors do not entail substandard care, the re-
searchers further concluded that the rate of negligent adverse
events was one percent.6 9 In the realm of drugs alone, one recent
David Naylor, Better Care and Better Outcomes: The Continuing Challenge, 279 JAMA 1392, 1392
(1998).
167. See STARR, supra note 8, at 25-29 (1982).
168. In American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the Supreme
Court held that the American Medical Association (AMA) was guilty of antitrust violations as
it opposed prepaid group practice and forbade its members to interact with physicians in
such arrangements. The AMA "conspired to boycott Group Health in order to prevent it
from marketing medical services in competition with petitioners' doctor members." Id. at
523.
In another antitrust case against the AMA, the Seventh Circuit held that the organiza-
tion's long-term opposition to chiropractic care was not just rooted in concerns for public
health; it was also rooted in the desire to eliminate competition. See Wilk v. American Med.
Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990).
In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Counci 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme
Court struck down a rule of the state pharmacy board, which had declared it to be unethical
to advertise drug prices. The Court noted wide variations in prices and suggested that se-
crecy about prices served more to keep prices high than to protect consumers. See id. at 754,
763.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court struck down the state of
Virginia's minimum fee schedule for attorneys as anticompetitive. In a footnote, the Court
observed that one county had declared that reducing one's fees below the prevailing mini-
mum was an unethical form of solicitation. See id. at 777 n.4. In 1962, the Fairfax County Bar
had declared that "although there is an ethical duty to charge a lower fee in a deserving
case, if a lawyer " ' purely for his own advancement, intentionally and regularly bills less than
the customary charges of the bar for similar services... [in order to] increase his business
with resulting personal gain, it becomes solicitation.., and also a violation of Canon 7,
which forbids the efforts of one lawyer to encroach upon the employment of another.'" Id.
The Court acknowledged that the professions may have certain ethical tenets that differ
from business, but did not deem such a possibility to be a justification of anticompetitive
activity in the case under consideration. See id. at 786-87; see also National Soc'y of Prof'l
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
169. See Brennan et al., supra note 108; Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse
Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Malpractice Study, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
377 (1991). Leape notes that a one percent rate of negligent errors may seem acceptable,
but
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study looked at all medication-prescribing errors in a teaching
hospital, fromJanuary 1, 1987 through December 31, 1995. During
that period, the rate of errors per written-order, per admission,
and per patient-day all increased significantly.17°
Such rising rates of error, omission, and excess are not entirely
surprising. During the past several decades, "an explosion has oc-
curred in the proliferation and supply of drugs, the availability of
technological tests and bedside procedures, and the array of high-
tech diagnostic methods and invasive therapeutic maneuvers. Each
of these changes creates new opportunities for error." 7' As medical
science and the health care systems within which it is provided be-
come increasingly complex, it may simply be impossible to expect
physicians to continue their traditionally unilateral responsibility
for care and outcomes.
C. Who Should Control What: Finding
a Reasonable Balance
At this point several observations sit somewhat uneasily together.
On the one hand, forbidding health plans to "interfere" with phy-
sicians' judgment would effectively require them to give physicians
unfettered clinical discretion. Such unfettered physician discretion
can be financially costly and will not necessarily produce optimal
care for individuals or for broader populations.
a 1% failure rate is substantially higher than is tolerated in industry, particularly in
hazardous fields such as aviation and nuclear power. As W.E. Deming points out ...
even 99.9% may not be good enough: "If we had to live with 99.9%, we would have: 2
unsafe plane landings per day at O'Hare, 16,000 pieces of lost mail every hour,
32,000 bank checks deducted from the wrong bank account every hour."
Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994).
170. See Timothy S. Lesar et al., Medication-Prescribing Errors in a Teaching Hospita4 157
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1569, 1570 (1997). Another study finds that fatal adverse drug
reactions (whether or not the product of either error or negligent error) rank between the
fourth and sixth leading cause of death in the U.S. SeeJason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Ad-
verse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-anaylsis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA
1200, 1202 (1998).
171. Alvan R. Feinstein, System, Supervision, Standards, and the "Epidemic" of Negligent Medi-
cal Errors, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1285, 1286 (1997). Feinstein further notes: "The
combination of shortened durations of time for both the patient in hospital and the house
officer on a service has reduced the house officer's sense of continuity of care within the
hospital ... and has increased the difficulties of maintaining rigorous patterns of supervi-
sion and discussion." Id. at 1287.
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On the other hand, the guidelines by which health plans exert
clinical control may be based on unsound research or on no sci-
ence at all. Even scientifically well-founded guidelines cannot
supplant the need for professional judgment that can fine-tune
clinical care to meet individual patients' distinctive biological and
personal needs.
If one conclusion seems evident, it is that neither physicians nor
health plans should monopolize clinical control. A thoughtful divi-
sion of labor, based mainly on who is better suited to do which
tasks, appears to make more sense. What follows should not be
deemed a definitive decree concerning the allocation of control. It
is at most a suggestion of one reasonable approach to allocating
responsibilities between health plans and physicians. It does not
propose a rigid separation. As health care delivery evolves, consid-
erable blurring of these boundaries is likely. Some tasks seem more
suitable for the organization level, while others seem more suited
to the personal, clinical level. Because this Article principally con-
cerns corporate practice of medicine, attention will focus on health
plans.
1. Health Plans--Clearly, there are some things that only physi-
cians or related practitioners will do. 1 2 Only an individual clinician
can physically examine a patient, ask about medical and social his-
tory, and probe for further information. Only an individual patient
can discuss matters of intimate privacy or personal importance
crucial to diagnosis and treatment. Only an individual surgeon can
decide, when something goes wrong in the midst of surgery, what
should be done at that moment. Health plans cannot hope to re-
view every physical exam and history; cannot scrutinize the
differential diagnosis1 73 for every patient with vague complaints;
cannot second-guess every x-ray or ultrasound reading; cannot
build a warm, deeply trusting relationship with each patient; and
cannot determine, on their own, when their guidelines do not fit a
particular patient. In short, health plans have no choice but to
trust that, as a general rule, their physicians know how to practice
medicine in the care of individual patients. 4
172. For some of these functions, other kinds of practitioners can serve equally well, in-
cluding advanced practice nurses and physicians' assistants.
173. "Differential diagnosis" is a term commonly used in clinical medicine to indicate
the various diagnoses that might be possible, given the patient's initial signs, symptoms,
history, etc. Further diagnostic evaluation and work-up (further tests and examinations)
then help the physician whittle down this list to one or a small number of working diagno-
ses, on the basis of which treatment options are considered.
174. In this assessment one might at least somewhat disagree with the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (1991). A hospital was sued for its
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Accordingly, rather than obsessively peering over shoulders and
second-guessing every individual clinical encounter, health plans
should fulfill four main functions. First, they must focus on the
business aspects of running a health care system. Where plans un-
dertake to provide care rather than merely reimburse it, or where
they limit subscribers' choices among providers of care, they must
next monitor what happens under their auspices. There are two
aspects to this monitoring. On a positive note they should identify
and encourage the delivery of patterns of good care-their second
function. A more negative dimension involves health plans' third
function, the identification and correction (when reasonable) of
defective care. In both these realms, health plans must focus not so
much on individual episodes as on overall patterns of care. The
fourth function is the practice of medicine in certain circum-
stances. Each of these functions deserves discussion.
Health plans' first and most obvious domain is the business side.
The chief function of a health plan is, of course, to ensure that the
right care (or payment, in the case of an indemnity plan) flows to
the right people, for the right purposes, in a timely fashion, and as
physicians' failure to recognize the dangers posed by some medications a patient had taken
prior to being injured in a motor vehicle accident. See id. at 704-05. In an amicus brief the
state's hospital association argued that it is neither realistic nor appropriate to expect the
hospital to conduct daily review and supervision of the independent medical judgment of
each member of the medical staff of which it may have actual or constructive knowledge. See
id. at 708. The court disagreed, holding:
It is well established that a hospital staff member or employee has a duty to recognize
and report abnormalities in the treatment and condition of its patients. If the attend-
ing physician fails to act after being informed of such abnormalities, it is then
incumbent upon the hospital staff member or employee to so advise hospital authori-
ties so that appropriate action might be taken. When there is a failure to report
changes in a patient's condition and/or to question a physician's order which is not
in accord with standard medical practice and the patient is injured as a result, the
hospital will be liable for such negligence.
Id. at 709 (citations omitted).
To a certain extent, a hospital (or health plan) surely may be expected to "control" its
employees by establishing policies, periodically checking on compliance with those policies,
and having procedures in place to address failures to adhere to those policies. It is also rea-
sonable to expect that the hospital will require nurses and other qualified personnel to
report clearly aberrant instances of care, so far as they can discern within their training and
scope of practice. It is neither feasible nor reasonable to expect, however, that an institution
be aware of, anticipate, or avert each and every instance of inadequate conduct on the part
of its employees and staff members. Such levels of scrutiny would require constant, one-on-
one supervision of every physician at every moment. If courts nevertheless want to impose
liability even where the institution has implemented proper policies and could not have
avoided the adverse outcome, then it might be plausible to suppose that such a court is
more interested in finding a party affluent enough to pay for injuries than in apportioning
damages according to fault or blameworthiness.
SUMMER 1999]
promised in the contract. For an indemnity plan this will be finan-
cial payment, whether to indemnify patients for expenses incurred,
or to pay providers directly for goods and services rendered. In an
HMO-type plan this will mean arranging for the availability of
enough of the right kinds of providers and facilities, in enough of
the right locations, to ensure that the full spectrum of promised
services will be readily available to enrollees. It also means forging
appropriate contractual and financial relationships with such pro-
viders. Transferring high levels of financial risk to physician groups
who are too inexperienced to manage resources under capitation,
for instance, can be a poor business practice that, in turn, can have
serious medical implications for subscribers.
Admittedly, such business matters cannot be distinguished
crisply and cleanly from medical issues. As noted, every medical
decision is also a spending decision, and any decision to cut busi-
ness costs will almost certainly have medical implications, whether
immediate or long-term. Still, some functions are obviously busi-
ness-related and clearly are the health plan's responsibility-from
arranging for facilities and housekeeping, to equipment purchases
and maintenance, reimbursing covered medical interventions, and
paying the electric bills.'
7 5
Regarding the second function, identifying and encouraging
patterns of good care, it should be noted that modern health plans
virtually cannot operate without using some sort of clinical guide-
lines to decide which care is covered under the plan. It is a
business necessity with obvious clinical implications." 6 Ideally used
as a coherent set of protocols that suggest scientifically well-
founded ways to handle routine problems, guidelines have become
an important tool for promoting consistency of care, integrating
new information into clinical practice, and shaving off common
practices that are nevertheless pointless or injurious.
Good guidelines are especially needed regarding serious ill-
nesses and injuries. Here, at the cutting edge of medicine where
life and death are the most uncertain, where excesses and inade-
quacies of care can have the most dire consequences, where the
newest technologies may or may not deliver wondrous results, and
175. Several courts have distinguished between purely business functions and clinically-
oriented activities. See, e.g., Women's Med. Ctr. v. Finley, 469 A.2d 65, 73 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1983). Other courts reject the distinction, including Parker v. Board of Dental Exam-
iners, 14 P.2d 67, 73 (Cal. 1932).
176. Health plans are not necessarily restricted to a single set of guidelines. Different
large purchasers (such as employers) may want different levels of coverage, and these in
turn may require variations in the guidelines that the health plan applies to beneficiaries'
care.
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where the greatest amounts of money are spent,' it is particularly
important for health plans to ensure that care is provided effec-
tively and resources are used wisely."'
Systematic technology assessment should be the cornerstone of
health plans' coverage decisions in this difficult realm. 9 The resul-
tant guidelines can help health plans not only to make more
rational, evidence-based decisions, but to respond more fairly and
consistently to treatment requests from members of a given plan.
Such fairness is particularly important with respect to dire illness and
cutting-edge care. If one person in Plan X receives a bone marrow
transplant that is then denied to another person with the same dis-
ease in the same plan, the latter patient can easily complain of
unjust treatment, perhaps even at the cost of her life. 180
Guidelines need not focus exclusively on what is and is not fi-
nancially covered. HMOs especially are defined at least partly by
the fact that they are not merely pass-through financial agents, but
directly arrange for their enrollees' care. Therefore, they should
actively seek to ensure that high-quality care is delivered under
177. For example, many companies have adopted innovative policies, such as medical
savings account plans, to provide their employees the flexibility to control the costs of their
own health care. See Editorial, Consumer-First Health Care, WALL ST. J.,July 21, 1994, at A14.
178. See Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113.
179. See Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, HEALTH AFT., Winter 1995,
at 180, 186-89 (analyzing the history and evolution of the term medical necessity from an
insurance concept to a rationing tool); Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance
Therapies and Managed Care: Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 32 (providing different models of managing experimental and last
chance therapies as examples of how decision making regarding coverage can include fair-
ness and legitimacy); David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical
Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030, 3030 (1993) (suggesting critical evaluation of new technologies
before they are widely adopted); Holoweiko, supra note 126, at 171; Stanley Joel Reiser,
Criteria for Standard Versus Experimental Therapy, HEALTH Apr., Summer 1994, at 127, 130-31
(outlining criteria to illustrate distinctions between standard and experimental therapies
and suggesting a new category, cross-over therapy); James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, De-
termining "Medical Necessity" in Mental Health Practice, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at
5 (proposing a rationale for determining medical necessity in the administration of health
insurance benefits); Earl P. Steinberg et al., Insurance Coverage for Experimental Technologies,
HEALTH AeF., Winter 1995, at 143 (proposing policy options for payment of new technolo-
gies that take into account the necessity of balancing various interests); see also Bucci v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. Conn. 1991). In Bucci, the insurer applied a
five-factor "Technical Evaluation Criteria" test to evaluate new technologies. "Summarized,
the criteria are (1) government regulatory approval; (2) evidence which permits conclusions
as to the effect on patient health; (3) demonstrated improvement of the patient's health;
(4) demonstration of medical benefit at least equal to that offered by established alternative
treatment; and (5) improvement other than in investigational settings." Id. at 731. The
court, however, rejected the criteria as invalid on the ground that they were subjective in
nature and imprecise. See id. at 732-33.
180. See Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113; William M. Sage, "Health Law 2000" The
Legal System and the Changing Health Care Market, HEALTH Asp., Fall 1996, at 9, 13-14; Michael
Meyer & Andrew Murr, Not My Health Care, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 36-38.
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their auspices. In that effort, they should strive affirmatively to en-
hance quality of care. This will mean making sure not only that
their physicians refrain from delivering treatments that an enrollee
does not need or did not purchase, but also reciprocally that physi-
cians provide the care that the plan has promised and that patients
need. As noted above, physicians do not always provide even the
care that is of obvious, agreed-upon benefit."s Accordingly, stan-
dards for such things as preventive care and routine management
of chronic illnesses such as diabetes, arthritis, and asthma will be
two important areas in which health plans undertake affirmative
leadership.
As a practical matter, health plans are ordinarily in a better posi-
tion than the lone clinician to identify effective patterns of care.
Few individual physicians have time for the kind of systematic lit-
erature search that can help them to distinguish between solid
research that warrants changing their clinical routines and more
transient findings that do not warrant change. In contrast, health
plans can and should make it their business to evaluate ongoing
research and scientific consensus, especially regarding those as-
pects of medicine that are most amenable to general guidelines.
Because all health plans must choose and make explicit the levels
of care they will cover, and because some additionally furnish that
care, they should do so on the basis of the best available evi-
dence.112 Fortunately, a number of efforts are under way to collect,
evaluate, and promulgate evidence-based guidelines.'83
181. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
182. See Daniels & Sabin, supra note 179, at 38-40.
183. Weingarten describes some of these efforts:
The Clinical Practice Guidelines Directoiy (http://www.ama-assn.org) serves as a reposi-
tory of guidelines on more than 2000 topics from more than 90 organizations. It is
easy to use and can quickly point a reader toward the sources of guidelines on rele-
vant topics. The US. Preventive Services Task Force Guide to Clinical Preventive Services
Second Edition [(visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://odphp.050phs.dhhs.gov/pubs/
guidecps/>] is an evidence-based source of preventive care recommendations ....
Another resource available on the Internet is the National Guideline Clearinghouse,
which includes guidelines that meet specific criteria for being evidence-based. The
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, in partnership with the American Asso-
ciation of Health Plans and the American Medical Association, has invited developers
of practice guidelines, including professional societies, to submit guidelines for pos-
sible inclusion in the National Guideline Clearinghouse. Guidelines must contain
systematically developed statements that satisfy the Institute of Medicine's definition
of a guideline ... be developed under the auspices of a medical organization; be de-
rived from a systematic review of the relevant literature and science; have been
developed, reviewed, or revised in the past 5 years; and be available in English.
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The mandate to choose, scrutinize, and improve guidelines
need not mean that each health plan should work in isolation from
other plans. Indeed, collective investigation, if undertaken by con-
sortia of health plans and other research entities, is more likely to
produce credible results than if each plan, struggling in isolation,
reinvents its own peculiar wheel. 184 Neither does it mean lock-step,
one-size-fits-all mandates. Because not even the best guidelines will
fit every patient, and because various purchasers have different lev-
els of resources to spend on health care, discretion, flexibility, and
ranges of options are important. Nevertheless, guidelines for rou-
tine care do help remind physicians that, in the absence of
contraindications or exceptional circumstances, certain things
should generally be provided for patients with particular condi-
tions.
As health plans do the homework for continually improving rou-
tines of care, they can institute mechanisms for helping physicians
to learn and implement these routines in daily practice. The ordi-
nary physician, busy each day with large numbers of patients, may
know very well the need for inhaled steroids for asthma and ACE
inhibitors for congestive heart failure. But a hectic pace may make
it difficult simply to remember everything that must be done dur-
Scott Weingarten, Using Practice Guideline Compendiums to Provide Better Preventive Care, 130
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 454, 455 (1999). The website for the National Guideline Clearing-
house is <http://www.guideline.gov>.
184. Collective efforts using combined resources may produce better results than the
less well-funded and potentially biased investigations of any one health plan. Fortunately,
some collaborative research and guidelines construction is already underway. A large num-
ber of major corporations have pooled funds to create the Foundation for Accountability
(FAcct), an organization that is conducting outcomes studies on a variety of conditions. The
research looks not only at standard morbidity and mortality, as many such studies do, but
also investigates quality of life, return to normal functions of living, and other matters im-
portant to a broader view of medical outcomes. See Ken Terry, Can Functional-Status Surveys
Improve Your Care?, MED. EcON., Aug. 12, 1996, at 126.
In an analogous effort, the Managed Care Outcomes Study, funded by six MCOs and the
National Pharmaceutical Council, recently led to publication of a study indicating that ex-
cessively stringent formulary limits tend perversely to increase patient visits to outpatient
offices, emergency rooms, and hospitals, and to raise overall costs of care. See Horn et al.,
supra note 99, at 1105. In the same vein, the HMO Research Network coordinates 12 re-
search organizations located within integrated health care organizations. See Durham, supra
note 128, at 111.
The Ambulatory Sentinel Practice Network (ASPN) looks at common clinical dilemmas,
and has created guidelines, for example, for CT scanning in new-onset headache, whether
and when to do dilation and curettage after uncomplicated miscarriage, whether there
should be hospitalization of every woman with pelvic inflammatory disease, and whether to
prescribe 10-day antibiotic course for every child with otitis media. See Paul A. Nutting et al.,
Practice-Based Research Networks Answer Primary Care Questions, 281 JAMA 686 (1999). For fur-
ther discussion see Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113; Morreim, Resource Limits, supra
note 40, at 49-52.
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ing that ever-briefer office or bedside visit.115 MCOs can help by
creating computer-based systems to remind physicians to imple-
ment recognized improvements to care.8 6 By the same techniques
they can also play a major role in helping, for instance, to reduce
error rates with medications."7 Aside from computer aids, an MCO
can initiate ongoing education, working with medical leaders in
the community.' ss MCOs can also undertake their own health-
promotion initiatives, such as support groups and education and
exercise classes for groups such as diabetics, asthmatics, and the
elderly. 189
185. A physician in the office may only have 10 to 15 minutes with a patient.
Yet, in that time, the physician may also need to call the MCO to authorize a specialty
referral, consult a directory to determine which specialist is on the MCO panel, refer
to a managed care formulary to choose a drug, and even take a call from a hospital
nurse urging the physician to discharge another patient before the end of the day.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to keep the physician focused on the many
initiatives each MCO employs to achieve... improved quality and reduced costs.
Harry L. Leider, Influencing Physicians: The Three Critical Elements of a Successful Strategy, AM. J.
MANAGED CARE, Apr., 1998, at 583.
186. See supra notes 140-71 and accompanying text; see alsoJerry Avorn et al., Reduction
of Incorrect Antibiotic Dosing Through a Structured Educational Order Form, 148 ARCHIVES INTER-
NAL MED. 1720 (1988); David W. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a
Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, 280 JAMA 1311 (1998); Robert B.
Elson & Donald P. Connelly, Computerized Patient Records in Primary Care: Their Role in Mediat-
ing Guideline-Driven Physician Behavior Change, 4 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 698 (1995); R. Scott
Evans et al., A Computer-Assisted Management Program for Antibiotics and Other Antiinfective
Agents, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 232 (1998); Giles K. Fraser et al., Antibiotic Optimization: An
Evaluation of Patient Safety and Economic Outcomes, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1689 (1997);
Richard Garibaldi, Computers and the Quality of Care-A Clinician's Perspective, 338 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 259 (1998); Atel Gawande, When Machines Become Doctors, Will Doctors Become Machines ?,
MED. EcON., Oct. 5, 1998, at 144; Dereck L. Hunt et al., Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Deci-
sion Support Systems on Physician Performance and Patient Outcomes, 280 JAMA 1339 (1998);
Mark Morhane et al., Improving Prescribing Patterns for the Elderly Through an Online Drug Utili-
zation Review Intervention, 280JAMA 1249 (1998); J. Marc Overhage et al., Computer Reminders
to Implement Preventive Care Guidelines for Hospitalized Patients, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1551 (1996); Robert A. Raschke et al., A Computer Alert System to Prevent Injury from Adverse
Drug Events, 280JAMA 1317 (1998).
187. Sage andJorling note:
[T]he most common cause of serious medication errors with respect to antibiotics is
a failure to note a patient's known allergy, a mistake that can be addressed at the in-
stitutional level by devoting greater resources to eliciting information, developing
more effective charting and communication among providers, and maintaining a
work environment that promotes attentiveness.
William M. Sage & James M. Jorling, A World That Won't Stand Still: Enterprise Liability by Pri-
vate Contract, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007, 1021 (1994) (footnote omitted).
188. See Leider, supra note 185.
189. See Deborah A. Grandinetti, What It Takes for Big Groups to Succeed, MED. EcON., Apr.
7, 1997, at 87.
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just as health plans should work, positively, on patterns of care
that should be delivered, so must they, on a more negative side,
strive to identify and remedy poor quality care. This is their third
proposed area of major responsibility. As argued above, health
plans neither can nor should try to second-guess every individual
clinical encounter. To do so would require enormous resources-
virtually an entire extra layer of physicians to check up on each
action of physicians caring for patients at the clinical level, with per-
haps yet another layer to monitor the monitors. More importantly,
such intense supervision would be intrusive and unnecessary. '90 No
supervision system can prevent all errors. Further, if the medical staff
is chosen with reasonable care, such intimate scrutiny should be un-
necessary.
Accordingly, health plans' target should be patterns in which a
physician systematically fails to render an appropriate quality or
quantity of care. As the American College of Physicians suggested
regarding UM: "Evidence suggests that the principal process of re-
view, the case-by-case review, may not be cost-effective and may not
be conducive to improving quality..1.1 Instead, "the American Col-
lege of Physicians recommends that routine case-by-case reviews be
abandoned and replaced by profiling of patterns of care.' 192 Those
profiles can look, on the positive side, to ensure that physicians are
providing important forms of standard care. On the negative side,
they can monitor adverse incidents to ascertain whether a given
physician has simply committed an individual error or whether iso-
lated incidents constitute a pattern.
When systematic deficiencies appear, plans can respond with
additional education and training or supervision, or practice re-
strictions or, if necessary, personnel replacement. Other cases may
show that the guidelines, not physicians' behavior, must change.
The health plan's question is not so much whether a physician
erred in a given instance, or whether that physician owes redress to
the patient. Such personal debts from physicians to their patients
are generally better addressed within classic malpractice tort law.
Rather, the health plan's task is to determine whether a given phy-
sician should remain on its panel and, if so, what remedial actions
should be taken to improve performance. Such evaluations might
be undertaken directly by the MCO or may emerge from tradi-
190. See supra note 174.
191. American College of Physicians, supra note 128, at 423.
192. Id. at 426.
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tional kinds of peer review. Either way, the process should be
geared not toward punishment, but toward quality improvement.9"
In their fourth function, health plans literally practice medicine.
This domain is unavoidable because the preceding three do not
have clear or precise boundaries. Even if health plans ordinarily
provide only general guidance on the optimal management of
chronic illnesses; even if they are looking mainly for patterns of
inadequate care among their physicians rather than trying to pin-
point every error or dubious judgment; and even if their business
duties are not ordinarily "medical" in character; at certain points
the health plan will be looking into a member's clinical care in a
way that can only be described as practicing medicine, because the
plan will be making medical judgments that directly determine, or
at least are a substantial factor, in the patient's specific care and
outcomes. Because of this inquiry health plans could find them-
selves practicing medicine in any of their first three domains.
In the first domain it should be noted that not all business deci-
sions are strictly business. Again, because every medical decision is
also a spending decision, controls on spending will often have
medical implications. If the health plan takes those implications
into account, then in at least some instances it practices medicine.
If surgeons on its staff request that a certain piece of equipment
such as a new type of laser be purchased, for instance, the MCO
may need to undertake an independent evaluation of the sur-
geons' claims that this new laser will produce better outcomes than
current procedures. If the MCO decides that these medical claims
are not fully credible, and thereby declines to purchase it on medi-
cal grounds (rather than on cost or other grounds), its decision
will directly affect the health care of the enrollees who would oth-
erwise have been treated with that laser. In such cases the health
plan may have practiced medicine in the course of making busi-
ness decisions. These cases will be debatable, because the impact of
the MCO's business decisions on individual patients' care and out-
comes will be considerably more remote than in the other two
domains. Nevertheless, it is possible at least to envision scenarios in
which business decisions involve practicing medicine.
The more obvious opportunities for practicing medicine arise
from the exercise of plans' prerogative to foster good practice pat-
terns and address poor performance patterns. Within the second
domain, if a physician indicates that one of his patients needs an
193. See David Blumenthal & Arnold M. Epstein, The Role of Physicians in the Future of
Quality of Management (pt. 6), 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1328, 1329 (1996); Glenn Laffel &
Donald M. Berwick, Quality in Health Care, 268JAMA 407 (1992).
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exception to the general guidelines, the health plan must scruti-
nize that case. It will make a medical judgment as to whether the
physician's request is warranted, and its decision whether to cover
the requested variation will in many cases have a major impact on
the patient's care. In essence, any time an MCO must interpret
guideline ambiguities in order to determine which care it will
cover for a specific enrollee, or any time it must consider excep-
tions to its usual limits on covered care for a patient who does not
fit the guidelines, there is a high probability that the plan will be
practicing medicine. Note that these instances mainly arise in
situations in which the MCO exercises direct utilization control
over the care that is provided. Where the plan has transferred fi-
nancial risk to physicians, as through capitation, physicians are
usually free to provide as much care as they wish, so long as they
provide no less than that to which the patient is contractually enti-
tled. In these cases the physician, not the plan, makes the
medical/financial judgments.
An MCO also will sometimes practice medicine in its third do-
main of control, as it monitors staff performance. If a physician's
asthmatic patients generally do not do as well as expected, for in-
stance, the health plan must investigate that physician's individual
interventions for particular patients, and it must at certain points
determine whether those decisions constituted good medicine or
bad medicine. If the MCO then decides to work more closely with
that physician, directing his actions to ensure that the care of sub-
sequent individual patients comports more closely with its
standards, it may in many instances be practicing medicine.
2. Physicians-If these are the kinds of things that health plans
can and should control, physicians likewise have their distinctive
domains. These will be outlined only briefly here, because this Ar-
ticle focuses primarily on MCOs. As noted above, physicians must
have the freedom to exercise considerable clinical discretion so
that they can examine patients, form diagnostic hypotheses, ex-
plore those hypotheses, discuss choices and their respective
benefits and risks, and in the process build the personal, trusting
relationship with each patient that is indispensable to good care.
Physicians should not have to spend endless hours justifying ordi-
nary decisions to MCOs, because the MCOs should be looking
mainly for practice patterns, not moment-to-moment decisions.
Beyond these obvious patient-care duties, physicians also have a
substantial responsibility to identify instances in which patients do
not fit the health plan's guidelines. As noted, even the best clinical
protocol will not fit every patient. The physician has the profes-
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sional training and the responsibility to recognize such instances
and to pursue acceptable alternatives on behalf of that individual.
More broadly, physicians also need to help plans recognize
when the guidelines themselves do not work and need to be im-
proved or replaced. It is a task that can only be fulfilled by those
who live and work at the intersection between the general (the sci-
ence and guidelines of care) and the particular (the patients).
3. The Balance-In sum, health plans and physicians each can
claim a fairly distinctive role. MCOs' job is to find better ways to
shape clinical patterns of practice, and to find minimally intrusive
ways to draw physicians in that direction. MCOs cannot escape
practicing medicine at certain points, but those occasions should
be limited. Practicing medicine should be the exception, not the
rule.
Although the foregoing is at best a rough sketch of the ways in
which control might be distributed between physicians and health
plans, it shows a sufficiently clear path to move into a discussion of
liability. If the proper priority is to establish first who should be
controlling what in the delivery of health care, and only thereafter
to consider who should bear what sort of liability for adverse out-
comes, it is now appropriate to move to that latter question. As
noted, health plans and physicians should bear liability only for
those aspects of care that they can and should control. As Part V
demonstrates, MCOs should first pare down the extent to which
they currently practice medicine, if their role is to focus on prac-
tice patterns as recommended here.
V. SCALING BACK MCOs' MEDICAL PRACTICE
If MCOs and physicians, respectively, should bear liability only
for those aspects of health care that they can and should control,
as per Part III; and if, per Part IV, MCOs should practice medicine
sparingly rather than routinely; then the first task in discussing an
appropriate liability allocation is to examine the extent to which
MCOs currently practice medicine. As this Part proposes, health
plans currently practice medicine much more than they should,
primarily because health care contracts are largely founded on the
concept of medical necessity. As long as health plans must first de-
cide whether an intervention is medically necessary (thereby
making a medical judgment) before they can make a coverage de-
termination, and so long as financing is a prerequisite to receipt of
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care for many patients (thereby causing these medical judgments
to have a significant impact on patients' treatment and outcomes),
plans will continue to practice medicine routinely rather than spar-
ingly. For many reasons, this arrangement should change.
A. Scaling Back Medical Practice:
Dropping "Medical Necessity"
Virtually all health plans today define their benefits in terms of
medical necessity. This has not always been the case. For many
years, health plans covered almost any service that a physician
chose to order, until it eventually became evident that some physi-
cian services were extravagant, exclusively for convenience, utterly
untested, or dubious in a host of other ways. Not until the 1960s, in
an attempt to curb costs, did health plans begin seriously to restrict
what they would cover under the rubric of "medical necessity."
Courts, in turn, tended not to enforce plans' denials of coverage
because the term was so vague. Over time, plans attempted to carve
out more explicit exclusions, such as for experimental or cosmetic





To be precise, health plan contracts do not actually contain lan-
guage that expressly promises to cover all medically necessary
health care. Rather, contracts typically identify the categories of
services they cover, such as inpatient care and outpatient care
(including hospital and health professional services, for both
emergency and non-emergency situations); care for mental illness
and substance abuse; prescription drugs; laboratory, radiology, and
diagnostic services; home health care and hospice services; durable
194. As Hirshfield and Harris have observed, "[w]hen a health plan agrees to cover
health care services, the contract with the beneficiary generally specifies that the services
must be paid for when they are reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
an illness or injury suffered by the beneficiary." Hirshfeld & Harris, supra note 8, at 4; see also
Gerard F. Anderson et al., Medical Technology Assessment and Practice Guidelines: Their Day in
Court, 83 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1635, 1636 (1993); Bergthold, supra note 179, at 182-83; David
M. Eddy, Benefit Language: Criteria That Will Improve Quality While Reducing Costs, 275 JAMA
650, 652 (1996) (noting that "unadorned" contract language limiting coverage to "medically
necessary" or "appropriate" treatment has failed to limit liability for refusing treatment and
suggesting that insurers adopt "specific criteria" illustrated with examples to clarify exactly
what treatment will be paid for under an insurance contract); Hall & Anderson, supra note
30, at 1644-51; Wendy K. Mariner, Patients'Rights After Health Care Reform: Who Decides What Is
Medically Necessary?, 84 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 1515, 1516 (1994) (noting that "(p]rivate health
insurance companies have relied on the concept of medical necessity to limit the services
they will pay for in individual cases").
1010 [VOL. 32:4
medical equipment; and rehabilitation. 95 Not all plans cover all
categories and, for care within the accepted categories, plans typi-
cally carve out exceptions. Exclusions are usually for services that
are "experimental," "innovative," or "not medically necessary." By
implication, however, as long as a service is within an accepted
category and is medically necessary (that is, it is not excluded or
unnecessary), it is covered.'96 One would be hard-pressed to find
any health plan that explicitly denies services that it agrees are
"medically necessary," and that fall within a category the plan
pledges to cover.
This implicit promise to cover all necessary services within the
accepted categories is not limited to indemnity-style plans that gov-
ern resources via reimbursement decisions and explicit utilization
management. The promise also applies to capitated arrangements
and other forms of risk-sharing. An MCO might contract with pri-
mary care physicians (PCPs) under a capitation arrangement, for
instance, requiring them to provide primary care services and a
spectrum of laboratory, radiology, and specialist services. That
capitation contract will ordinarily list the kinds of services physi-
cians must cover in exchange for the set monthly per-patient fee.9
Although such arrangements leave physicians considerable free-
dom (albeit at personal financial peril) to deliver the care they
deem appropriate, in fact the contract the patient signs with the
health plan will still contain the familiar categories of services, the
same exclusions for experimental and medically unnecessary serv-
ices, and the same implicit promise that, if a service within those
categories is necessary, it will be covered. However specific or gen-
eral the list may be, and however free these physicians may be to
deliver more than what they are obligated to provide, they must at
least provide medically necessary services of the covered types.
If health plans clearly owe their beneficiaries medically necessary
care, however, it is not at all clear what medical necessity means. At
one extreme, an intervention is only necessary if it is "'essential to
195. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 135, at 230.
196. See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 8, at 4 ("When a health plan agrees to cover
health care services, the contract with the beneficiary generally specifies that the services
must be paid for when they are reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
an illness or injury suffered by the beneficiary.").
197. In some cases such listed services include procedures traditionally done by special-
ists, including dermatologic procedures such as skin biopsies, casting of undisplaced
fractures, coloscopies, sigmoidoscopy, joint aspiration and injections, stress tests, and the
like. See James Novak, How We Wrote Our Own Managed-Care Success Story, MED. ECON., Aug.
10, 1998, at 116; Ken Terry, Surprise! Capitation Can Be a Boon, MED. EcoN., Apr. 15, 1996, at
126; Karen Cheney, What You Can Learn from an M.D. Mutiny in a Managed-Care Plan, MONEY,
Dec. 1995, at 21.
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reach a goal of improving or curing a disease.' , 9 8 This minimalist
definition could preempt many interventions currently deemed
standard-including such mundane things as anesthesia for pain-
ful office-based procedures. In contrast, Medicare's definition of
"reasonable and necessary" inquires whether the intervention is "safe
and effective, not experimental, and appropriate. ''199 On this much
broader approach, an intervention is necessary if it "works., 20 Com-
monly, "medically necessary means medically appropriate. It
excludes experimental care, nonstandard treatments, treatment
without any known benefit, and treatment such as cosmetic surgery
not intended to correct or relieve a medical condition., 20 1 It means
"sufficiently accepted within the medical community to be covered
as acceptable medical care.,
22
198. William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical Necessity, 22 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 362, 362
(1992).
199. Steinberg et al., supra note 179, at 144.
200. One of the most specific definitions comes from Florida's workmen's compensa-
tion law:
"Medically necessary" means any service or supply used to identify or treat an illness
or injury which is appropriate to the patient's diagnosis, consistent with the location
of service and with the level of care provided. The service should be widely accepted
by the practicing peer group, should be based on scientific criteria, and should be de-
termined to be reasonably safe. The service may not be of an experimental,
investigative, or research nature, except in those instances in which prior ap-
proval ... has been obtained.
Mariner, supra note 194, at 1516-17 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c), quoted in Jones v.
Petland Orlando S., 622 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). This more precise-looking
definition is still almost hopelessly vague when one tries to define "appropriate," "widely
accepted," "reasonably safe," "experimental," and similar phrases. See also Eddy, supra note
194, at 651-52; Helvestine, supra note 68, at 172-73.
201. Hall et al., supra note 56, at 1056; see also CLARK C. HAVICHURST, HEALTH CARE
CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 15 (1995) ("Under the
test of 'medical necessity,' which serves almost universally as the contractual touchstone of
plan coverage, the criteria tsed to check the spending discretion of providers are almost
exclusively medical, not economic.").
202. Mariner, supra note 194, at 1516. Definitions of medical necessity include:
* Medicare excludes coverage for services that "are not reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed
body member."' Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1) (1988).
* In the context of Medicaid, Minnesota specifies that covered services must:
A. be determined by prevailing community standards or customary practice and us-
age to: (1) be medically necessary; (2) be appropriate and effective for the medical
needs of the recipient; (3) meet quality and timeliness standards; (4) be the most
cost effective health service available for the medical needs of the recipient;
B. represent an effective and appropriate use of medical assistance funds.
MINN. R. 9505.0210 (1999).
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Historically, health plans have tended to defer to the collective
judgments of the profession to determine which interventions are
necessary under which circumstances.03 However, in light of the
term's vagueness and the difficulty of enforcing benefit limits,
plans have increasingly felt compelled to adopt clinical guidelines
of their own, together with specific procedures for determining the
* The Florida Administrative Code provides the following definition:
Covered outpatient services must be medically necessary, preventive, diagnostic,
therapeutic or palliative services.... Requested service must be reasonably calculated
to prevent, diagnose, correct, cure, alleviate, or prevent the worsening of conditions
that threaten life, cause suffering or pain, result in illness or infirmity, or threaten to
cause or aggravate a handicap, physical deformity, or malfunction, and there is no
equally effective, more conservative or less costly course of treatment available.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 10C-7.040 (1992).
* In South Dakota:
To be medically necessary, the covered service must meet the following conditions:
(1) It is consistent with the recipient's symptoms, diagnosis, condition, or injury; (2)
It is recognized as the prevailing standard and is consistent with generally accepted
professional medical standards of the provider's peer group; (3) It is provided in re-
sponse to a life-threatening condition; to treat pain, injury, illness or infection; to
treat a condition that could result in physical or mental disability; or to achieve a level
of physical or mental function consistent with prevailing community standards for di-
agnosis or condition; (4) It is not furnished primarily for the convenience of the
recipient or the provider; and (5) There is no other equally effective course of treat-
ment available or suitable for the recipient requesting the service which is more
conservative or substantially less costly.
S.D. ADMIN. R. 67: 16:01:06.02 (1991).
0 Finally, in California, a service is "medically necessary" or a "medical necessity" when it is
"reasonable and necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disabil-
ity, or to alleviate severe pain." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 51303(a) (2000) (incorporated by
reference into 22 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 51336 (2000)).
0 Health plans' corporate definitions can be somewhat more specific. The Travelers Insur-
ance Company has used this definition:
Company determines, in its discretion, if a service or supply is medically necessary for
the diagnosis or treatment of an accidental injury or sickness. This determination...
[considers] the following:
" It is appropriate and required for the diagnosis or treatment of the accidental
injury or sickness.
• It is safe and effective according to accepted clinical evidence reported by
generally recognized medical professional or publications.
" There is not a less intensive or more appropriate diagnostic or treatment al-
ternative that could have been used in lieu of the service or supply given.
Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 971 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D. Mass. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded in part, all on other grounds, 167 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing
language from The Traveler's Plan, under which plaintiff was covered).
203. See Havighurst, supra note 201, at 14-15.
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necessity of new technologies and innovative interventions. °4 Such
guidelines have not been universally welcomed. As noted through-
out this Article, their use has prompted bitter accusations that
MCOs are meddling in the clinical practice of medicine.
The problems with using "medical necessity" as the contractual
cornerstone of health care benefits, however, go far deeper. There
are three major problems that collectively constitute sufficient rea-
son to discard the concept in favor of an alternative, namely
guidelines-based contracting, as proposed in Part V.B below.
2 0
5
First, the vagueness of "medical necessity" makes it very difficult
for health plans to enforce denials of coverage-a problem that, in
turn, makes it very difficult for plans to control their costs and
thereby the price for those who pay premiums. Second, the con-
cept does not fit the clinical realities of medicine so that as a
benefits standard it requires continual second-guessing of, and in-
terference with, physicians. Third, the standard currently leads to
the mistreatment of patients in several ways: by cultivating over-
expectations with the promise of sameness among various health
plans that in fact deliver very different levels of benefits; by de-
creasing their benefits as the operational definition of "medical
necessity" quietly shrinks; and by removing choices legitimately left
to patients, through the imperative of "necessity." Each of these
deserves a closer look.
From health plans' perspective, perhaps the biggest drawback to
the medical necessity criterion is that its vagueness renders the
benefits denials issued under its aegis almost impossible to defend
in court. As a general principle of contract law, courts routinely
construe ambiguities against contracts' drafters. °6 This doctrine of
contra proferentum is based on a fairness principle: because the party
writing the agreement had the opportunity to make the wording
clear, the drafting party's failure to do so should not work against
the party who lacked this opportunity.
20 7
204. In Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 723 (D. Conn. 1991), Blue Cross-Blue
Shield had implemented a five-factor "Technical Evaluation Criteria" (TEC). See id. at 731;
see also discussion supra note 178. The court held the reliance on the TEC to be invalid on
the ground that some portions were irrelevant, other portions subjective. See Bucci, 764 F.
Supp. at 732; see also Bergthold, supra note 179, at 183; Daniels & Sabin, supra note 179, at
28-29; Hall & Anderson, supra note 30, at 1683-89; Mariner, supra note 194, at 1516.
205. See infra notes 246-253 and accompanying text.
206. The court applied this principle in Bucci: "Ambiguities in the plan should be re-
solved against the insurer." Bucci, 764 F. Supp. at 730. "If a court finds that an insurance
policy is ambiguous ..... an ambiguous policy will be construed in favor of the insured."
Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 515 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Neb. 1994); see also ROBERT H.
JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 125-36 (2d ed. 1996).
207. See Havighurst, supra note 201, at 182.
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Given the vagueness of "medically necessary," courts have often
overturned health plans' denials of benefits on this familiar con-
tractual principle. Thus, in Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Association,"', the
Illinois Supreme Court held that because "medically necessary" was
ambiguous, and contract disputes must be construed in favor of
the insured, the patient should receive coverage for inpatient re-
moval of impacted wisdom teeth. °9 In McLaughlin v. Connecticutf 210
General Life Insurance Company, the California Supreme Court
likewise cited contra proferentum to hold that, in view of the ambigui-
ties inherent in "medical necessity," immunoaugmentive therapy
for terminal lung cancer should be covered. 1 In Ex Parte Blue Cross-
Blue Shield,212 the Alabama Supreme Court relied on the same rea-
soning to award coverage for inpatient care of osteoporosis-related
fractures, while in Group Hospitalization, Inc. v. Levin2 13 the District
of Columbia appellate court awarded costs incurred for private
nursing services for back pain. Similarly, a California appellate
court held in Hughes v. Blue Cross 1 that when an insurer imple-
mented a standard of medical necessity significantly different from
prevailing community standards and did not properly investigate a
claim, it stood to incur liability for bad faith. 215 One could list many
more cases,2 16 but the trend is clear. As long as courts honor contra
proferentum, and as long as health plans rely mainly on such an ut-
terly ambiguous concept as medical necessity to guide the great
208. 365 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. 1977).
209. See id. at 643.
210. 565 F. Supp. 434 (Cal. 1983).
211. See id. at 450-52.
212. 401 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1981).
213. 305 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1973).
214. 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1988).
215. Not every case goes against the health plan, of course. Sometimes a court is even
willing to construe an interpretation of medical necessity as being plain enough to prevail.
See, e.g., Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1982); Lockshin v. Blue Cross,
434 N.E.2d 754 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
216. In McGraw v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998),
Prudential Insurance denied physical therapy services for a patient with multiple sclerosis on
the ground that it would not affect the course of the disease. Prudential's criteria of medical
necessity required that the service be provided by a doctor, that it be recognized as safe and
effective for the particular illness or injury, that it be employed in ways consistent with medi-
cal standards, and that it not be educational, experimental, or investigational. See id. at 1256.
The Tenth Circuit held that the denial of services was arbitrary and capricious, on the
ground that the insurer had covertly modified its definition of medical necessity to incorpo-
rate an additional requirement that the treatment provide a measurable, substantial
increase in functional ability. See id. at 1263.
On some occasions courts invoke government Medicare or Medicaid approaches to
medical necessity in order to find for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Thie v. Davis, 688 N.E.2d 182, 187
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
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majority of their benefits decisions, plans can expect their efforts
to limit expenditures to be systematically thwarted.
This need not happen. Recently courts have been willing to up-
hold benefits denials where the contracts were clear.1 7 In Loyola
University of Chicago v. Humana Insurance Co.,215 for example, sur-
geons performing coronary bypass surgery responded to an
emergency situation by implanting an artificial heart as a bridge to
the human heart transplant that was performed a month later. The
insurer refused to cover the artificial heart on the ground that it
was experimental, and also denied reimbursement for the human
heart transplant because the patient failed to secure UM approval
as required. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "This is a contract case
and the language of the benefit plan controls. Again, Loyola and
Mr. Via were certainly free to attempt these life-saving procedures,
but the benefits plan does not require Humana to pay for them."
21 9
The court noted:
As the plan unambiguously states, no benefits are payable
without prior approval. It is undisputed that necessary records
on Mr. Via's condition were not sent by Loyola until after the
heart transplant and that the records were not received by
Humana until after Mr. Via's death.... Although it seems cal-
lous for Humana to deny coverage for a life-saving procedure
and thereafter deny all subsequent hospital expenses-in es-
sence saying to Mr. Via "we will not cover you because you
should be dead"-Humana's humanity is not the issue here.
This is a contract case and the language of the benefit plan
controls.22 °
217. See Morreim, Contributive Justice, supra note 40, at 254-56.
218. 996 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1993).
219. Id. at 903.
220. Id. The same Seventh Circuit panel ruled similarly in Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Insur-
ance Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994), in which a woman sought an autologous bone marrow
transplant (ABMT) for advanced breast cancer. The insurance contract excluded research
treatments, and the court found that ABMT for her disease was research. "Under the pres-
ent state of the law, we are bound to interpret the language of the specific contract before
us and cannot amend or expand the coverage contained therein." Id. at 1412. The court
went on to observe: "Although we fully realize the heartache Mrs. Fuja's family has endured,
as judges we are called upon to resolve the legal question presented in this appeal, i.e., in-
terpreting the Benefit Trust insurance contract." Id. at 1407.
In the same vein, in Free v. Travelers Insurance Co., a Maryland district court held that an
insurer was not obligated to pay for the patient's laetrile:
The plaintiff's unfettered right to select a physician and follow his advice does not
create a corresponding responsibility in the defendant to pay for every treatment so
chosen. As one court noted, "it is simply not enough to show that some people, even
1016 [VOL. 32:4
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The Tenth Circuit echoed the theme in McGee v. Equicor-
Equitable HCA Corp.,221 upholding an HMO's refusal to pay for
nursing home care for which prior UM approval had not been
sought as required.
We are mindful that the objective in construing a health care
agreement, as with general contract terms, is to ascertain and
carry out the true intention of the parties. However, we do so
giving the language its common and ordinary meaning as a
reasonable person in the position of the HMO participant, not the
actual participant, would have understood the words to
222mean.
The court pointed out that "[w] hile it is readily apparent Mr. McGee
sought the best possible care for his daughter, he was still obligated
to work within the defined contractual borders of the HMO he
elected to participate in. ' '2 3 These borders may be especially
experts, have a belief in [the] safety and effectiveness [of a particular drug]. A rea-
sonable number of Americans will sincerely attest to the worth of almost any product
or even idea."... Finally, the Court notes that the plaintiff, by his own admission, was
well aware that laetrile and nutritional therapy are disapproved of by the majority of
cancer specialists. He was equally well informed of the accepted alternative, chemo-
therapy.
551 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Md. 1982) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in McLeroy v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, a district court in Georgia pointed out that it
was "well within the bargaining rights of the parties" to determine the conditions under
which special alternative services might be provided. 825 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
In Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, a New Jersey district court held that the plaintiffs'
written policy was clearly written, with adequate notice of policy changes, and enabled the
plaintiffs to make an informed purchase. No. 93-3711, 1993 WL 384498, at *9 (D.NJ. Sept.
24, 1993). Significantly, the court also expressed an interest in the responsibilities of sub-
scribers:
This Court is also troubled by the invitation to recognize a cause of action, not based
on the fact that the policy was unclear, but rather, as plaintiffs suggest, on the prem-
ises that insureds (1) do not read the full brochure detailing policy coverage and (2)
do not heed the admonition in the section on "How the Plan Changes" to review the
entire policy.
Id. This decision was subsequently overturned by the Third Circuit, on grounds, not of its
substance, but of jurisdiction: preemption from state to federal court should not have oc-
curred automatically, and required further adjudication. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail
Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1994).
221. 953 F.2d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 1992).
222. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989)). The
Tenth Circuit did require the HMO to pay for some benefits that in fact met their utilization
requirements.
223. Id. at 1207.
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important in managed care. "HMOs are not traditional insurance
companies designed to indemnify participants for services they uni-
laterally select at any geographic location. Instead, HMOs...
provide comprehensive prepaid medical services within a defined
geographic area, and with specific exceptions, only by participating
medical professionals and facilities."2 4 Equicor, the defendant
HMO, had made rehabilitation benefits contingent on periodic
determinations by the patient's physician-a requirement Mr.
McGee knew about but chose not to fulfill.
In a now-familiar vein, the Third Circuit upheld an insurer's re-
quirement that the patient pay thirty percent of his medical bill
because he failed to secure advance approval for his care. The pa-
tient knew at least a full day ahead of time that he would need to
enter the hospital; his wife could have obtained precertification
within the time required. Beyond that, he presented hospital ad-
missions staff with an outdated insurance card that lacked current
225 k oprecertification information. A number of other recent cases
226
likewise insist on faithfulness to contractual language.
224. Id.
225. See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1336 (3d Cir. 1991). The court noted that it is
legitimate for those who pay for health care to attempt to contain their rising costs. See id. at
1328. In this case, a corporation gave teeth to its precertification requirement by imposing a
30% penalty on those who failed to comply. If this requirement were overruled, the corpora-
tion "and its employees would be deprived of an important weapon in their joint battle
against rising healthcare costs." Id. at 1338.
226. In Gee v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 919, 920-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the
Utah Court of Appeals upheld an insurer's denial of coverage for removal of breast im-
plants, holding that the policy was not ambiguous. "Insurance policies are contracts, and are
interpreted under the same rules governing ordinary contracts.... [A] policy term is not
ambiguous simply because one party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own
interests." Id. at 920-21.
Other courts have expressed similar views. The Seventh Circuit has noted that "because of
the plain language of the contract, we would have no choice but to affirm the denial of cov-
erage even if, arguendo, we were to review that decision de novo." Harris v. Mutual of Omaha
Co., 992 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1993).
The district court for the District of Columbia has held:
The plan is clear and not ambiguous.... The contract is clear. HDC-ABMT is not
covered under the 1992 Plan. Accordingly, Blue Cross/Blue Shield's decision deny-
ing coverage and OPM's review and affirmance of that decision are rational. Denial
of coverage is clearly not an arbitrary and capricious decision; indeed, because of the
plain language of the contract, the Court would affirm denial of coverage even if that
decision were reviewed de novo.
Arrington v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv. Inc., 806 F. Supp. 287, 290-91 (D.D.C. 1992).
Many similar cases have upheld payers' denial of funding based on the plain language of
the contract. See Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe
v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 995
F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.
1993); Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992); Healthcare Amer-
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Thus, although courts have been quite willing to uphold clear
contracts (usually found where the contract has an explicit exclu-
sion), many balk when the only basis for benefits denial is a fuzzy
claim that "we consider this medically unnecessary., 227 Therefore, a
health plan that wants to draw and meaningfully enforce limits on
its expenditures must provide a far more specific contractual basis.
The second flaw in the "medical necessity" concept concerns the
ill fit between "necessary" and ordinary medical care. The problem
is immediately obvious in the question now facetiously bandied
about as health plans consider the recently approved drug for male
impotence: how often per month (per week? per day?) is drug-
assisted sexual intercourse "medically necessary"? Most medical
decisions do not present clear choices of life versus death, nor jux-
tapose complete cures against pure quackery. Rather, the daily
stuff of medicine is a continuum requiring a constant weighing of
ica Plans, Inc. v. Bossemeyer, 953 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Kan. 1996); McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No.
93-3711, 1993 rL 384498 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F.
Supp. 590 (S.D. Ala. 1988); see also Adnan Varol, M.D. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F.
Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (informing a group of psychiatrists that they were expected to
adhere to their contract with an insurer, even though they now disagreed with its cost con-
tainment provisions); Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987) (upholding insurer's
right to deny payment, based on its own judgment of medical necessity); Madden v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Cal. 1976) (holding that an employee who had chosen
his HMO from among several options negotiated on his behalf by a state agency was bound
by the arbitration clause to which he had agreed, and noting that "one who assents to a
contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the lan-
guage").
227. Judges' favor for injured plaintiffs sometimes goes further than invoking contra pro-
ferentum. In a pattern dubbed "judge-made insurance," courts have sometimes stretched
contractual language to award benefits when desperate individuals seek treatment that may
be their only hope for survival. Even when contractual language is quite clear, courts some-
times have gone out of their way to favor the needy individual over the large insurer. In
Bailey v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia, 866 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1994), for instance, a
woman with advanced breast cancer sought high-dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem
cell rescue (a form of bone marrow transplant). The insurer's policy language stated:
"'Autologous bone marrow transplants and other forms of stem cell rescue.., with high
dose chemotherapy and/or radiation are not covered.'" Id. at 280. Although the policy
listed some exceptions to this exclusion, it explicitly stated that breast cancer was not such
an exception. Nevertheless, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the policy was ambiguous. Typically judges in these cases will argue that the
contract is ambiguous, that the ill patient may lose his life while the health plan loses only
money, and that the patient will arguably prevail on the merits in any event.
For a more detailed discussion of "judge-made insurance" see generally PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 142-52 (1988); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the
Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981);John H. Ferguson et al., Court-Ordered Reimbursement for
Unproven Medical Technology: Circumventing Technology Assessment, 269 JAMA 2116 (1993); Hall
& Anderson, supra note 30; Frank P.James, TheExperimental Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool
for Silent Rationing of Health Care, 12J. LEGAL MED. 359 (1991).
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uncertainties and values .22 For a patient needing hip replacement,
one prosthetic joint may be longer-lasting but far costlier than an
alternative. One antibiotic regimen may be far less costly than an-
other, but with somewhat higher risks of damage to kidneys or
liver. One antihypertensive regimen may be considerably more
costly than an equally effective alternative, but with fewer side-
effects and the enhanced convenience of once-a-day dosage rather
than thrice-a-day may be more palatable. It is artificial precision to
say that one is "necessary," connoting "essential" or
"indispensable"-and the other is "unnecessary," suggesting
"superfluous" or "pointless." Various options have merits, and of-
ten no single approach is clearly "the correct" choice. A given
option is better described as "a good idea in this case," "reasonable,
given the cost of the alternative," "maybe a bit better than the al-
ternative," or "not ideal, but acceptable." The question is whether a
particular medical risk or monetary cost is worth incurring in order
to achieve a desired level of symptomatic relief or functional im-
provement. A huge array of treatments fits this description: more
or less worthwhile, but not "(un)necessary" in any ordinary sense.
The patient will not die without it, or might even die from it (with
this or that degree of risk), and alternatives can be reasonable even
if each option has drawbacks.
More broadly, concepts like necessity, appropriateness, and ef-
fectiveness can only be defined relative to a goal.229 Antibiotics are
not "effective" per se; they are effective against bacteria and, bar-
ring placebo effect, ineffective against viruses. It makes no sense
for a physician to prescribe antibiotics if the goal is to eradicate a
viral infection. But if the goal is to placate a relentlessly demanding
patient who insists on antibiotics for his viral infection, it may at
least superficially make sense to write the prescription. The choice
228. Hirshfield and Thomason describe medical necessity as a continuum:
Ultimately, medical necessity can be thought of as a continuum, whereby services at
one end of the continuum are clearly necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an
illness or injury, and services at the other end of the continuum are clearly unneces-
sary, and in between are services that have some degree of likelihood of benefiting a
patient. As one moves along the continuum from clearly necessary to clearly unneces-
sary, the percentage of likelihood of a benefit from the provision of the health care
involved decreases. The value judgment that must be made is how large the percent-
age of likelihood of a benefit should be for care to be provided. The closer that
percentage is to 100%, the more likely it is that some individuals will be harmed by
the withholding of care that could have benefited them.
Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 8, at 24-25 (citations omitted).
229. See Eddy, supra note 194, at 654-55; Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility,
326 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1560 (1992).
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of goals, and of the prices that may or may not be worth paying in
order to reach them, requires a level of clinical complexity that is
not reflected in simplistic notions such as necessity. It would be far
better to acknowledge these choices and uncertainties openly than
to hide them under blanket categories connoting a facade of preci-
sion.2 3° Across a broad spectrum of such choices and trade-offs,
people may legitimately come to different conclusions about what
price is worth paying, medically and financially, to achieve what
kinds of goals. To presume that a medical intervention is either
necessary or unnecessary belies the legitimacy of such variation.
The problem marches from the conceptual drawing board into
the clinical setting as health plans try to apply this ill-fitting notion
to actual medical decisions. As long. as health plans base their
benefits decisions on medical necessity, they must make a medical
decision in order to make an economic decision. Wherever this
economic decision has a significant bearing on the actual decisions
and outcomes experienced by patients, the health plan is practic-
ing medicine-on a clinically odd basis, at that. Such routine
second-guessing and intrusion into the clinical setting disrupts re-
lationships and often is counterproductive.2 3' A considerably less
intrusive approach, "guidelines-based contracting" as outlined be-
low, 23 2 would have plans specify what they do and do not cover.
In the third problem, patients can be harmed in unexpected
ways when benefits are allocated according to the medical necessity
concept. First, the concept invites enrollees to entertain high, uni-
form expectations. As long as virtually every plan implicitly appears
to promise all "necessary" care within the covered categories, and
as long as a person assumes (as many laymen do) that medicine is
highly scientific and precise, then it is reasonable for health plan
subscribers to expect that all of the plans based on medical neces-
sity will provide the same benefits, aside from any explicit
exclusions or other specified exceptions that might differentiate
them. If, beyond this, subscribers invoke the most common con-
ception of medical necessity-the definition that only requires an
intervention to be safe, effective, and appropriate in order to be
"necessary"-enrollees will believe they are entitled to "everything
that works," regardless of the price of their plan. Indeed, the very
notion of medical necessity implies a scientific evaluation, to which
230. For further elaboration see Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113.
231. See supra Part V.C.1.
232. See infra Part V.B.
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economic and other normative considerations are irrelevant.13 It is
a tall order for any plan that wants to provide care at an economi-
cal price.
The bright promise of high, uniform benefits could hardly be
farther from reality. As noted above, "medical necessity" can range
narrowly from only those interventions that will diagnose or cure
disease, to broad versions encompassing virtually everything that
works.234
Even a unified definition would not solve the problem. The fed-
eral Medicare program for the elderly and disabled, for example,
ostensibly provides a uniform set of benefits to all enrollees, al-
though various insurers act as the plan's fiscal intermediaries. Yet
in a study conducted by the General Accounting Office, Medicare
payment for a chest x-ray was 451 times more likely to be denied in
Illinois than in South Carolina; payment for a physician office visit
was almost ten times more likely to be denied in Wisconsin than in
California; and payment for real-time echocardiography was nearly
one hundred times more likely to be denied by Transamerica Oc-
235cidental than by Blue Shield of California.
233. As Helvestine points out, health plans may even see an increased risk of liability if
they permit theirjudgments of medical necessity to influenced by economic considerations.
See Helvestine, supra note 68, at 174.
234. See supra Part V.A.1.
235. See Michael Pretzer, Hate Those Medicare Denials? Try Moving, MED. ECON., Apr. 10,
1995, at 92-93. Data showed that for every 1000 services allowed:
0 for office visits, Blue Shield (BS) of northern California denied 12.1, while Wisconsin
Physicians' Service (WPS) denied 109.7;
. for real-time echocardiography, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS) of Illinois denied zero,
BS of California denied 2.2, and Transamerica Occidental (TO) denied 198.5;
. for myocardial perfusion imaging, BCBS of Illinois and WPS denied zero, while TO de-
nied 252.3; and
0 for ambulance with basic life support: BS of California denied 1.5, BCBS of South Caro-
lina denied 1.5, and Connecticut General denied 413.2.
See id. at 93; see also Stephen C. Gleason, Health System Deregulation: Some Aspects of Health Care
System Reform Need Not Be Held Hostage, 274 JAMA 1483, 1483 (1995); Wendy K. Mariner,
Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236
(1995).
This variability also has important implications for providers, who can be accused of fraud if
they provide and bill for "unnecessary" services. As pointed out by one commentator
HCFA has elected ... to allow each of its contractors to establish the medical neces-
sity guidelines and parameters that will be applied in its service area. Thus,
notwithstanding the national coverage "speed limit," HCFA allows-indeed, has en-
couraged--carriers and fiscal intermediaries to set up what are essentially "speed
traps" for the unwary by refusing to inform providers of local interpretations and pa-
rameters to be applied in processing their claims.
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just as the definition and practical implementation of "medically
necessary" can vary widely from one plan or geographic region to
another, so implementation can change quickly and quietly within
a particular plan. One major area in which an erosion of benefits is
particularly disturbing concerns interventions that restore or pre-
serve quality of life. These interventions provide comfort and
function, as distinct from the more dramatic life-and-death treat-
ments. People do not often die from untreated cataracts, for
instance, even if their lives are considerably disrupted by an inabil-
ity to see well enough to read or drive. Yet patients in some prepaid
health plans are significantly less likely to have cataract extraction
than patients in fee-for-service (FFS) plans.236 In like manner, reha-
bilitation once deemed standard is also under scrutiny. 37 Patients
with strokes may be discharged to nursing homes rather than to
rehabilitation facilities, with potentially less opportunity for
improved function.23s A plan may decide without prior notice that
epidural anesthesia is "unnecessary" for normal vaginal childbirth
because, after all, the pain is only transient. 239 In some cases, entire
medical disciplines are under economic pressure because they fo-
cus mainly on quality of life. They range from ophthalmology to
orthopedics, dermatology, mental health care, reconstructive plas-
tic surgery, and end-of-life care.240
Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and
Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 91, 102
(1999).
236. Less care does not necessarily mean worse care, of course, because the "artesian
well of money" fee-for-service system rewarded excess. But at some point, less is worse. See
Caroline L. Goldzweig et al., Variations in Cataract Extraction Rates in Medicare Prepaid and Fee-
for-Service Settings, 277 JAMA 1765, 1767-68 (1997); Stephen A. Obstbaum, Should Rates of
Cataract Surgery Vary by Insurance Status?, 277JAMA 1807, 1807 (1997).
237. See Adelson v. GTE Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1992).
238. See Sheldon M. Retchin et al., Outcomes of Stroke Patients in Medicare Fee for Service and
Managed Care, 278 JAMA 119, 122-24 (1997); James R. Webster & Joseph Feinglass, Stroke
Patients, "Managed Care, " and Distributive Justice, 278JAMA 161, 161 (1997).
In Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996), the insurer for a boy with
cerebral palsy refused to continue most of the coverage for his physical therapy, occupa-
tional therapy, and speech therapy because these would not improve the boy's condition.
Testimony that the services could preserve current function and prevent deterioration were
to no avail until a federal court overturned the insurer's denial.
239. See Edward Hirshfeld, The Case for Physician Direction in Health Plans, 3 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 81, 93 (1994).
240. See generally Daniel B. Borenstein, Does Managed Care Permit Appropriate Use of Psycho-
therapy?, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 971 (1996); Goldzweig et al., supra note 236; Clifford
Warren Lober, Dermatology: Positioned for Health Care Reform, 132 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY
1065 (1996); Paul S. Russell & LisaJ. Kaplan, The American Academy of Dermatology's Response to
Managed Care and Capitation, 132 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 1125 (1996); Robert K. Schreter,
Ten Trends in Managed Care and Their Impact on the Biopsychosocial Model, 44 Hosp. & COMMU-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 325 (1993); Robert S. Stern, Managed Care and the Treatment of Skin Diseases,
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As a health plan's (usually undisclosed) guidelines and thus its
specific benefits shift underneath the vaguely-worded contract, the
result can be a steady erosion in the plan's actual coverage. A sub-
scriber cannot know precisely what she has purchased in a health
plan. It may cover much less than she thinks, if administrators flesh
out the slippery "necessity" concept differently than she expects.
Where necessity is defined according to physician acceptance the
iteration of what "works" can change as fleetingly as the fashions of
consensus.2 4 1 Interestingly, when health plans shrink their iteration
of necessary services, patients rarely enjoy financial savings. Every-
one but the patient seems to benefit as health plans, employers,
and governments pocket the cash while patients endure greater
discomfort and reduced function. Even where the benefit cuts aim
mainly to avert premium increases, patients rarely have any voice
in the trade-offs. Unfortunately, as long as the deleted interven-
tions are dubbed "unnecessary," patients ostensibly are not being
deprived of anything important, and the underlying, value-laden
trade-offs remain unrecognized.
The notion of necessity also preempts choice. "Necessary" is an
imperative. As noted by an Ohio appellate court borrowing from
Webster's dictionary, it means: "essential, of an inevitable nature,
inescapable, predetermined, compulsory, absolutely needed, re-
quired; the general tenor is that the word imports something
which is indispensable or essential."242 In medicine, people other
than the patient make most of the important decisions regarding
what should be covered and what should not.
Up to a point this reasoning is valid. If the fundamental objec-
tives of health care are to save lives and preserve capacities for
function, medical science has much to say regarding which sorts of
care are essential, which are marginal, and which may actually
harm those goals. But this analysis is hardly definitive. Necessity
and effectiveness can only be defined relative to a goal.2 43 The
principle of informed consent holds that the patient, not the
health plan or the physician, should ordinarily choose the goals
132 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 1039 (1996); The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Con-
trolled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses
and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
241. See generally John F. Burnum, Medical Practice a la Mode, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1220
(1987); Joseph E. Hardison, To Be Complete, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193 (1979); James W.
Mold & Howard F. Stein, The Cascade Effect in the Clinical Care of Patients, 314 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 512 (1986); Edward T. Wong & Thomas L. Lincoln, Ready! Fire!... Aim! An Inquiry into
Laboratory Test Ordering, 250JAMA 2510 (1983).
242. Lockshin v. Blue Cross, 434 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
243. See Eddy, supra note 194, at 654-55.
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and, within certain parameters, the means of treatment.2 44 Removal
of cataracts may be "necessary" for someone annoyed by an inabil-
ity to do his favorite things, unimportant for someone who enjoys
her life as is, and pointless for patients in a permanent vegetative
state. The key question is whether a particular medical risk or
monetary cost is worth taking or paying in order to achieve a de-
sired goal such as possible prolongation of life, symptomatic relief,
or functional improvement.
In the healthcare context, calling an intervention "necessary"
usually means the health plan must cover it and thus that subscrib-
ers must pay for it in the purchase price. When "necessity" is
defined as "everything that works," people can be forced to pay for
care that many may deem excessive. 45 Combine these features with
the fact, noted above, that it is virtually impossible to know what a
plan covers, and it becomes equally impossible to select a plan on
the basis of what it does and does not cover. Consumers have virtu-
ally no control over what they buy.
B. Better Approach: Explicit,
Guidelines-Based Contracting
Instead of writing health plan contracts in broad terms such as
medical necessity, and then fleshing them out with a set of covert,
detailed-but-quietly-changeable clinical guidelines, health plans
should simply drop the elusive notion of medical necessity, open
their guidelines, 24 6 describe the procedures by which they adjudi-
cate disputes, and make these guidelines and procedures the
explicit basis on which they contract with enrollees.
The basic ideas behind such guidelines-based contracting have
been proposed by this author and by others, and thus will not be
redescribed in detail here. 24 For present purposes, it is useful to
244. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, 790 (D.C. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
245. For further discussion of the ways in which health plans commonly require sub-
scribers to purchase a level of care beyond what they might want, see HAVIGHURST, supra
note 56.
246. At least one state already requires a degree of such openness. NewJersey requires
that all health plans permit their participating providers "an opportunity to review and
comment on all medical and surgical... protocols.., of the carrier." Health Care Quality
Act, ch. 192, 1997 N.J. SESS. LAw SERV. 192 (West).
247. A number of commentators have challenged the way in which "medical necessity"
is used in health care contracting. However, many of them propose not to drop the concept
as recommended here, but to find a uniform definition alone or in combination with refin-
ing the procedural criteria by which health plans adjudicate uncertain cases. In other words,
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note several major advantages of such an approach. Once the
vagueness of medical necessity is replaced with the greater preci-
sion and clarity of open guidelines, the variation that already exists
among plans and their coverage will become more obvious. Less
costly plans may require a higher threshold of scientific validation
and cost-effectiveness before accepting costly new drugs or other
they retain the notion that health plans are all implicitly striving to provide the same kind of
care (the "necessary" care), but believe that the notion needs to be defined much more
precisely. David Eddy, for instance, proposes to replace the terminology of medical necessity
with an array of procedural criteria that could be used to consider the following: whether
the intervention in question is used for a medical condition, whether there is sufficient evi-
dence on which to draw conclusions about the intervention's effects on health, whether
there is evidence attesting to the likelihood that the intervention will actually work as in-
tended, whether the benefits of the intervention are likely to outweigh its harms, and
whether it is the most cost-effective available intervention. See Eddy, supra note 194, at 653.
Through this move, Eddy still looks for a one-size-fits-all approach to health benefits. He
seeks only to make that single set of benefits clearer by replacing necessity language with
procedures such as those he outlines. See id.; see also Bergthold, supra note 179.
Other commentators, including this author, propose that health plans should not collec-
tively attempt to define a single product. Instead, a diversity of approaches should be
accepted given that, as noted above, few interventions are "necessary" in any objective sense.
Rather, they are more or less desirable, toward this or that goal, with greater or lesser scien-
tific credibility. Once this is acknowledged, the health plan's task is to expose its own
particular approach to the trade-offs of medicine via opening guidelines and writing con-
tracts on that basis. See Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113; E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and
Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Patients into Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 89
(1996) [hereinafter Morreim, Diverse and Perverse]; Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note 40, at
47-52; Morreim, Contributive Justice, supra note 40.
Havighurst endorses the use of guidelines to spell out the details of health care contracts.
Because there are many.sets of guidelines now in use, enrollees would potentially have many
options from which to choose. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 56, at 222; see also Hall & Ander-
son, supra note 30, at 1689-93; Paul E. Kalb, Note, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling
Technology: A Private Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1123 (1990).
In a compatible vein, Hadorn proposes to eliminate medical necessity in favor of a de-
tailed description defining the most basic level of care, above which people could purchase
more elaborate plans:
Basic benefit plans would provide coverage for all and only legitimate health care
needs. 'Needs,' in turn, would be defined as services judged to have been reasonably
well demonstrated to provide significant net health benefit to patients who receive them.
Costs of care would not be directly considered in making judgments of necessary
care, but would be addressed indirectly by eliminating coverage for many services that
cannot meet the standard of demonstrated benefit. By restricting coverage to this
subset of currently provided services, basic benefit plans could realize substantial cost
savings while preserving patients' access to truly needed, basic care.
Defining necessary services in this way will require the use of a special type of clinical
guideline-'necessary care guidelines'-to depict the specific clinical indications for
which various services are to be deemed necessary, and therefore covered under ba-
sic-level plans. A complete set of necessary-care guidelines would then constitute a
basic benefit plan.
Hadorn, supra note 164, at xi.
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technologies, for instance, while costlier plans may offer a wider
array of options. Arguably, all plans should provide some reason-
able level of basic care-a point that will be presumed but not
defended here. Beyond that, plans would simply disclose what they
do and do not cover by basing contracts openly on their clinical
guidelines.
Once this information is openly available, purchasers will be bet-
ter able to compare health plans and to make choices that fit their
own needs, values, and priorities-just as they do with other impor-
248tant choices in their lives. They can reasonably expect, for the
duration of the contract, that they will know what they bought, and
it will not silently erode under the cover of vague language. This is
not to say that health plans must mail their entire compendium of
guidelines to every current or prospective enrollee, or that sub-
scribers must understand and affirm every clause of every guideline
before the contract is valid. That would be impossible and unrea-
sonable, and would go far beyond the level of information typically
required for other contracts exchanging complex goods.2 49 Rather,
each plan should provide a general description of its basic ap-
proach to benefits-its summary of plan benefits and its underlying
coverage philosophy' -together with an assortment of case illus-
trations to show how that philosophy is actually implemented. To
this the MCO can add information about how to inspect the com-
plete guidelines (such as visiting a website) .
248. See generally Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113; Morreim, Diverse and Perverse, su-
pra note 247; Morreim, Contributive Justice, supra note 40; Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note
40. Critics might respond that some people would make foolish choices that could cost them
their lives. In reply, such diversity does not preclude the setting of some reasonable basic
level, below which no plan would be permitted to go. See Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note
113; Morreim, Diverse and Perverse, supra note 247; Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note 40, at
47-52.
249. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 56, at 181.
250. Kalb proposes three tiers of care from which patients might choose, each of which
would represent a different resource philosophy and have its own set of guidelines. The
most basic level would encompass care that has been shown to be safe, effective, and cost-
effective. The next level would include interventions that, although also safe and effective,
are not maximally cost-effective. The top level might encompass innovative treatments that
have not yet been proven effective. See Kalb, supra note 247, at 1122.
Hall and Anderson propose a similar but broader set of tiers of health care, including
care that has been deemed safe, effective, and cost beneficial; care that is safe and cost-
effective; safe and effective but not cost-effective; safe and effective; safe but ineffective;
safety in doubt; and unsafe. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 30, at 1689-93.
251. Part VI will further discuss such variations among guidelines. In addition to disclos-
ing the guidelines' basic approach to care, it would seem appropriate for plans to provide
information regarding how their guidelines were created. Those based on science may have
a considerably different level of credibility than those created strictly by consensus of a few
invited physicians.
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Such openness might be expected to lead to improved guide-
lines. Part IV.A observed that many guidelines are not founded on
good science, and many physicians have noted that guidelines
sometimes make little clinical sense. However, once physicians and
the public at large can examine and critique various sets of guide-
lines, better research and improved guides might follow.
Health plans, for their part, might anticipate that their enrollees
would make more knowledgeable purchasing decisions. It will be
to MCOs' advantage if patients no longer expect that every plan,
regardless of price, provides exactly the same level of benefits.
More importantly from plans' perspective, guidelines-based con-
tracts can expect greater deference from courts. Contra proferentum
is difficult to invoke against clear and unambiguous contracts.
253
VI. MEDICAL PRACTICE AND CORPORATE MALPRACTICE
This Part will not study all potential legal causes of action against
254health plans for rendering inferior quality of care. As noted pre-
252. The typical consumer, of course, will not choose among plans by carefully scruti-
nizing guidelines. Most people, after all, would find such scientifically esoteric details
incomprehensible. But this does not preclude lucid descriptions of the basic ways in which
each plan chooses what it will cover and what it will not. As noted, supporters of this general
approach have looked to criteria like proven safety, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and the
like, to distinguish between plans' resource philosophies. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 56;
Hadorn, supra note 164, at xi; Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113; Hall & Anderson, supra
note 30, at 1689-93; Kalb, supra note 247; Morreim, Diverse and Perverse, supra note 247; Mor-
reim, Resource Limits, supra note 40, at 47-52; Morreim, Contributivejustice, supra note 40.
253. See Morreim, Contributive Justice, supra note 40. Relevant cases include: Barnett v.
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Insur-
ance Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Group Hospital & Medical Service, 3 F.3d 80 (4th
Cir. 1993); Loyola University v. Humana Insurance Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1993); Harris v.
Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995
F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 995 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1993); Farley
v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992); McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA
Corp., 953 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1992); Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 93-3711, 1993
WL 384498 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993); McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1064
(N.D. Ga. 1993); Arrington v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Service, 806 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C.
1992); Adnan Varol, M.D. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. Ala. 1988); Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729
P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); Wil-
liams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); and Gee v. Utah State Retirement
Board, 842 P.2d 919 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
254. Others have done so. See Chittenden, supra notes 11, 68. Chittenden's discussion
includes brief reference to health plans' and physicians' duties to disclose their cost-
containment and incentive systems. See Chittenden, supra note 11, at 483. Since that article
was written, other cases have supported this potential cause of action, at least in ERISA
cases. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No.98-1949 1999
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viously, the predominant avenues currently available are direct li-
ability (mainly for failure to credential and monitor physician staff
adequately, or for negligent design or implementation of the UR
process) and indirect liability (for the tortious deeds of employees
and ostensible agents).5 Rather, this part focuses on those cases in
which health plans have literally practiced medicine. Some recent
legislative actions appear to authorize placing medical malpractice
liability on health plans.2 5 Texas' law is the first and best known:
(a) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organiza-
tion, or other managed care entity for a health care plan has
the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care
treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an
insured or enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exer-
251cise such ordinary care.
U.S. Lexis 4742 (Sept. 28, 1999); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997); Negron v.
Patel, 6 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757
(D.N.H. 1997); McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F. Supp. 545, 551 (N.D. Ohio
1995); Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418 (Il. App. Ct. 1999); Nealy v. U.S. HealthCare HMO,
711 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1999). But see Ehlman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 20 F. Supp. 2d
1008 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
Sage and Helvestine also discuss liability. See Sage, supra note 68, at 173-75; Helvestine,
supra note 68. Hall likewise discusses theories of liability, including tortious interference with
advantageous relationships and fee-splitting. See Hall, supra note 8, at 460-502.
255. See generally Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Paterno v. Albueme, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. Col-
lege, 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp.
983 (E.D. Pa. 1990), Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990); McClellan v.
HMO of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547
A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(bringing an action against an insurer); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992). A recent case upholding both corporate negligence and vicarious liability claims
against an HMO is Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
256. This development is to be distinguished from earlier cases in which courts have
considered whether physicians acting in their capacity as MCO medical directors have prac-
ticed medicine. In Part ILA, three such cases were discussed: Murphy v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.
1993); and Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997). These
cases do not place malpractice liability on MCOs; their reach extends solely to physicians,
and inquires whether UM activities fall within the ambit of medical practice.
257. TEX. CIV. PRAc & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (West 1999). The statute continues:
(b) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other man-
aged care entity for a health care plan is also liable for damages for harm to an
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Since the Texas statute was enacted, other states including
Georgia 25 and Missouri25 9 have proposed or enacted similar provi-
sions. When the Texas statute was challenged on ERISA grounds,26 °
several features of the statute were held to be preempted by
ERISA.2 6 ' However, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas held that ERISA did not preempt those
clauses holding health plans liable for failing to exercise due care
when making treatment decisions,262 arguing that the statute refers
to the quality, not quantity, of the care rendered.262 Although this
Article will not elaborate on ERISA issues, the statute will assuredly
(3) ostensible agents; or
(4) representatives who are acting on its behalf and over whom it has the right
to exercise influence or control or has actually exercised influence or con-
trol which result in the failure to exercise ordinary care.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that this second source of liability simply places a legislative
endorsement on the vicarious liability health plans have already incurred for the misdeeds
of their employees, agents, and ostensible agents.
256. See Ga. H.B. 732, 145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999); Ga. S. Res. 210,
145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999).
259. See Mo. H.B. 335, § A, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (codified as
amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.505 (West 1999). The bill deleted the following subsec-
tion from Missouri Revised Statute section 354.505: "Any [HMO] authorized under
[s]ections 354.400 to 354.550 shall not be deemed to be practicing medicine and shall be
exempt from the provisions of Chapter 334, R.S.Mo." Id. As Garrison observes:
Concurrent with the elimination of this provision, H.B. 335 adds HMOs to the defini-
tion of health care provider under Missouri's medical malpractice statutes. It also
includes HMOs in the peer review protections of Chapter 537. The significance of
these changes remains to be seen. According to a bulletin issued by the Department
of Insurance, the Department interprets the amendment to Missouri Revised Statute
section 354.505 as making HMOs subject to medical malpractice claims. There are,
however, strong arguments that the amendment should not be interpreted to create
a liability that would not otherwise exist.
Garrison, supra note 33, at 782-83.
260. See Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (S.D.
Tex. 1998). For discussion of ERISA, see Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note 40, at 76-94;
Morreim, Contributive Justice, supra note 40, at 251-52.
261. For example, the court preempted those parts that established an independent
appeals process for coverage denials, forbade health plans to remove physicians because
they had advocated for patients, and forbade indemnification or hold harmless clauses. See
Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
262. The statute defines a health care treatment decision as "a determination made
when medical services are actually provided by the health care plan and a decision which
affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment provided to the plan's insureds or
enrollees." TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001 (West 1999).
263. See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 611-20.
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be relevant to non-ERISA plans, regardless how courts address the
ERISA issues."'
We turn to the question whether and how malpractice tort
claims might be applied to health plans' practice of medicine. As a
prefatory point it is useful to note that once health plans abandon
contractual reliance on "medical necessity" and embrace explicit
guidelines-based contracting, they will vastly reduce the extent to
which they practice medicine. In this revised setting the plan es-
sentially says "if you. purchase this plan, here is what you get: .... "
Immediately, most of the instances in which health plans are cur-
rently practicing medicine by making medical judgments will
become fairly straightforward matters of contract reading. The
plan administrators look at the relevant guidelines and conclude:
"see, here it is-you do(n't) get that." Where this is the case, the
plan is subject to standard principles of contract law, not tort mal-
practice law. When the plan wrongly fails to provide-what it clearly
was obligated to cover, contract law can provide surprisingly ade-
quate remedies.265
Not all contract interpretations will be clear and straightforward.
Even the best clinical guidelines cannot cover every possible sce-
nario. Sometimes they will be unclear about the case at hand, and
in other cases they may be contrary to a patient's interests and will
require a legitimate exception. As outlined in Part 11,266 this sce-
nario is a key instance in which an MCO will practice medicine.
Accordingly, before any malpractice claim can succeed, a plaintiff
must first show that the MCO was actually practicing medicine, and
notjust interpreting the contract. To recall the definition provided
267in this Article, practicing medicine involves two dimensions: (1)
making a medical judgment that (2) has a significant impact on
the patient's care and outcome. Both these dimensions require
further discussion before turning to the mechanics of bringing a
tort malpractice action against an MCO. Following that discussion,
the remainder of this Part will consider some of the distinctive
challenges that arise in bringing a malpractice action against an
MCO.
264. For further discussion of ERISA and health plans' liability, see Morreim, Resource
Limits, supra note 40, at 76-94.
265. See id. at 52-62.
266. See supra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 68-112 and accompanying text.
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A. Medical Practice
1. Making Medical Judgments-Clear guidelines that straightfor-
wardly apply to a particular patient do not require the MCO to
make medical judgments. If an otherwise healthy adult falls and
bumps his head, but experiences no dizziness or loss of conscious-
ness, a guideline might suggest a brief period of observation
followed by instructions for rest and reexamination if symptoms
change. If such a patient nevertheless demands a computed tomo-
graphy (CT) scan, just to be sure his headache does not signify
terrible trauma or a sudden onset of brain cancer, the MCO can
point to the guideline and declare "see-here it is: you don't get
that."
A well-crafted guideline will also provide alternate instructions
for common variations of the situation, as where someone has ex-
perienced loss of consciousness, double vision, or similar
symptoms. More broadly, guidelines commonly offer an array of
options, not just one-size-fits-all mandates. Such flexible guides
should adequately address the great majority of routine situa-
tions-and routine situations, by definition, represent the great
majority of cases.2
Where guidelines are sufficiently clear and applicable to the par-
ticular patient, there should be little need for discussion. 269 Note
that in cases where a guideline is quite clear in permitting a patient
access to a particular service or product, and the MCO nevertheless
wrongfully denies it, the plan is engaging in breach of contract, not
the practice of medicine. For instance, if the MCO's drug formu-
lary includes a particular medication the patient requests and a
UM clerk mistakenly says the drug is not on the formulary, then
the problem is a simple breach of contract.
268. If such guides are adequately disseminated, as by computer links with physician of-
fices, ideally there should be no need for physicians to contact health plans frequently.
Open guidelines should thus, at least in principle, ameliorate a significant portion of the
"hassle-factor" currently permeating many physicians' practices, as they or their staffs must
spend large amounts of time arguing with clerks about invisible edicts.
269. In another option for streamlining the process, health plans might leave the most
routine decisions to physicians and patients, and produce guidelines only for the costlier,
more complex situations where some measure of uniformity is more important. In such a
don't-sweat-the-details arrangement, cost-containment at these lower levels could be
achieved by placing patients under medical savings accounts or similar financial incentives.
Where patients and physicians have reasons to consider the economic as well as the medical
wisdom of proposed interventions, there is little need for health plans to intervene. For a
more detailed description of such approaches, see Morreim, Diverse and Perverse, supra note
247, at 105-18; Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113.
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At the same time, even the best guidelines will not cover every
scenario. If the head-bumping patient is a child who also happens
to have been gobbling up large doses of the anticoagulent (blood-
thinner) pills prescribed for her grandmother's heart condition,
the usual guidelines may be inapplicable becaise in this unusual
scenario there is an increased danger of intracranial hemorrhage
or other complications atypical of ordinary head-bumps. In atypical
situations the MCO must combine two types of reasoning.
First, because the "letter" of the guideline is insufficient, the
MCO must interpolate the "spirit" of the health plan's contract to
apply to the present situation. If the contract is a generous, no-
holds-barred plan, the MCO would probably have to approve what-
ever interventions would maximize the health and safety of the
patient, regardless of cost. If the plan is more conservative, and
generally restricts enrollees to the most cost-effective interventions
among those that are likely to preserve the patient's life and
health, the options will be more limited. In other words, it is one
thing for the patient to request a flexibility that can be legitimately
encompassed within the overall resource limits of the plan, and
quite another to ask for a clearly higher level of care. Although
MCOs' guidelines must be fundamentally medically sound, they
need not cover every conceivable benefit for maximally optimal
care. This periodic need to interpolate the spirit of the contract-
that is, to interpret ambiguities as the guidelines are implemented
in practice-is a standard phenomenon in contracts and contract
law. In this process, the MCO is not necessarily making any medical
judgments.
Second, a different kind of reasoning requires the MCO to dis-
cern, as it evaluates requests for outside-the-guidelines services,
whether the proposed care is likely to help the patient, or whether
some alternative would be as good or better, within the basic pa-
rameters of the plan. For these judgments the MCO must know
what the patient's current condition is, which kinds of intervention
have what probabilities of helping, with what risks, and other rele-
vant factors. A request for a costly drug that is not on the
formulary, for instance, will require information about what side-
effects the patient has experienced with the approved drugs, or
what symptoms indicate that these should not be tried, how likely
the requested drug will avoid such problems, and so forth. In such
situations the MCO is making medical judgments. These medical
judgments can be made well or poorly, with adequate or inade-
quate information, and with a good or poor understanding of the
clinical realities of diagnosis and treatment for people in this
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patient's situation. In this context MCOs will be rightly judged for
the adequacy of the factual and medical basis on which they made
their medical judgment.
2. Affecting Patient Care-Aside from making medical judg-
ments, practicing medicine requires that the judgment be
implemented and have a significant impact on care and outcomes.
To review briefly the discussion in Part 11,270 two elements are im-
portant.
First, the denied intervention must at least plausibly be owed by
the MCO to the enrollee. As noted,27' where the health plan clearly
does not owe an intervention, then even if the lack of funding
prompts a denial of care and ultimately an adverse outcome, that
outcome is not attributable to the plan. The MCO is no more re-
sponsible than any other bystander who also did not owe the
intervention. Undoubtedly, a significant area for litigation will
focus on the ambiguous cases where coverage is unclear. But with
reasonably clear guidelines instead of the fuzzy "medical necessity"
standard, these instances should occur less often.
Second, the denial of resources must have a significant impact
on decision making and thereby on outcomes. In many cases this
will be obvious. Health care is often very costly, and physicians,
hospitals, and other providers are increasingly reluctant to offer
services with no assurance of payment. But the bare fact that an
MCO has declined coverage does not, ipso facto, mean that the
patient will be denied care. If the patient is affluent, or the cost of
the service is easily affordable, or the denial only triggers a small
increase in copayment, or other sources of funding can conven-
iently be found, or providers are content to render care without
assurance of payment, then the MCO's denial is not necessarily
decisive. More important from the standpoint of ascribing liability,
an MCO's denial does not always mean a refusal of all coverage.
Where the MCO's denial means only a marginal diminution of
coverage-as when it pays eighty percent instead of ninety percent
of the intervention-then, analogous to analysis looking for pro-
portionate fault, the MCO may not bear as much causal
responsibility as it would have, had its decision been a complete
denial of all coverage.272
270. See supra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part II.C.
272. See Morreim, supra note 62.
273. In Adnan Varol, M.D. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich.
1989), a district court found that psychiatrists who had agreed to a managed care arrange-
ment and then found its terms intrusive were nevertheless contractually bound. The court
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For litigation purposes, courts may need to identify some gen-
eral criteria to guide decisions about whether a health plan's
denial of resources had sufficient impact on treatment decisions to
constitute a "substantial factor". The analysis could be tuned to the
individual in question, and inquire strictly whether that individual
could easily have gotten treatment despite the denial of coverage.
Or the analysis could inquire more broadly whether the "reasonable
person" would have deemed the influence significant. In either case,
the court will only inquire into this issue if it finds that the health
plan did owe the patient the coverage in question. If coverage was
not owed, then its denial was not a "substantial factor" in causing
the treatment decision, no matter how badly the patient needed
the treatment or the money.
B. Ascribing Malpractice
In the final analysis, then, MCOs can potentially be liable for
medical malpractice. But this is only so only where the MCO has
practiced medicine, and has done a poor job of it with the result
that the patient is wrongly denied coverage he should have gotten,
and the denial is a substantial factor in the patient's failure to
noted that even when authorization for services was denied, the providers still received most
of their fee:
[T]he Program in no way prevents providers from obtaining full payment even for
rendering services that are not concurrently reviewed or preapproved. If the treating
psychiatrist renders the service, that psychiatrist can still obtain 80 percent of his fee
directly from BCBSM and collect the balance from the patient. So the denial of ap-
proval does not have the effect plaintiffs have urged; it merely changes from whom
providers collect the 20 percent.
Id. at 833. Although in this case the court's reasoning applied most directly to physicians, it
also applied to patients, whom the physicians would expect to pay the difference. In the eyes
of the court, a reasonably affluent patient can make the copayment, while a reasonably af-
fluent physician can absorb the defaults of those who cannot.
In Long v. Great West Life &Annuity Insurance Co., 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998), a denial of
payment-authorization meant a far more substantial change in patients' cost-sharing, and
might be expected to have a considerably greater impact on decisions about the patient's
care. "Under the contract, surgery performed without authorization would result in a pay-
ment penalty. Authorized surgery was paid at 80% up to $5000.00 less deductibles and then
100% over $5000, while unauthorized surgery would only be paid at 60% for all costs." Id. at
825. Nevertheless, it might be noted in this case and in a number of others the patient actu-
ally received the treatment, paid out of pocket, and then sued afterward for these expenses
and other alleged damages. See also Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 455 (6th
Cir. 1998) (noting patient eventually underwent successful heart transplant despite insurer's
denial of coverage); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) (patient paid
for initial stages of autologous bone marrow transplant after payer denied coverage).
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receive the care he should have gotten, thereby precipitating an
otherwise avoidable adverse outcome. The criteria for ascribing
malpractice here, as elsewhere, are the usual tort criteria of duty
and breach, injury, and causation.
The latter elements will not be a focus in this Article. Questions
about the existence of an injury can be settled in the usual ways.
Given the definition of medical practice offered, at least part of the
causality issue will already have been addressed. In order to say that
the MCO has actually practiced medicine, one must already have
determined that the MCO made a medical judgment that affected
the patient's care. Establishing that impact, as defined in Part
II.C, 174 requires a determination that the MCO's denial of coverage
was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the treatment decision
that was actually made. A further causal inquiry must, of course,
establish that the denial, delay, or change in treatment, in turn,
caused the patient's injury. This, like establishing the existence of
an injury, is a routine task in malpractice tort litigation.
More interesting is the question what constitutes the MCO's
duty of care when it makes medical judgments. The issues are too
complex to permit exhaustive treatment here. But several observa-
tions can be made. To begin with, the usual way in which the
medical standard of care is set, by appealing to physicians' prevail-
ing practices, would not satisfactorily establish MCOs' duties. As
suggested in Part III, physicians' practices are not necessarily opti-
mal either medically or financially, and as argued in Part IV, MCOs
should have significant opportunities to shape the care their enrol-
lees receive. Indeed, this author has argued elsewhere that the
prevailing-practice approach to the standard of care is an anachro-
nism that must be dropped, even as the ruler by which to measure
physicians.27 5
Rather, health plans' duty of care in practicing medicine should
be understood as an obligation to bring sufficient knowledge, care,
skill, judgment, efficiency, and effort to their tasks-a duty of ex-
276pertise, as distinct from an obligation to deliver resources. In this
sense, health plans' duties must for technical reasons be a bit dif-
ferent from expertise duties owed by physicians. A physician has an
obligation to examine the patient carefully, for instance to listen
carefully and knowledgeably to heart sounds, or to use a scalpel
with precision so as to avoid damaging nearby tissue. Obviously an
organization such as an MCO cannot literally perform such hands-
274. See supra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
275. See Morreim, Resource Limits, supra note 40.
276. For further discussion of the distinction between expertise and resources, see id.
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on functions. Accordingly, the MCO's duty of expertise must be
drawn in terms of its judgments about the patient's medical situa-
tion, based on information it gathers from the attending physician
and other sources.
As the MCO makes medical judgments, its duty of care begins
with the obligation to obtain an adequate factual picture. The
MCO should avoid drawing conclusions and should seek further
information if it knows or suspects it does not have all the relevant
facts. 277 Further, the MCO's medical judgments should be based on
advice from sufficient numbers of physician-consultants with ade-
quate training in the relevant field(s). Thus, the MCO should not
make a decision about the effectiveness of lung reduction surgery
for emphysema by asking a dermatologist, nor should it ask a
family practitioner to guide its judgments about which interven-
278tions are appropriate for pediatric intensive care. 8 In the end, if
the MCO undertakes sufficiently careful procedures, its own medi-
cal judgments should be at least as credible as the attending
physician's. 79
277. Sorting out problems surrounding inadequate factual information can pose inter-
esting challenges. Where a deficit is due to an attending physician's recalcitrant refusal to
furnish the necessary information, then arguably the blame and liability for any resulting
adverse outcomes would shift to the physician. But reciprocally, where a health plan places
onerous administrative burdens on its physician staff, the blame and liability can shift back
toward the health plan. For further discussion, see id. at 64-67.
278. In a poignant case, a young California girl diagnosed with Wilm's tumor could be
cured with surgery. The operation is technically demanding, however, and can only be suc-
cessful if performed by a highly experienced surgeon. TakeCare Health Plan, the family's
HMO, insisted that the surgery be done by a general surgeon with no experience in this
particular procedure, rather than by the highly experienced pediatric surgeon whom the
family had requested. The child eventually received the surgery from the qualified surgeon,
and the HMO was penalized by the California Department of Corporations. See Hirshfeld &
Thomason, supra note 8, at 36-37. Quite possibly, the HMO's error in this case stemmed at
least partly from inadequate medical understanding and a failure to appreciate the need for
specialized surgical expertise.
279. This potential for health plans to make medical judgments that improve upon at-
tending physicians' judgments is rooted partly in the fact that so many ordinary physicians'
actual practices are not well-founded on scientific research. See supra Part IV.B. Numerous
researchers have documented that physicians' practices vary widely, without any particular
relation to patients' underlying illnesses. See Guadagnoli et al., supra note 140, at 573; Leape
et al., Practice Volumes and Geographic Variation, supra note 140, at 656 (supporting John
Wennberg's hypothesis that geographic variation in use of surgical procedures results from
referral and performance patterns in the area); Wennberg, Paradox, supra note 140, at 2568;
Wennberg et al., Hospital Use, supra note 140, at 1172 (describing study of Boston and New
Haven that found rates of hospital use gave no information on relative illness rates);
Wennberg et al., Invasive Cardiac Procedures, supra note 140, at 1161; Wennberg et al., Ra-
tioned, supra note 140, at 1185.
A practical example illustrating that MCO judgments might sometimes be better than in-
dividual physician judgments comes from a recent Sacramento case. The attending
physician for a woman with an ostensibly localized cancer of the cervix (squamous cell can-
cer in situ) wanted to treat her with a hysterectomy, i.e., removal of the entire uterus as well
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Aside from individual medical judgments, the guidelines them-
selves might be a potential target for malpractice litigation,
because MCOs must bring good medical reasoning to the process
whereby they select and modify their guidelines over time. This is
not to say that all plans must subscribe to the same guidelines.
There is wide latitude for differences among plans, because there
are many legitimate ways to make the risk-benefit and cost-value
tradeoffs implicit throughout medical decision making.280 But it
would be a mistake to infer that therefore every guideline is as
credible as any other. As noted in Part 111,2 81 many of the guidelines
in use today have little or no scientific foundation and precious
little medical credibility. Accordingly, the guidelines themselves
should reflect sound medical judgment.
2 2
as the cervix, even though her cancer appeared to be completely confined to the original
site. Humana, the patient's HMO, recommended an alternative. Removing just the affected
cone of the cervix would be not only less expensive, but equally effective in terms of remov-
ing the cancer and distinctly safer, with decreased risks of bleeding, adverse anesthesia
reactions, abdominal pains, and infections. If a pathologist's review of the removed tissue
showed that the cancer was confined to the excised cone, nothing further need be done; if
the review showed the cancer was not confined, a hysterectomy could then be undertaken.
See Tom Philp, When juries Play Doctor, Verdicts Can Be Bitter Pills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 9,
1998, at B7. The need for such decision making is evident in this regard:
When it comes to hysterectomies, hundreds of thousands of women have been saved
from needless surgeries by health insurers and medical researchers who had the
courage to challenge the practice patterns of doctors.
Back in 1975, when insurers rarely scrutinized surgery proposals, American doctors
performed 725,000 hysterectomies. Experts throughout the 1980s suggested that
many hysterectomies were not necessary. Doctors now perform about 150,000 fewer
hysterectomies every year. What's more, studies out of Dartmouth University have
proven that doctors in certain sections of the country are far more likely to recom-
mend surgery than doctors elsewhere. One's zip code rather than one's medical
condition can be a better predictor of whether a doctor will recommend surgery.
Id. Relying not only on its own physicians, but also on an independent panel, the MCO thus
offered a medical judgment that it deemed not just to be more consistent with the patient's
contract, but medically superior to the attending physician's opinion. As the case turned
out, the patient elected to follow her physician's more aggressive approach and paid $14,000
out of pocket for the hysterectomy. Pathological review showed that her cancer was confined
just to the cone of the cervix. Nevertheless, the patient sued the MCO and won ajury verdict
of $13.1 million. See id.
280. See Morreim, Diverse and Perverse, supra note 247; Morreim, Resource Limits, supra
note 40; Morreim, Saving Lives, supra note 113.
281. See supra notes 68-112 and accompanying text.
282. A classic example of a guideline once included in one major commercial set of
guidelines was marketed by the actuarial firm Milliman & Robertson to such firms as Cigua,
Prudential, United Healthcare Corp, U.S. Healthcare Inc, and others. See George Anders,
Limits on Second-Eye Cataract Surgery Are Lifted by Major Actuarial Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
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Tort evaluation in this area will once again focus largely on pro-
cedures. Relevant questions would include how the MCO chose or
developed the guideline in question-whether there is any scien-
tific basis, whether qualified physicians were invited to comment
on it, and how readily the plan will consider changes if clinical ex-
perience shows the guideline to be seriously flawed.
Overall, when health plans practice medicine the focus of tort is
on sufficiently careful procedures, a point that carries from the
narrowest to the broadest level: the plan must use due care to en-
sure that it has medically accurate, adequate information about the
patient; it must use due care to ensure that it has medically accu-
rate, adequate information about the patient; it must use due care
to ensure that its selection, adaptation, and ongoing revisions of
guidelines are medically credible. The focus is on the MCO's poli-
cies, its procedures for implementing them, and the care and
faithfulness with which it followed its own mandates.
CONCLUSION
The past decade has brought stunning changes in health care.
Spiraling costs have slowed or leveled, even if only temporarily. But
the price for that prized result was a measure of activism by health
plans that has deeply concerned physicians and sometimes fright-
ened the public. Although anti-managed care horror stories in the
media have undoubtedly been exaggerated or distorted at least
some of the time, some very real concerns have emerged concern-
ing the proper role that MCOs should play in the daily delivery of
clinical care. Simplistic answers will not suffice. It is not true that
every time an MCO declines to cover a proposed intervention it
has practiced medicine, let alone practiced it badly, or that it de-
serves to pay in tort just for disagreeing with a treating physician.
At the same time, neither should MCOs be permitted blithely to
escape accountability in those instances where they have truly prac-
ticed medicine, and done so in a substandard fashion. As proposed
in this Article, excellence in health care requires first that we de-
termine who, between health plans and physicians, should be
controlling which aspects of care. In such a framework, health
1994, at B6. The guideline regarding cataract surgery indicated that "'[aifter one lens has
been removed, removal of the other lens is only indicated in a relatively young person who
requires binocular vision for vocational function.'" Id. The flaws of such a guideline are as
obvious: a frail, elderly person attempting to descend a staircase needs binocular vision at
least as much as a younger working person. The guideline was eventually dropped. See id.
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plans should focus, not on micro-management, but on patterns of
care and on guidelines-based contracting that will sharply limit the
instances in which they literally practice medicine. Even so, where
MCOs do play doctor, they should be open to malpractice ac-
countability, right alongside physicians.
